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MODERN THEORIES OF THE FALL OF MAN AND ORIGINAL
SIN.

An examination of modern theories, with a view to determining how far these witness (a) to the modification of the orthodox Christian doctrines in the light of the general theory of evolution, and (b) to attempts to vindicate these doctrines in the light of that theory, together with a restatement of the doctrines in the light of the foregoing examination.

Thesis submitted to the University of Durham for the degree of M.Litt.

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February, 1949.

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I. INTRODUCTION.

1. Pre-Darwinian Christian thought about man: Agreements and Disagreements.

Before Wallace and Darwin presented to the world the results of their researches there was a fairly common idea amongst Christians about how man had been made. He had been created by God separately from the beasts. There was also a fairly common idea amongst them as to how he first sinned. He disobeyed what he knew quite clearly to be a command from God, by yielding to a temptation, the source of which lay outside himself. His yielding to the temptation was known as the fall of man. The source of the temptation was held to be a wicked angel who had been created good by God, who had, however, rebelled through pride, had been expelled from heaven, and had spent his time thereafter in seeking to seduce humanity.

There was, further, a fairly common idea about the results for mankind of this fall. Adam had been created originally righteous. Man's nature was now different. It was spoiled, weakened, or corrupted. Man was henceforth sinful from birth because of the nature with which he was born, and this sinfulness was called original sin.

There were differences of opinion concerning both the original state of man before the fall and the effects of the fall on his nature. These opinions ranged, in the case of

original righteousness from a conception of child-like innocence to that of a god-like perfection, and in the case of the effects of the fall, from the loss of a supernatural gift, and a weakening of nature, to a total corruption of nature.

There were differences, too, about the question of man's guilt and responsibility in relation to original sin, but, in the main, these ideas about the creation of man, his original righteousness, his temptation by Satan, his yielding or fall, and the consequence known as original sin, are still solidly entrenched in official Christian doctrine. The main change has been in regard to the method of creation. The old idea of special creation has been largely dropped, and the idea of evolution widely accepted.

2. Effects of the Theory of Evolution on Christian Thought.

The scientific theory of evolution was bound to make a disturbing impact on these old religious ideas. It told another story than the Genesis one about how man first appeared. In doing so, it appeared to contradict any idea of his original righteousness and to offer a different explanation of his proneness to sin, as well as to render unnecessary the thought of a personal devil. Man's animal ancestry was the hard fact against which these old ideas had to struggle, and it seemed difficult to reconcile fully the new knowledge with the old ideas about guilt and responsibility. Sin began to be seen

by some in a new light, and it was not long before disturbing implications seemed to be arising in respect of the doctrines of the Incarnation and the Atonement.

It is not unlikely that it is the sight of these far-reaching consequences of scientific discoveries, that makes many Christians draw back from the task of thinking out as fully as possible the relation between these ancient Christian ideas and the new knowledge about man's beginnings.

The obligation to relate old doctrine to new knowledge is too obvious to be either remarked or escaped, but it is especially incumbent upon any who claim that in their religion they possess the final revelation of God's truth to the whole world. Wherever it remains impossible to reconcile an apparent cleavage between the two, there is general loss. Outsiders harden in antagonism, and insiders either weaken through doubt or harden in arrogance.

3. The chief passages of Scripture relating to the doctrine of sin.

The chief passages of Scripture relating to the doctrine of sin are to be found in Genesis III and VI, in Romans V, VI, VII, I Corinthians XV, 21, 22. II Corinthians XI, 3, and in Galatians V, 16 - end. In Genesis there is the Paradise story in chapter III, the story of the lustful angels, the Watcher - legend as it is called, in chapter VI, 1-4, and the idea of the

evil imagination in chapter VI, 5 and VIII, 21. These three items constitute the Biblical material on which the post-exilic Hebrew mind worked as it sought to hammer out some explanation of the conflict between its conviction of God's goodness and its observation of the widespread nature of sin. The apocalyptic literature of the post-exilic-early Christian age is the fruit of that speculation.

The first of these stories to be fixed on as pointing to some event which was responsible for man's sad condition of proneness to sin was the story of the lustful angels. Man's wickedness was traced to an infection of human nature which was initiated by their (i.e. the angels') unholy unions with mortal women (I Enoch, VI - XI).¹ The fact that even after the deluge wickedness continued, may have been felt as a difficulty of this theory. (In I Enoch LXXXIX, 11, the author of The Visions speaks of Noah's sons begetting an unclean brood).² At any rate the writer of Jubilees abandoned the watcher-legend and fixed on the Paradise story of Genesis III as an explanation of man's wickedness (Jubilees III, 17-35).³

1. R.H.Charles. Apoc. and Pseudep. of the O.T. pp.191-195. Vol.ii

2. ditto. p. 252. Vol.ii.

3. ditto p. 116. Vol.ii.

It was this story which, owing to the later influence of St. Paul became the official fall-story of the Christian Church.

The displacement of the one story by the other was gradual, but by the time of Ezra 4, which probably dates from the last quarter of the first century A.D., the watcher-legend had disappeared. One significant point in it is that it reflects a tendency which emerged strongly in later Christian speculation viz., to regard man's proneness to sin as closely linked with lust.

Before we pass on to consider the Paradise story we must glance at the idea of the evil imagination. The doctrine of the *yēqer ha-ra'* arose directly from the exegesis of Genesis VI, 5, and VIII, 21. "God saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth and that every imagination (*yēqer*) of the thought of his heart was only evil continually." "The Lord said in his heart I will not again curse the ground any more for man's sake, for the imagination of man's heart is evil from his youth." In this latter verse the evil imagination seems to be regarded as a kind of excuse for human wickedness, as though it were part of man's essential constitution for which he was not responsible. On the basis of these verses there grew up the scholastic or Rabbinic doctrine of an evil impulse implanted by God in every human soul separately and individually, not in order to cause

man to sin, but in order to make moral virtue really possible for him by his own subordination of the impulse to the Law.

The doctrine was held sometimes in contradistinction from, sometimes in addition to, the popular idea of a fall of the race in Adam which was based on the Paradise story. An example of the former is found in 2 Baruch where the famous phrase occurs, "But each one of us has been the Adam of his own Soul" (LIV, 19.)¹ while an instance of the latter is in 4 Ezra (III f; VII. 46, 48; VIII, 35.), where the writer rejects the idea that the Law is a sufficient remedy for the evil impulse, and explains the empirical universality of actual sin by admitting that while Adam began with the implanted evil, he proceeded to fix and habitualise it by the Fall, and so made it hereditary for the whole race, it being henceforth communicated to posterity by physical propagation. There is one fatal objection to this theory, which, though it seems fairly obvious, was nevertheless nowhere faced by its upholders. It lays upon God the responsibility for creating evil, and in doing so strikes a blow at the very heart of ethical monotheism.

1. Op. cit., p. 512.

2. Op. cit., pp. 562-3, 585, 596.

Our Lord Himself made no specific pronouncements in regard to any of the three ideas which we have mentioned. He Himself was concerned chiefly to redeem men from the power of sin. Doubtless He held His own private belief about the circumstances in which sin came to have such a grip on the human heart, but we have little more from His lips on the subject than the parable in which He speaks of an enemy sowing tares among the wheat and a number of sayings expressing His belief in the existence and activity of demons. There is no means of determining with any degree of precision what theory of the origin of sin Christ held. It is to St. Paul that the Church has ever looked as her chief authority in this matter, and we have already remarked that it was he who raised the Paradise story to that position of eminence in the Christian world of speculation about the origin of sin from which it has never declined.

In view of the huge doctrinal edifice which has been built by generations of theologians on the story, it is as well to state at once as briefly as possible the results of the critical examination to which it has in recent years been subjected. There is no doctrine of original righteousness, in the sense of high moral and spiritual endowment, in the Genesis narrative. All that the story allows is, Adam was capable of being addressed by God, he understood divine

permission and prohibition, and when the first temptation came he sinned by disobedience. There is no record of Adam ever having been strong enough to resist temptation. At first he is like all other men. He has that in him which makes temptation possible. His fall seems to point to a proneness to self-seeking.

There is no basis in the Genesis story for asserting that any fundamental drastic change took place in Adam's moral ability or constitution after his sin. The image of God would seem to belong to man not only in his 'unfallen' but also in his 'fallen' state. (Genesis I. 26; V, 1,3; IX, 6.).

There is no doctrine of original sin in the story. The idea that the sin of Adam was the source of the sinfulness of succeeding generations or in any way an explanation of it is absent. The tendency to sin which is found in his children is in Adam right from the beginning. There is no difference between Adam and his descendants here. Abel, Enoch and Noah hardly support the idea of universal sinfulness. The story does not teach the fall of the race in Adam as the cause of the moral evil of Adam's posterity.

There is no necessary connection in the story as it stands between Adam's sin and man's mortality. The Scriptural text implies that Adam was created mortal, though he might have made himself immortal by eating of the tree of life even after his sin, and that it was in order to keep him mortal that God

placed the Cherubim at the entrance to the Garden. God's warning that death would follow disobedience need not be taken to mean that immortality would be replaced by mortality, but that immediate death (instead of death at some relatively distant date) would follow for one who had to die in any case. The fact that God's warning was not immediately fulfilled is a difficulty here, but it is also a difficulty that God should place the tree of life in the garden, if, independently of eating its fruit, Adam was supposed to be already immortal ! Logical difficulties of this sort, however, may not have appeared to the mind of the composer of the story.

In the text, as it stands, there is no suggestion that the serpent is Satan in visible form, or that he is indwelt by Satan, or that he embodies any personal principle of evil external to or other than himself.

The story suggests a fall only in the sense that Paradise was forfeited, the opportunity of obtaining immortality was lost, and man was bound to the servitude of hard toil. The connection between the first sin and man's subsequent hardship is not represented as being due to anything like an interior corruption or infirmity capable of being transmitted physically to offspring. Man's misfortunes are pictured as being due partly to the decree of a jealous God, partly to the conditions of life brought about by man's growth in knowledge. In this latter connection, perhaps the phrase "social heredity" might

be guardedly used. The idea that Cain was tainted with an innate bias to evil is based on Genesis IV.7, "if thou doest not well, sin coucheth at the door", - a text which, because of the uncertainty of its real meaning, cannot be made to bear the weight of any such idea.

The sex-motif is present in the story in that the immediate effect of eating the fruit is the sudden consciousness of nakedness, and the sense of physical shame.

By the time of Ben Sira, in the first quarter of the second century before Christ, the view was prevalent that physical death was the outcome of the first sin (Ecclus.XXV,24; compare also Wisdom II, 23,24.), while in 2 Enoch XLI (roughly contemporary with Christ) we find the definite idea that Adam's sin was the cause of spiritual death in his descendants.¹ In this we have the beginnings of a doctrine of original sin.

There also grew up gradually an exalted estimate of the state of man before the fall. Adam's attributes were added to as speculation developed, and the "original perfection" of man soon became an established belief. It is stated quite clearly in 2 Enoch XXXI., where the first man is described as "a second angel, honourable, great and glorious", "appointed as ruler to

1 op. cit., p.456. misquoted by Williams (p. 55..Bampton Lectures) as C.XL.

the earth, and to have God's wisdom." Probably this extra-Biblical idea underlies the passage in Ezekiel XXVIII, 11-19, where the future fall of the King of Tyre is likened to an expulsion from the Garden of Eden.

For the sake of completeness we can mention a variation of the story which is found in the Slavonic Enoch (XXXI, 6,), the idea that Eve was seduced by Satan who appeared as a serpent, and that as a result she contracted and passed on to her posterity an actual physical pollution. This is the theory of the inquinamentum, and it is reflected in 2 Corinthians, XI, 2, 3, and in I Timothy II, 14.

Such was the material or background of thought against which St. Paul worked out his own belief about the significance of sin in human life. The main positions which he adopted may be briefly summarised as follows: (a) Adam's sin communicated to his posterity physical mortality. "For since by man came death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead. For as in Adam all die even so in Christ shall all be made alive." (I. Cor. XV, 21-22). (b) It also communicated what can really be called original sin. "Wherefore, as through one man sin entered into the world and death through sin and so death passed unto all men for that all sinned. For until the Law sin was in the world: but sin is not imputed where there is no

law. Nevertheless death reigned from Adam unto Moses, even over them that had not sinned after the likeness of Adam's transgression who is a figure of him that was to come."

(Rom. V. 12-14). Though the difficulties of this passage are well known, it is nevertheless generally agreed that it does represent a causal relation between Adam's sin and subsequent sin and death. It is difficult to separate this language from the idea that there is in man some kind of hereditary spiritual disease, a sort of "unconscious suppressed sinfulness" which comes to the surface in acts of conscious sin when provoked by contact with the Law. (c) Such original sin, however, did not imply for St. Paul original guilt. "Sin is not imputed where there is no law." (Rom. V. 13.). This phrase is definitely against that idea. (d) Nor is there any trace in his writing of any clearly held belief in original righteousness. (e) The remedy for the condition of original sin was to be found in baptism (Rom. VI, 1-11.), though it was a difficulty not dealt with fully that converts to the faith including himself continued in sin after baptism. (f) The seat of this inherited sinfulness was the flesh. This was only so because of Adam's fall, and not because of any inherent evil in the flesh, as such, in a dualistic or Manichaean sense.

"I am carnal, sold under sin." (Rom. VII, 14.) "For I know that in me, that is, in my flesh, no good thing dwelleth." (Rom. VII 18.). "I see a different law in my members warring against the law of my mind, bringing me into captivity under the law of sin which is in my members. O wretched man that I am ! who shall deliver me from the body of this death? So then with the mind I myself serve the law of God; but with the flesh the law of sin." (Rom. VII. 23-25). (See also Galatians V.16)

(g) Evil permeates not only human but also sub-human and super-human life. "The whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now." (Rom. VIII. 22.). The idea that Nature was corrupted by the fall of Adam was present in the thought of pre-Christian apocalyptists, and was derived ultimately from the primal curse pronounced in Genesis upon the earth. St. Paul speaks of "the princes of this age." (I. Cor. ii, 8.), "the god of this age" (II Cor. iv. 4.), "messenger of Satan" (II Cor. xii.7.), etc., and it may reasonably be assumed that in his thought there lay behind the fall of Adam a more remote fall of spiritual beings. The passage II Cor. xi.3 (the seduction of Eve by the serpent) suggests an already corrupt tempter.

Such briefly is St. Paul's main thought about sin, and as such it passed down into the life of the growing Church to become the groundwork of doctrines which in some cases were

but the legitimate amplification of his own ideas, but which in others were developments far removed from his own intentions and desires. To the consideration of the two main streams of Christian thought on this great theme we can now proceed.

Note on Ephesians 11. 3.

"We were by nature children of wrath."

This has no reference to the doctrine of original sin. "By nature" (φύσει) means no more than "in ourselves," and "children of wrath" is a Hebraism meaning objects of Divine wrath. There is no suggestion of a hereditarily acquired sinfulness antecedent to actual sin. (See N.P.Williams, The Fall and Original Sin, note on p.113.).

Note on Romans V.12.

"for that all have sinned." The exegetical errors that were made in connection with this text are noted in the chapter on Augustinianism.

II. AUGUSTINIANISM

1. St. Augustine's views on Man summarised. x

St. Augustine based his reflections upon the fall of man mainly on a strictly literal interpretation of the Paradise story in Genesis. The substance of those reflections is to be found in what are called his anti-Pelagian treatises, and may be summarised as follows. Adam, in Paradise, was exempted from all physical evils, and endowed with immortal youth. The tree of life would have enabled him to transubstantiate his earthly nature into pure spirit, so that he would have passed painlessly from this life to the fuller life of heaven, without passing through the horror of physical death. His intellect was superior to anything since known amongst men. He had freedom in the sense that he was able not to sin (*posse non peccare*). A tendency towards evil did, indeed, exist in Adam, but only in a faint degree, just enough to make choice real when it had to be exercised. If he had remained in Paradise he would have begotten children, but in accordance with the dictates of reason, and without any excess of emotion. His will was confirmed in goodness by an implanted rectitude, a settled bias towards virtue, the equivalent of that character which the greatest saints have acquired through a life time of struggle. His character was

x For quotations see end of Chapter.

presented to him, as it were, ready made by His Creator, and he had no temptation, as we are tempted.

It is pointed out by Williams (The Ideas of the Fall and of Original Sin, p.363) that some scholars think that St. Augustine drew no distinction between what the schoolmen called *donum supernaturale*, and *pura naturalia*. Williams himself thinks it safest to conclude that St. Augustine never decisively made up his mind on this point, and that the germs of both opinions (the distinguishing between, and the identifying, the *donum supernaturale* and the *pura naturalia*) are to be found in his writings.

The malice of the first sin must thus have been infinite, for obviously Adam was given every chance of not sinning.

St. Augustine excused himself from giving a logically perfect conception of transmitted sin because of the difficulty of the subject. In his eyes, concupiscence is both sin and the penalty of our first fathers sin and it is more or less identified with sexual passion; hence, we are in a literal sense, born in sin, that is, in the sin of our parents. Baptism, while cancelling the guilt of concupiscence yet leaves us with concupiscence, and offspring are born with it plus the guilt of it, while all unbaptised persons are similarly guilty in the sight of God.

St. Augustine's language seems logically to contradict the idea of freedom. The condition of man after the fall is one of subjection to a *peccatum habendi dura necessitas*. Yet he refuses to admit that fallen man does not still possess free will. The *libertas* of the Paradisal condition (i.e. freedom to remain in Paradise and acquire the gift of immortality) has perished, but *liberum arbitrium* remains.

Yet man cannot be regarded as totally depraved in the Calvinistic sense, for in that everything is derived from God, it is, in a true sense, Good. Evil is therefore, not positive. It is a defect of goodness. So we find St. Augustine repudiating, as against Julian, the idea that human nature is essentially, not accidentally good (see *Confessions*. Bk.vii. Ch. 12).

The transmission of original sin (as *vitium*) is by way of biological heredity, and its communication, as *reatus*, is by seminal identity. Adam included in himself, in a real physiological sense, the whole of the human race, and St. Augustine vindicated this idea by reference to *Hebrews* vii, 9, 10. - where Levi is represented as paying tithes to Melchizedek, while still in the loins of his father Abraham. From this idea it follows that the whole of the human race is born subject to the penalty of hell, and it is only the inscrutable decree of God's predestination

that singles out those who are to be saved. The justice of this arrangement is not to be questioned. No virtue is possible in the unbaptised, and all such, including personally guiltless children, dying, are damned, though the punishment of unbaptised babes may be of the mildest kind.

2. Criticism of His Views.

(a) Original Righteousness.

The Augustinian form of the doctrine of original righteousness is no longer tenable in the light of our knowledge of man's primitive history. In the desire to rest wholly on the Bible narrative, St. Augustine committed the error of treating as literal history what can only be a mythological framework; even so, his picture of Adam goes far beyond what is warranted only by the words in Genesis, and what the earliest Greek fathers said about man's original condition as being one of infancy. The unfallen Adam can no longer be canonised as ideal athlete, philosopher, saint, for, as Schleiermacher said, the higher Adam is exalted, the more incredible becomes the fall, the greater becomes his resistance to grace and the stronger the tendency to disobedience which must be presumed to be already present in him.

Most scholars, while subjecting St. Augustine's thought

about original righteousness, original sin, and original guilt to considerable criticism have at the same time acknowledged the acute psychological insight that characterises much of his analysis of man's sinful nature. No one could reasonably disagree with that judgment. Yet it is strange that while his particular doctrine of the primitive state is criticised by some traditionalists as being inconsistent with the Bible narrative, with a considerable part of Church tradition, and with our modern knowledge of man's animal ancestry, it is rarely criticised by them as being morally and psychologically impossible. (C.S. Lewis and F.H. Maycock think the doctrine of a highly endowed spiritual state in the first man is not inconsistent with our belief in evolution. See Chapter 5).

It will be a main part of our argument that any high degree of ready made goodness would not be real goodness at all, that God was, in fact, under a moral obligation to create self-centred creatures at first, to make them gradually self-conscious, and God-conscious, and only then set to work to win them out of that self-centredness into God-centredness. We shall also seek to argue that any high degree of goodness would preclude not only the deception implied in the story of the serpent, but also the infinite

malice implied in the story of Adam's yielding. The terrible catastrophe, represented as the immediate consequence of a good man's first sin is, in reality, only conceivable as the cumulative result of years of sinning in a character that has deteriorated progressively. A creature as good as Adam, with the degree of nearness to God which he is represented as having possessed, would have been filled with self-loathing, would have repented, and would have sought and found reconciliation, as a Christian does now in Christ. It is the moral impossibility of what God is said to have done in creating Adam practically perfect, and the moral and psychological absurdity of Adam's action and its consequences that we would criticise.

We must not, however, anticipate one of our main arguments here. It is enough to note it thus briefly. We can see, however, why a writer like Williams, for example, does not criticise the doctrine of a highly endowed primitive state from this moral and psychological angle, for to do so would undermine his own doctrine of a similarly highly endowed world-soul.

There is one further point we must notice in concluding this criticism of St. Augustine's doctrine of the primitive state. On page 362 of his Bampton lectures N.P. Williams notes that J.B. Mozley, in drawing out the implications of the passage, v.61. in *Opus Imperfectum contra Iulianum*, concluded that Augustine believed there was a tendency towards evil in Adam

right at the beginning, only in a faint degree, but sufficient to constitute his Paradisal condition a state of trial or testing (J.B.Mozley Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination (1885) p.91). St. Augustine was here touching upon the vital root of the problem of all rebellion against God. He perceived that it was necessary to posit an already existing degree of self-adherence in Adam at the very beginning in order to make temptation possible. God must, therefore, have put it there, but He must be defended at all costs against any appearance of being responsible for sin through having implanted too high a degree of self-centredness. Hence, in St. Augustine's view, the degree of self-adherence which God must have implanted in Adam in order to make virtue as well as sin possible through choice must be conceived as being the tiniest possible. In taking up this position, St. Augustine and the many theologians who have followed him in it, blundered perhaps unavoidably but none the less fatally. The blunder was perhaps unavoidable in view of the idea of special creation: even the idea of a prenatal fall does not get rid of the real difficulty. In seeking to defend the character of God as love, they have in effect misrepresented it, since they have conceived of Love as being primarily concerned to make things easy for man. This is really what lies at the back of their idea of the tiniest

possible degree of self-adherence in the first man. That Adam sinned at all proves one thing, namely, that the degree of self-adherence in him was far greater than any degree of God-adherence. Moreover, however much blame may be placed on the serpent, Adam must have been self-centred in a manner somewhat like that in which Satan was self-centred for it was a desire to be like God that was appealed to by the Tempter. When a man can be tempted in this specific way he cannot reasonably be said to possess only a small degree of self-adherence, for it presupposes an advanced stage of self-centredness not unworthy of the name diabolical. If Adam's yielding to whatever degree of self-adherence he possessed can be called infinitely malicious, then that degree of self-adherence can scarcely be called infinitely small. The nature of Adam's self-adherence, which made such a temptation possible at all would be equivalent to that which we recognise as a highly advanced state of megalomania. God could scarcely have made Adam originally in that state!

It is the idea of God making man practically perfect that ought to disturb us not only because of the psychological absurdity of such a creature being tempted and yielding in the way described, but chiefly because of the implications involved regarding God's character. It is a misunderstanding of Love

which represents it as ready to be pleased with the obedience of a virtual puppet. God's way is to win the love of men, and He can scarcely be said to win what He creates practically ready made. God is really represented as a moral coward prepared only to take the slightest risk of being disappointed, preferring really to make man a puppet, and prepared to accept puppet worship, but arranging a tiny degree of self-centredness only as a kind of grudging admission that the ends of morality must somehow be served. What real freedom to be good would there be in a creature created with 99.9% of ready made goodness? What freedom would there be to please self in a creature created with 0.1% of ready made self-centredness? Far from any such idea safeguarding the conception of God's character as Love, it completely destroys it. Creative Love is under an obligation to give a creature every possible chance of refusing to respond with love: and 'every possible chance' means somehow weighting the scales heavily against the easiness of that response in the beginning, so that when love at last is born there will be no doubt about it being the genuine article.

Love can never force itself on any person, and for God to have created Adam already in Love with Him in any degree, without consulting his will and affections, would have been an obvious forcing of his love. It would seem that the reverse

of St. Augustine's picture would be truer to reality, viz. Adam created originally with a high degree of self-centredness, and with only a very slight tendency in any other direction. Enough has been said here to indicate the nature of this particular criticism. We shall return to it later in discussing the question of the relation between an initial high degree of self-centredness and God's responsibility for sin.

(b) The Doctrine of Original Sin.

St. Augustine's views have been criticised as being strongly coloured by Manichaeism. The idea that concupiscence is now something sinful in itself, cannot be held if we hold, as surely we must, that it is part of the original God-given human nature, and that our nature, as it came from God, was a good thing. Concupiscence, if it is the *fomes peccati*, is also the *fomes boni*, part of the morally neutral raw material of all character.

The Augustinian belief that "all have sinned in Adam", with the corresponding ideas of humanity as a sinful mass, and of sinfulness being inborn by reason of seminal identity, rested on a mistranslation, by Ambrosiaster, of St. Paul's phrase in Romans v.12, ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον as in quo omnes peccaverunt. The correct translation, given by the Pelagians and denounced by St. Augustine, was "propter quod". We may

notice here, what Williams has pointed out, that the slenderness of St. Augustine's Biblical foundation for his dogma is realised when it is pointed out that of his five great proof texts (Ps. li, 5, Job xiv, 4, 5. St. John iii, 5, Ephesians, ii, 3 and Romans v.12), three are mistranslations (Williams, op.cit. p.379).

(c) Freedom.

The difficulty of St. Augustine's language on this subject has been recognised by many writers. His position really resolved itself into a belief that the will of fallen man is free, but it always only freely chooses evil under the influence of concupiscence. We may be free to do what we like, but we are certainly not free to like what we ought. His difficulty really sprang from wishing to keep freedom in order to preserve man's responsibility for actual sin yet wishing to reject it to make way for the idea of irresistible grace. The result was much verbal subtlety which only had the effect of denying free will in any except an abstruse and unnatural way.

(d) The Doctrine of Original Guilt.

This doctrine has been so widely criticised and rejected, and the criticisms seem so obvious and unanswerable that it is impossible to add anything substantial to them. Williams (op.cit. p.381) says it is not necessary to do more than point

out the absurdity of a theory which asserts that "human beings are held responsible by an all-just Judge for an act which they did not commit, and for physiological and psychological facts which they cannot help." The theory of seminal identity "needs no serious refutation", and "no verbal manipulation of the 'universal' of human nature makes it just to punish a man for a sin alleged to have been committed several milleniums previously by another man." F.J.Hall has said (Creation and Man, c.ix) that the theory can be dismissed as an accretion to Catholic doctrine which requires no defence at all. R.S. Moxon has called it a shocking travesty of the Catholic faith (the Doctrine of Sin, p.106), while Roman Catholic theologians have distinguished between individual and personal guilt, allowing that human nature as such is guilty of the sin of Adam, but the individual is not guilty. (God and the Supernatural, ed. Cuthbert; C.V. The Problem of Evil, by E.I. Watkins, p.150). J. S. Whale has remarked that the theory is contrary to reason and morality, and is incompatible with our modern conception of individual personality and a realistic view of sin (The Christian Faith, ed. Matthews, pp.122-3).

(e) The Doctrine of Election.

Perhaps the most cogent criticism of this Augustinian doctrine comes from Karl Barth, who finds in it a determinism

by which God appears to make Himself the prisoner of His own predestination. Election is not a determinism, a mystery lying behind the gospel and threatening its nature as a gospel: it is rather the sum of the gospel; it is a decision of God's grace to choose man, every man, unless a man finally refuses, and even in hell he will not be beyond the grace of God. Even the reprobation of a man would be grounded on God's grace, since He has not two wills but one.

The determinist doctrine of predestination was based not on Jesus Christ as the completion in time of God's original purpose and decision to save all men, but on a secret decree of God before the worlds began. It went behind Christ, and found a basis for ethics as for theology, in an absolute decree of God, which could only be known, so far as it could be known, in its reflection in natural law. Barth rejects any absolute decree which is not identical with the concrete decree of God in Jesus Christ for man's election. It is difficult to see how this criticism could be rebutted. (see "Reformation Old and New", ed. Camfield, pp.106. 118.).

(f) Sin The Punishment of Sin.

St. Augustine's statement that sin is the punishment of sin has been criticised by R.S.Moxon (The Doctrine of Sin, p.106) as illogical, unjust, irreverent. It is illogical because it

fails to explain the first sin, and also because it creates a chain of cause and effect, necessarily endless and irremediable. It is unjust because the punishment falls on innocent heads. Man is compelled to sin, and is punished for undergoing punishment. It is irreverent because God is made to appear responsible for sin's continuance.

QUOTATIONS FROM S. AUGUSTINE'S WORKS RELATING TO
ORIGINAL RIGHTEOUSNESS, THE FALL, and ORIGINAL SIN.

1. Adam in Paradise exempted from all physical evils;
(de Gen. c. manich. ii. 8.).
2. The gift of immortality within his reach;
(de Gen. ad litt. vi. 36.).
(op. imperf. c. Iulian. vi. 39.).
3. The tree of life would have precluded the necessity of
physical death;
(de Gen. ad. litt. ix. 6.).
4. Adam's great superiority of intellect;
(op. imperf. c. Iulian. v. I.).
5. Adam able not to sin as well as able not to die;
(de corrept. et grat. 33.).
6. An original faint tendency to evil in Adam;
(op. imperf. c. Iulian. v. 61.).
7. The begetting of children in Paradise would have been
without excess of feeling.
(de nupt. et concup. i. I, 6, 7, 8.).
8. Adam's will confirmed in goodness: a settled bias
towards virtue;
(op. imperf. c. Iulian. v. 61.).
9. The malice of the first Sin infinite.
(op. imperf. c. Iulian. i. 71.).
(enchirid. xlv.).
10. The vitium of original sin is the tyranny of
concupiscence: it is both sin and the punishment of sin.
(de pecc. mer. et rem. ii. 36.).
11. The act of begetting a child stains it with original sin;
(de pecc. mer. et rem. i. 57.).
12. Baptism cancels the reatus of concupiscence, but
leaves the actus in existence;
(de nupt. et conc. i. 29.).

13. Free will drastically affected, seemingly abolished;
(enchirid. 30.).
(de perfect. iust. hom. 9.).
14. Evil is nothing positive, only a defect in goodness;
(de nat. boni 17.).
15. Human nature only accidentally, not essentially, evil:
(op. imperf. iii. 190.).
16. Levi seminally shared in the payment of tithes to
Melchisedek;
(op. imperf. c. Iulian. i. 48.).
17. Predestination to hell the penalty for original sin;
(de civ. Dei. xiii. 14.).
18. Humanity a lump of damnation;
(enchirid. 26, 27.).
19. Virtue impossible in the unbaptised;
(c. Iulian. Pel. iv. 17.).
20. Personally guiltless infants doomed to eternal fire;
(op. imperf. c. Iulian. iii. 199.).

III. THOMISM.

1. Summary of the Thomist Position.

The position of St. Thomas Aquinas can reasonably be called a modified Augustinianism. St. Augustine's distinction between nature and grace was hardened by logic into the famous scholastic distinction between Adam's *pura naturalia* (human nature, as such), and the *donum superadditum*, or *supernaturale*, or *indebitum*, (the supernatural gifts of 'original perfection'). According to St. Thomas, the *pura naturalia* were necessary if God was going to make a man at all, but the *donum supernaturale* was a gift which God was under no necessity to bestow upon man. If man had remained unendowed with the *donum supernaturale* he would still have attained to a certain natural knowledge of God. If Adam had resisted temptation he could have passed on into the purely heavenly life without having to face the ordeal of physical death, and would have enjoyed the benefits attaching to the primitive state as they were described by St. Augustine.

The infinite malice of the first sin was assumed by St. Thomas, and its main effect was the immediate loss of the supernatural endowment. Original Sin is, formally, the lack of original righteousness, and materially, inordinate concupiscence, and hence it is more than a mere lack or deprivation of gifts or graces once possessed. It is a real corruption of the *pura*

naturalia, in the sense that they are subject to a disorder which need not have happened.

St. Thomas held that original sin involved guilt, but instead of the idea of seminal identity he used the idea of 'Motion'. The concupiscence which accompanied the act of generation was said to stain the resultant offspring with original sin. Sanctifying grace communicated through baptism was said to abolish the guilt of original sin, but it left concupiscence still existing, no longer as sin, but as the *fomes peccati*.

So far as freedom in fallen human nature is concerned, St. Thomas's view was practically the same as that of St. Augustine. He held that God was the prime cause of all motions of the human soul, even those we call free. No real change in this connection was introduced by the fall, - man was just as much a puppet in the hands of God as before the first sin. Yet the will remains 'free' for "God moves the human will in such a manner that its motion remains contingent and not necessary."

As regards the fate of unbaptised children, St. Thomas took a milder view than the Augustinian one. He adopted the Pelagian idea of the *limbus puerorum*, and for this purpose he regarded original sin on its negative side. Lack of the *donum superadditum* here meant lack of the Beatific vision there. Infants in this state enjoyed a purely natural happiness. Like

the righteous pagans in limbo they were content without the Beatific Vision.

2. His Views Criticised.

(a) The Doctrine of the Donum Superadditum.

The doctrine of the donum superadditum is open to the same criticisms as were levelled against the Augustinian idea of man's primitive state. It is not warranted by the language of the Biblical narrative, and it cannot be reasonably maintained in view of what is now widely delived to have been the lowly state of man's beginnings. Can we really believe that, if St. Augustine and St. Thomas had known then what Darwin and succeeding scientists have discovered, they would have persisted in the belief that one moment in the story of evolution there was a self-centred anthropoid, the next a highly developed saint? The doctrine involves the idea of the fall in the same moral and psychological difficulties as already noticed in the case of Augustinianism. We shall deal later with modern attempts to vindicate it in the light of a belief in evolution (see C. iv & v). Meanwhile we have to notice the following further points of criticism. Haering (The Christian Faith, English transl. vol. i. p. 315) traced the view of the donum superadditum to trifling with the Hebrew words in Genesis 1.26. On this point Niebuhr says that Irenaeus distinguished between the image and the likeness of God on the basis of Genesis 1.26,

a distinction which persisted in Christian Tradition until the Reformation questioned its exegetical validity. According to Irenaeus the fall destroyed the likeness but not the image. Luther was right in rejecting the theory from the standpoint of exegesis. The original text "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness" is no more than a common Hebraic parallelism. (Nature and Destiny of Man, vol.1.p.286). Niebuhr then criticises the doctrine as follows. "The doctrine of a *donum supernaturale* given to man beyond his natural endowments and lost in the fall leaving him thus with his natural virtues unimpaired, is very confusing. Ostensibly it is a supernatural virtue which is destroyed, but the capacity for it is the same as that which leads to sin, namely, man's self-transcendant spirit. The structure of man is therefore altered after the fall. He has become an essentially Aristotelian man. He has a capacity for natural virtue which is subject to the limitations of man immersed in finiteness. He lacks the capacity for the eternal. If this were true he would also lack the capacity for the sinful glorification of himself." (p.292).

Niebuhr's criticism may be expanded thus. The whole idea of a supernatural gift which God was under no obligation to give to man, which was not owed to man, is mechanical, artificial, unchristian. It breeds, and is built upon, the idea that God, while being Perfect Love, could have created a creature capable

of apprehending Him to a certain degree, and yet could have left him in that imperfect state without doing anything unworthy of Love. God is thus conceived too much after the fashion of a merely munificent Oriental potentate, whose essential nature would not be contradicted by withholding a gift that would benefit a creature who had done nothing to deserve its being withheld. God has to be conceived as the Father who could no more withhold a gift which it was possible and good to bestow, than He could murder each child deliberately. If it was God's eternal purpose to create man and bring him into the blessedness of heaven, then it is meaningless to talk about God not being under an obligation to bestow the gift that would alone make that possible. It would have been a sheer contradiction of love to have withheld it. Anything which is said to have been done by God, cannot be said to have been unnecessary, nor when God has done it can it be said He was not under an obligation to do it. God is always under the obligation, - the self-imposed obligation of Love, - to be true to His own nature. The misunderstanding is clearly shown when the donum is called indebitum, as though it were a work of supererogation, as though there were a limit of love beyond which the love of God need not pass.

(b) The Doctrine of Sin as Defect.

So far as the Thomist teaching, about evil consisting in the absence of some actuality or perfection which belongs to the

full and proper nature of a particular thing, is concerned, we can notice the following criticism adduced by O.C.Quick (the Gospel of the New world pp.22,23). Evil when identified with privation is nothing positive or actual; it remains no more than a certain kind of incompleteness or lack. Four things can be said about such a view. First, "We must beware of confusing any particular defect or lack with the results of which it is the cause or condition sine qua non. A disease may be occasioned by a mere defect in bodily health, which lowers the body's power of resistance. It does not follow that the disease itself is a mere defect in health: on the contrary it is something positive." Secondly, Adam as first created can have lacked nothing that belongs to the perfection of human nature. How then, on St. Thomas's theory, is his fall to be accounted for? "St. Thomas commits himself to the assertion, "Malum quod in defectu actionis consistit semper causatur ex defectu agentis." (Summa theologica, Ia, Q.49, Art 2) But what defect can there have been in Adam to cause the action by which he fell? Thirdly, if sin were a mere lack or privation, "all that men could require for deliverance would be the supply of that which they lack or have been deprived of. If, however, men need forgiveness, conversion, new creation, then their need is other than a mere gift of something which the recipient has not." Fourthly, if all evil is privation of being, it follows that "the greater the evil, the less being in

the human soul," and so "souls which are finally lost must be annihilated." But St. Thomas believed that the soul is immortal by nature, so presumably he would hold that "it can only be invaded by evil up to a certain point, and that a lost soul would retain only what was necessary to its existence. In that case it would be difficult to see how the existence of a lost soul could be said to be in itself good, and the soul good in so far as it exists."

(c) Freedom.

The difficulty of St. Thomas's position in regard to freedom is the same as that in regard to St. Augustine's. Man seems to be wholly determined by God, yet to retain freedom of will. St. Thomas is content to leave the question like this, a virtual declaration that psychological freedom can co-exist with metaphysical determinism. He meets the objection that God would thus seem to be the author of sin by referring to the idea above criticised, viz, sin is a defect and as such can never be conceived as caused by the author of all being.

(d) The Idea of Limbo.

We may add here a few reflections on St. Thomas's idea of unbaptised infants resting in a state of natural happiness in Limbo. If souls exist at all, it is difficult to conceive of them as remaining static in the sense that they neither grow nor retrogress while being objects of God's love. Whether baptised or not they are the objects of God's love, and so it is surely

reasonable to conceive of an equivalent to baptism in the next world and of a process of growth in the Church there, or of deterioration, as in the case of baptised souls here. It is extremely difficult to conceive of God being responsible for an arrangement whereby souls are deprived of the possibility of the full Beatific Vision in the next life because of some accident in their physical or mental state here. The fact that they would be ignorant of the Vision, or that they would not suffer consciously in any way, does not somehow affect the real question, which is one of God's love.

It is a mechanical and artificial view of life which sees the event of physical death as the end to all real progress and growth for all souls, which sees our capacity to enjoy God through all eternity doomed to remain at the level attained at the moment of physical death. As a child's soul would have developed here on earth had it lived, so surely it will develop in the beyond until by God's mercy it enjoys Him fully or by its own sin rejects Him and passes forever into "the outer darkness."

Wherever a soul is, whatever its condition, it is the object of God's love. God is active towards it, and that means He is continually seeking to remove all hindrances to its full enjoyment of Himself. The incentive towards missionary zeal provided by the old doctrine of the unbaptised and heathen being doomed to deprivation of the Beatific vision is not damaged by a

doctrine of the eternal progress or retrogression of all souls, for the pain and difficulty of repentance at any stage of alienation from God are too well recognised by Christians not to provide such incentive.

The New Testament certainly suggests the idea that the Judgment is concerned chiefly with deeds done in this life, and that our state on the other side of death depends much on the state of our relationships here, but the obviously speculative nature of the question permits of further meditation. The main difficulty in it centres around the question of the nature of spiritual life. It is extremely difficult to conceive of a soul remaining at the same level of spiritual life through all eternity, which is what is involved in the idea of Limbo. Even those who may be said to enjoy the Beatific Vision cannot be conceived really as having reached the full end of all spiritual attainment. Such an idea would involve that of a created soul having exhausted the glory of the Being of God in contemplation and Communion and enjoyment, and this is finally incompatible with the idea of the infinity of that Being. Even the greatest saint cannot be conceived as having reached, in his earthly pilgrimage, anywhere except the dimmest outer fringe of the glory of the Triune God, and shall the incident of physical death suddenly immobilise his spirit in its onward, upward progress, limiting it in its capacity for the enjoyment

of God through all eternity to that stage of development reached during an infinitesimally small 'moment' in eternity, which we call mortal life?

Is it really possible for a Christian to conceive of any soul persisting through all eternity not knowing God, or knowing Him imperfectly, and God being satisfied with such a state of affairs? It can scarcely be said that such an idea represents the summing up of all things in Christ, the final glory of God, or the perfecting of creation. Rather it reflects incompleteness, disharmony, failure. If we are to conceive of an end, it must be a perfect end, with no incompleteness, no reflection on God's inability to bring all at length to the full enjoyment of Himself. Limbo is in the end, more of a liability than an asset to a theology which seeks to hold at its centre the ideas of Eternal Love and the ultimate triumph of that Love over all.

QUOTATIONS FROM THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA OF ST. THOMAS
AQUINAS (TRANSLATION BY THE FATHERS OF THE ENGLISH
DOMINICAN PROVINCE) RELATING TO ORIGINAL RIGHTEOUSNESS,
THE FALL, and ORIGINAL SIN.

1. The supernatural splendours of original perfection.
(Part I, qq.xciv, xcv) (Vol. 4, pp. 305 ff.)
2. Mankind's condition had Adam never fallen.
(Part I. qq. xcvi - ci.). (Vol. 4. pp. 335 ff).
3. Adam (moves' his descendants to sin by begetting them.
(Part II, first part, q.81, art.3.). (Vol.7. p.409.).
4. Man just as much a puppet in the hands of God after as
before the Fall.
(Part I, q.83, art.1. Misquoted by Williams as art.2.
on p.404 of his Bampton Lectures). (Vol.4. p.149.).
5. Yet God moves the human will so that its motion remains
contingent and not necessary. (Part II. first part,
q.10. art. 4.). (Vol. 6. p. 141).
6. God yet cannot be said to cause sin, for sin is a defect.
(Part II, first part, q.79. art.2.). (Vol. 7. p.389).
7. The primitive state was one of supernatural grace.
As soon as man disobeyed God, he forfeited the grace.
(Part I, q.95, art.1.). (Vol. 4. p.318).

IV. MODERN AUGUSTINIANS.

We can now look at some modern representatives of these two different schools of thought and see how they defend their views. We can take the Protestant school first.

1. Reinhold Niebuhr.

Niebuhr's aim is to hold together what he considers to be the essential truths of the Catholic and Protestant positions, and to reject what he considers to be the errors in both. Against Protestant thought, for example, he maintains that the image of God is preserved in spite of human sin, and in distinction from Catholic thought he eliminates the distinction between a completely lost original justice and an uncorrupted natural justice. (The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol.1.p.292).

He rejects the historical literalistic illusion by which original righteousness and the fall have been traditionally relegated to a remote historical period, and conceived of only in connection with the first man. "The fall", he says, "is a symbol of an aspect of every historical moment in the life of man" (ibid, p.285) "The later individual is not significantly differentiated from the first man". (quoted from Kierkegaard, Begriff der Angst, (p.105) ibid p.280) "There is no historical period to which we can assign original righteousness" (ibid p.293). "Perfection before the

fall is perfection before the act." (ibid p.294). What Adam did and what he was are symbols "for the whole of human history." (p.296).

Niebuhr believes that original righteousness is present to sinners always and only by way of the perception of an ideal. In the moment of self-transcendence (illustrated by Romans vii, 14,17), sinful man perceives the terrible contrast between what he is and what he ought to be (p.295). The content of original righteousness as this is perceived by sinful man is perfect faith, hope, and love, "the virtue of the soul's perfect communion with God." (p.302). The question arises, does Niebuhr believe every man was once originally righteous, before his first significant action? "Adam's sinlessness preceded his first significant action and his sinfulness came to light in that action". p.296). He would seem to argue that the first significant action of every man is a sinful one, and henceforth original righteousness is present only as a sense of something lacking (p.306). What was every man before becoming a sinner? Was he just innocent after an a-moral fashion, or was he positively, actually, originally righteous, in a state of faith and hope and love?

At the beginning of his chapter on original righteousness, Niebuhr quotes, with apparent approval, Pascal's words about man's greatness being proved by his wretchedness. "Man's

nature now being like that of the animals, we recognise he has fallen from a better nature which was once his. For who is unhappy at not being a King except a deposed King?"

(Pascal's *Pensées*, par.409. quoted by Niebuhr on p.281).

Niebuhr then goes on immediately to speak of man's "memory" of a previous condition of blessedness. He repeats this expression (p.310), and, combined with other language about the contrast between man's true nature and what he has become, together with the idea that original righteousness is not completely lost, this would seem to suggest that he believes that every man was once, even though only for a very short moment (see p.296), what he now knows he ought to be.

It is Niebuhr's analysis of the pre-fall condition of man, however, which seems to cancel out any idea that man could have been originally righteous. There would thus seem to be two inconsistent strands of thought here. Let us look at his analysis of man's pre-fall condition, and see how it militates against any idea of original righteousness.

One hesitates to accuse a writer like Niebuhr of a careless use of terminology, but his language expresses two contradictory ideas about man's pre-fall condition, viz. (a) that the human situation of finiteness and freedom, of which anxiety is an inevitable concomitant, is not, in itself, a temptation, and (b) that the human situation, in itself, is

a temptation. Here are the relevant quotations. First of all he says, "The situation would not be a temptation of itself, if it were not falsely interpreted by the devil" (p.194).

"The idea that the situation of finiteness and freedom is a temptation, once evil has entered it, and that evil does enter it prior to human action, is expressed in Biblical thought by the conception of the devil" (p.269). These statements plainly imply that the human situation is not, of itself, a temptation to sin.

He also says, however, "Anxiety" (which is part of the situation) "is the internal description of the state of temptation". (p.195), and "Anxiety, as a permanent concomitant of freedom is....a temptation to sin" (pp.197,198), and "the temptation to sin lies, as previously observed, in the human situation itself". (p.266). These statements plainly imply that the human situation is of itself, a temptation to sin.

There is a further instance of this confusing use of language. He says "anxiety alone is neither actual nor original sin" (p.266) and anxiety "must not be identified with sin" (p.195). He also says, however, "Man could not be tempted if he had not already sinned." (p.266). If, however, anxiety is of itself a temptation, then it must mean, according to this argument, that man must have sinned already.

Since, however, anxiety is a permanent concomitant of the human situation, sin must be equally a permanent feature of it. If, on the other hand, anxiety is not of itself a temptation, but temptation only comes through the devil misinterpreting the situation, then equally man must have sinned before the devil misinterpreted the situation, and so likewise sin would seem to be a permanent element in man's make up.

Niebuhr, moreover, drafts into the concept of anxiety a "tendency towards sinful self-assertion". "It is possible that faith would purge anxiety of the tendency towards sinful self-assertion" (p.195). Now if anxiety is a permanent concomitant of the human situation of finiteness and freedom, and if a tendency towards sinful self-assertion is always present in anxiety, it means that a tendency towards sinful self-assertion is an original element in human nature. A tendency towards sinful self-assertion can scarcely be called a good thing. It is a different thing from a tendency towards self-assertion. Nothing, however, that is original in man, is a bad thing. An original tendency towards sinful self-assertion, present even before the devil's temptation, suggests there is something of sin in man from the beginning. Nothing that is original in man, however, can be called of sin.

There is this further observation. Since this tendency

towards sinful self-assertion is present in the human situation itself, before those conditions are created which constitute original sin, viz. the human situation, plus the fact of sin, plus man's own first actual sin, (see p.270) then it means there was a tendency towards sinful self-assertion before there was original sin, one single yielding to which would establish it as an irresistible tendency. Any tendency of nature which can be conceived as requiring but one act of choice in order to establish it as a permanent and irresistible feature, must necessarily be regarded as being present already in a high degree of power. As original righteousness was traditionally conceived as requiring but one act of choice on the part of Adam in order to establish him in possession of it, so Niebuhr conceives of this tendency towards sinful self-assertion, - one sin and the tendency would become fixed and irresistible. There is only one possible conclusion to such thinking. Man must have been very nearly, though not quite, established in self-centredness by God in the beginning. One cannot think that Niebuhr wished his language to contain such implications, yet they are undoubtedly there, and are firmly opposed to anything like a condition of original righteousness. Traditionalists implied or taught some

degree, at least, of self-adherence in man, originally. This was necessary in order to make that choice a real one whereby God was chosen before self, and the self thus became established in righteousness: but it was a small degree of self-adherence, so small that only one act of choice was required to establish man in the opposite condition of God-adherence. The implications of Neibuhr's language about the pre-fall condition are opposed to this traditional view of original righteousness, and cannot be made to cohere with any idea of original faith, hope, and love.

There would, further, seem to be a tendency to blur moral distinctions, when it is assumed by Neibuhr that the responsibility for sins which spring inevitably from a first sin, is exactly the same in quality as the responsibility for that first sin which did not spring inevitably from the situation of finiteness and freedom plus the fact of (someone else's) sin. As link succeeds link in the lengthening chain of inevitable sin, can any responsibility for the latest link be of exactly the same degree as that for the first? The moral sense surely rises up in revolt against such a suggestion. Whether I begin the process or not, what follows is sheerly determined, and determinism of any kind (self-inaugurated or not) unavoidably affects the question of responsibility.

Again Niebuhr assumes that while the first sin was not inevitable, it made others inevitable. This is an unwarranted assumption. The ground on which it is assumed that the first sin was not inevitable, is clear. God is love, and therefore He must allow the possibility, in the beginning, of choosing whether to sin or not to sin. The first sin, therefore, could not have been inevitable. Whence does Niebuhr get the idea, however, that once the individual sins, further sin is inevitable? It is a non sequitur. We may only say that as the first sin was not inevitable, but was highly probable, so succeeding sins were not inevitable but only highly probable. We may vary the degree of probability, but we have no right to assert inevitability.

Again, if original sin is only constituted by the addition of actual sin to the already existing human situation of finiteness and freedom and anxiety and a tendency to sinful self-assertion and someone else's sin, (see p.270), then it means that the individual does not become possessed of original sin until the first sin is committed. This means that each individual is born without original sin, that he is born, in fact, originally righteous, and this has obvious and serious repercussions on the doctrine of baptismal regeneration in the case of infants.

Furthermore, original sin has always been differentiated

from actual sin. Niebuhr himself draws the distinction when he is talking about anxiety. "Anxiety" he says, "is neither actual nor original sin" (p.266). If, however, what converts the original situation of man into original sin is the individual's first actual sin, then each person can be said to sin original sin into existence, and actual sin is an indispensable element in original sin, and so the distinction between the two cannot be maintained as consistently as it has been traditionally.

The validity of Niebuhr's arguments from Scripture is sometimes questionable. In seeking to show that the sin of unbelief is not necessary, he quotes Romans, 1-20, (p.268), and describes the Pauline psychology exhibited there, as "penetrating and significant". "Man's freedom which tempts to anxiety also contains the ideal possibility of knowing God. Man is without excuse, St. Paul declares, because "the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead." Niebuhr, if he really agrees with St. Paul here, commits himself to the belief that from the beginning man was able to perceive through external creation, the nature and character of God sufficiently to warrant perfect trust in Him. That man's first apprehension of God through Nature was anything like a clear

seeing of Him, such as would encourage a response of trust cannot be supported by anything that we know, or surmise from what we know, of man's beginnings. Man's first religious perceptions resided in a vague and disturbing sense of the numinous: the reaction called out by that can scarcely legitimately be regarded as having been one of trust. St. Paul had no knowledge of evolution as we understand it. He believed in the special creation of man apart from the beasts. He could only, naturally, believe in man as having been created with an immediate ability to perceive God, through the medium of Nature, as being One whom he could trust. This Pauline psychology, in the context of Niebuhr's argument, can scarcely be called "penetrating" or "significant". That it is so called reflects adversely upon the position which it is employed to defend, and not a little upon the psychology of the one who so defends it.

Again, on page 269, he says "The idea that the inevitability of sin is not due merely to the strength of the temptation in which man stands by reason of his relation to both the temporal process and eternity is most perfectly expressed in the scriptural words: "Let no man say when he is tempted, I am tempted of God: for God cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any man: But every man is tempted, when he is drawn away of his own lust and enticed.

Then when lust hath conceived it bringeth forth sin: and sin, when it is finished, bringeth forth death." (James, 1, 13-15).

All that St. James is saying here is that man is tempted by reason of certain desires in him: when these desires are yielded to, sin follows, and when sin is persisted in, it leads to death. He says nothing about sin becoming inevitable after a first sin, or about the first sin being the result of yielding to something which is extra to the original human situation. When certain things happen certain other things follow, but it is not inevitable that they shall happen. Sin may be committed many times, but it is by no means inevitable that it will be persisted in until the end. We are not entitled to speak of inevitability in connection with sin, only of probability. Actually this particular utterance of St. James could be made to fit an evolutionary account of temptation far better than a traditional account (temptation due to Satan). God cannot be said to tempt man deliberately to do evil, but He can be said to be responsible for the situation in which temptation is inevitable, which temptation, however, He is pledged to help man to resist by His grace.

There would seem to be little doubt that Niebuhr (p.195) in passing straight from a discussion of the anxiety which is the inevitable concomitant of the original pre-fall human

situation, to consider Jesus' words "Be not anxious..." is confusing two entirely different psychological conditions. Kierkegaard's 'Angst', to which Niebuhr refers in a note, represents a premonition, an uncanny apprehension of a somewhat impending. It is directed towards nothing in particular. What might be experienced is unknown, unguessed. The only content of the premonition is sheer possibility. The anxiety which Jesus deprecated was, however, full of past experience, of memories of starvation, nakedness, privation, and so forth. We cannot equate the first vague shuddering apprehension of freedom in the first man before the fall, with the very concrete economic worries of a first century Galilean peasant!

There is one further criticism. Niebuhr attempts to distinguish between "the equality of sin, and the inequality of guilt. (pp.233 ff), but his attempt has been severely criticised by H. D. Lewis (Morals and the New Theology, pp.61 ff) and by O. C. Quick (The Gospel of the New World, note on p.48). He says we must continue to respect "the relative achievements of history", but this must somehow be done without prejudice to "the proposition that all men are sinners equally in the sight of God." He does this by a curious distinction between sin and guilt. "All men are sinners" but "there is nevertheless an ascertainable

inequality of guilt among men in the actualities of history. Guilt is distinguished from sin in that it represents the objective and historical consequences of sin," and "it is important to recognise that Biblical religion has emphasised this inequality of guilt just as much as the equality of sin." "Men who are equally sinners in the sight of God need not be equally guilty of a specific act of wrong doing in which they are involved: it is to the guilt of men that the less and more of historical judgments refers."

It is sufficient here to notice Quick's answer. He says that Niebuhr "strangely maintains that guilt is distinguishable from sin in that it represents the objective and historical consequences of sin." (Niebuhr) seems to have fallen into a confusion between (a) what the sinner's act causes and may loosely be said to be responsible for, and (b) that (in the act and its consequences) for which the sinner is personally responsible. In a moral universe, guilt is precisely that which makes a man liable to the strictly penal operations of God's law, or, as St. Paul would put it, to the imputation of sin."

It is in view of such criticisms that Niebuhr's attempt to restate the doctrines of original righteousness and original sin must be regarded as unsatisfactory.

2. E. Brunner.

Brunner may be called the continental counterpart of

the American Niebuhr. So far as they both represent a determined effort to hold "in tension" the belief in man's freedom and sin's inevitability, they represent an attitude which finds its extremest expression in Karl Barth, with whom both disagree so far as his extremism is concerned.

Brunner agrees with Niebuhr in holding that the image of God in man is revealed in the very perversion of sin. It is because a man can sin that he can be said still to retain the *imago dei*. "In his sin he shows the supernatural spirit power which issues from the primal image of God" (*Man in Revolt*, p.132). Like Niebuhr he rejects the Catholic doctrine of the *donum superadditum*. He calls it the doctrine of the double *imago* (*similitudo*, *imago*), and describes it as "the fatal fundamental error of all the anthropology of the Church." (appendix i, p.513).

Unlike Niebuhr he does not attempt even a partial and conditional justification of it. He holds that while essential nature is not uncorrupted human nature, as taught by the Roman Catholic Church, neither is it merely a relic of the original human nature, as was taught by the Reformers. He agrees with Niebuhr in rejecting the Protestant doctrine of the relic, and is opposed to extremist ideas of total depravity, which represent the *humanum* as a *profanum*. In this they both disagree with Karl Barth, whom

Niebuhr quotes as conceding only that "man is man and not a cat", so far as his sinful state is concerned (Man in Revolt, appendix 1, p.513: also p.95: Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, p.285).

Brunner agrees with Niebuhr in disavowing the historical literalistic error. "The Adam who was created in the image of God is not a far off primitive being, but you, me, everybody. The primitive state is not an historical period, but an historical moment, the moment of the divinely created origin, which we only know in contrast with sin" (op.cit. pp.110-111). This agrees with Niebuhr's idea that original righteousness is only known to sinners in the moment of self-transcendence.

At first sight there would appear to be a divergence between the two, in the matter of describing the first sin. Niebuhr, as we have seen, holds that the basic primal sin is mistrust, lack of faith towards God. Brunner states quite plainly that he believes it is presumption, arrogance, rebellion, the attempt to measure self against God. (op.cit., p.129), yet he says, a little later, that "man is led astray in such a way that, once desire is aroused, it militates against confidence in God." This would appear to introduce the sin of mistrust, though it is not dealt with specifically.

Both agree that human sin is not wholly Satanic. It is not pure undiluted arrogance. It is part weakness, part rebellion. They attribute this to the fact that man is led astray by evil forces already at work. "Man, by himself, is not great enough to discover sin and introduce it into the world." (Brunner, op.cit. p.131). The final ground of sin, however, is, "we love ourselves more than our Creator" (p.132). The significance of that last sentence is vital. If it is fully accepted it really excludes any doctrine of original righteousness, and it supports the idea of original self-centredness. Brunner, however, as we shall see in our last chapter, is inconsistent in his retention of original righteousness in view of the distance he is prepared to go in support of the evolutionary account of man's origin. There is also agreement between Brunner and Niebuhr on the point that man sins inevitably and is yet responsible for his sin. Man is not a sinner because of his sins. He sins because he is a sinner, yet is responsible for being a sinner. He is responsible for original sin, which is the source of his actual sins now. Brunner's own version of this doctrine is contained in his words "man is responsible for his sin, but also for the fact that he is a sinful creature "i.e. that he has a sinful nature. (op.cit. c.vi.)

We remember that, for Niebuhr, sinfulness was initiated

by the first sin which set going the process of inevitable sin. Brunner holds that when man sins he destroys the possibility of doing what he could have done. He calls this "the mystery of the irreparable." (op.cit.p.132).

Again, Brunner argues that all human sin has an element of weakness: it is mingled with anxiety (p.131). "Man cannot sin" he says, "simply from arrogance...the mixed character of primal sin is described in an inimitable way in the story of the fall. It is a fruit which attracts, it is a whispered doubt which stirs, it is the dream of being like God which turns the scale."

We are justified, in view of these words, in asking whether Brunner has unconsciously implicated himself in Niebuhr's idea of a tendency towards sinful self-assertion existing prior to that bias to sin, which, it is held by both, was originated by man? Brunner admits there is "weakness mingled with anxiety." With this we can compare Niebuhr's words about the ideal possibility that "faith might purge anxiety of the tendency towards sinful self-assertion". This idea of weakness in man's initial state argues the presence of some factor in his very original constitution which tends to weaken him in a situation where strength is required. The situation is that of temptation, and weakness in the face of temptation means only one thing, an attraction

towards what is forbidden. Brunner admits as much - "it is a fruit which attracts". Man cannot help this attractiveness of the forbidden. He cannot, at first, help his desires. He is made like it; it is a constitutional thing, and for it he cannot be held responsible. Both writers thus find a place for self-centredness in man at the beginning, and both, at one time or another, imply the preponderance of this element.

In their own ways these two theologians give expression to a truth which most men recognise, namely, that sin has a cumulative effect, and in its onward course moves towards a virtual "inevitablising" of itself. This is expressed by Niebuhr, as we have seen, in his idea of the first sin making subsequent sin inevitable, and by Brunner in his idea of the mystery of the irreparable. They incorrectly represent this truth in that they attribute to the first sin the effect which in reality can only be allowed to the heaped up sinning of years. Their motive in taking up this position is, presumably, to defend God against any possible charge of having made man in such a way that sin, in the beginning, was harder to resist than to commit. We shall speak of this later.

3. Karl Barth.

Barth insists that we view man exclusively in the context of grace and the will of God. Man is a creature in total dependence of being upon the gracious will of God,

a dependence which can be reckoned as from moment to moment (The Reformed doctrine of *Creatio Continua*). Barth has expressed this continual relation of the creature to the Creator in his teaching about the Holy Spirit. "The creature requires the Creator in order to live. He thus requires relation to Him, but this relation he cannot create. God creates it through His presence to the creature, i.e. in the form of a relation of Himself to Himself. The Spirit of God is God Himself in His freedom to be present to the creature, and so to create this relation, and thereby to be the life of the creature." (Doctrines of the word of God, pp.515 ff.).

The image of God is not to be understood as a doctrine about man's being in himself: it is rather an acknowledgment that he depends entirely on the will of Another whose grace and truth he images in a knowledgeable and obedient relation to the word of Grace. This image is grounded in God's will to create man in fellowship with Himself, and that original intention remains no matter what happens. Were it not to remain, man would simply pass out of existence. The objective basis of the image is, therefore, the grace of God. Subjectively it is man's thankful witness to that grace, and the power and substance of his witness lie in what he

witnesses to, not in his witness itself. It is essentially supernatural, grounded in grace, possessed only in faith. It is that which God has put into us, not by nature, but by grace.

Barth repudiates St. Augustine's idea that in the mind itself, even before it is a partaker of God, His image is found (De Trinitate 14, 8), and calls it the discovery of anti-Christ. Man cannot arrogate the image of God to himself as though it were a natural possession of his own being. This is the root motion of original sin. We must maintain the Biblical view of grace, with its account of the dynamic relation between man and God.

As regards original righteousness Barth's view would appear to be that Adam was neither the perfect paragon of manhood, nor the merely amoral innocent. Adam's righteousness was found in the word of God into which he was brought by creation in a loving personal relationship. He was originally created righteous in the sense that he was in obedience to the Word and Will of God. For Barth, the whole notion of evolution is quite irrelevant when we understand creation and the fall properly, for evolution is grounded upon secondary causes, and theology cannot think in those terms. It is a confusion to think the two together. Barth, in effect, treats the idea of evolution with something like contempt.

So far as the temptation and fall of man are concerned, he believes in a prehuman order of angels, and in the fall of some of them, and it is one of these, the Devil, who is behind the temptation and fall of man. Theologically Barth would say nothing about a pre-human perversion of life. He holds strictly to the Scriptural view of the cursing of the world with the fall, whatever that may entail. In a very definite sense he believes that the sin of Adam is the origin of the sinfulness of the race. As regards any theory of the origin and effects of sin, he may be said to be calling men back to the Reformed theological outlook as that is chiefly presented by Calvin.

Barth guards against misunderstanding the doctrine of depravity by planting it firmly in the context of grace (Credo. pp.43 ff. Doctrine of the Word of God, p.466). God does not delight in man's depravity. The sinner is still maintained in being by the very grace which he contradicts. All his virtues and endowments are due to grace. The total judgment of grace, therefore, does not mean a judgment upon these in themselves, but means they have been wholly polluted in the active perversity of sin. Grace indicates that the whole relation between man and God, called the *imago dei*, has been perverted into its opposite so that the truth of God is turned into a lie. "The revelation of God in Jesus

Christ means the discovery of the darkness which is man, the discovery not of something which he lacks, but of who and what he is. To be man means now to be an enemy of God, and this means to be the destroyer of one's own proper glory. What is our sin? It is what we are and what we do." (The knowledge of God and the Service of God. pp.49-54).

Barth is at one with Niebuhr and Brunner in insisting that the image of God in man ought to be conceived dynamically. It is a certain quality of personal relationship between man and God. He differs from them in his belief that sin completely destroys that relationship. They believe that the image relationship is only marred. Barth's insight is surely the more profound, a conviction which springs from an examination of the meaning of the image of God in man, and of what happens when man sins.

God loves man, and it is His will that man should respond with faith, hope and love. The image is seen in man when he so responds. When God made man in His image, it does not mean that man loved God at first perfectly, for if he had, he could not have loved himself more than God, and so have sinned. No man yet has loved God perfectly, save Jesus Christ. If God made man in His own image, it means therefore that the image relationship existed even while man was not yet perfect in faith, hope and love. This is important for it enables us to see that man learned to love God while being to

some degree in love with himself. Man, in love with himself at first, began to fall in love with God by the grace of God. A new love, however, does not at once completely oust an old love. A battle begins, and is waged over a period between self and the new object of love. The duration and intensity of the struggle is in direct proportion to the strength of the hold which the first love has gained over self. In the moment of self-love's victory, love of God cannot be said to exist at all. Man cannot love himself and God equally at one and the same time, and certainly in the moment of disobedience and rebellion, faith hope and love utterly perish. They are simply non-existent in that moment of the consummation of self-love. In that moment, therefore, there can be no image-relationship in man.

Brunner and Niebuhr base their claims that the image is not totally destroyed but only damaged, on the evidence of man's feelings of guilt, remorse, and what he ought to be. These feelings are the activity of the marred image, they believe, but we have to notice that they only succeed the moment of self-love's consummation. They do not exist during that moment itself, and they are, therefore, separated from the condition of image relationship by that moment. We have to stress the fact that it is an integral part of the triumph of sin that to be enjoyed, it banishes,

or rather simply does not permit, these feelings of guilt, etc., in the moment of actual consummation. That moment may be but a fraction of a second in duration, but it is of the essence of sin that for so long, self-will triumphs utterly.

It may happen that, as time goes on, through the pressure of God's grace, sin may come to be enjoyed less and less, and the moment of enjoyment may consequently shrink, till it can scarcely be differentiated from the overwhelming sense of guilt; but at first, at any rate, sin has its triumph in the complete exclusion of this sense from the moment of consummation. That is why sin is rebellion. It shuts the door in the face of God's pleading or accusing love. It enjoys itself completely at first.

In such a moment the image perishes, but God's grace does not cease. The fashion of its countenance may be altered to that of wrath, but it is still redeeming love and it is this love, which, at work on the soul that has sinned, brings to birth in that soul, by a miracle of recreation, the image of God, though now with the fashion of its countenance altered, through the experience of guilt, fear, sorrow, self-loathing, etc. Since these things are signs of the self turning away from self-love, they must be signs of the self turning towards love of God, which love is God's image in man.

Brunner and Niebuhr, in estimating the effect of sin upon the image, pass immediately in their analysis from the moment of the image unspoiled by sin, to the moment of the recreated image in the sinner, now mingled for the first time with the memory of sin. In doing so they pass over that vital moment of sin's consummation, in which the image is non-existent, not spoiled but completely destroyed. If the image is to be conceived dynamically, not statically and mechanically, then it is not a question of a bowl being broken, and the broken piece being cemented back into place by the maker, or anything like that. It is a question of something existing one minute, and not existing at all the next. It is not a question of man's unalterable basic structure, but of his loving and not loving, of being faithful and not faithful.

The recreation of the image does not mean a going back to the original situation, making man as he was before sin happened, for the original situation cannot happen again. Henceforth the image of God has to be created in a creature different from the one in whom the image was first created, namely, one who is now guilty of having destroyed it. The feelings of remorse and guilt, and the sense of what one ought to be but is not, are not, as Niebuhr suggests, what is left of the original image: they are the reaction of a sinful man, in whom sin has completely destroyed the image,

to the recreation in him of that image. As the original situation cannot happen again, so the way in which the image is possessed by sinners cannot be the same as the way in which it was possessed originally.

Barth's analysis is surely the more profound, psychologically, spiritually. Brunner and Niebuhr may claim that they are out to establish a dynamic concept of the image, but so long as they hold that sin only mars the image but does not destroy it, so long are they guilty of retaining the idea that the image is something substantial, almost mechanical. They seem to think that the image is some basic substance in man's soul, which will endure so long as the soul endures, and which may be weakened by sin, as a body is by disease, but which still endures beneath the assault, requiring only a restoration to full health. They seem to believe that the image in sinful man is like a sick body and sin the disease which needs curing. Barth believes that the image in man's soul at the moment of sin's consummation is like a dead body, which needs God's miraculous act to restore it to life. (We are here conscious of the limitations of our analogy but we believe the point is clear which we wish to make). The image relationship in sinful man, is, for Barth a situation of continual destruction and recreation. It is not a question of something which, in essence, exists

beneath all the weight of sin, kept alive all the time, like the soul, by the grace of God.

Niebuhr and Brunner are right in holding that what we have of the image of God is marred and imperfect, but they are wrong in thinking that the marred and imperfect image exists permanently in sinful man even in the moment of deliberate sin. The image of God is not as tough as that. In the moment of sin's commission it simply ceases to be.

"Ye cannot serve God and mammon" said Jesus. "Either we hate the one and love the other, or else we despise the one and hold to the other." We cannot love both at the same time, and if we love self we are not loving God, that is, in the moment of self-love's consummation, which is sin, we are completely out of the image relationship, which consists solely in loving God.

4. J. S. Whale.

We may conclude this section on modern Augustinians by referring to J. S. Whale, whose views on sin may be found in his essay in "The Christian Faith", edited by Matthews (second edition 1944), in an article in the Expository Times for April 1940, and in Chapter Two of his book, Christian Doctrine (1941). He is consistent throughout these. He agrees with Niebuhr in rejecting the literal interpretation of the Genesis story. Like him, he makes the pre-fall period,

and the fall itself in Genesis symbols of what is true for every man. "Every man is his own Adam", and "all men are solidarily Adam" (Expository Times p.317).

He agrees with Niebuhr and Brunner in holding that man's very sin testifies to the image which it defaces. Sin presupposes the image dei. Man could not be godless without God, a fact which, he says, has an important bearing on the doctrine of total corruption. He also agrees that the imago dei is present to man by way of wrath, judgment and the conception of 'ought'. The image of God is man's responsible awareness, his addressability (Ansprechbarkeit) as Brunner calls it. The essence of sin is man's self-centred denial of this distinctive endowment: its final ground is pride, and its active manifestation self-love (concupiscence).

Total corruption he holds to mean (and always to have meant in spite of Luther's extravagant outbursts), not that the stream of history is solid mud (a person totally corrupt in this sense would be incapable of sin), but that it is dirty in every part of its course. The doctrine represents the truth that though man can do many wonderful things, he cannot reconcile himself to God, obtain dominion over sin, and over the world by himself, without Christ.

His formulation of the subject of universal sinfulness, however, is unsatisfactory. He holds that the Augustinian

doctrine of original sin only made actual sins inevitable. It was, in fact, a kind of determinism, and in this it was resembled by modern psychological biological and sociological "explanations" of sin. Yet in spite of these assertions, Whale would appear to play very largely into the hands of determinism; where he appears to avoid doing so, it is only by leaving the question of the bias to evil finally unexplained. Here, we must examine his position a little more in detail.

The fact that sin is an empirically universal fact leads him to suspect a bias or perversion of the human will. He calls this the constitutional aspect of the problem, and holds that it was this to which St. Paul was referring in Rom. V.13. when he spoke of sin "where no law is". Whale describes this as "that deadly spiritual wrongness which pervades all humanity", and which, being objectively contrary to God's purpose and glory, alienates men from God even though they are not strictly blameworthy. Sin is there, he says, but "it is not imputed."

He illustrates this unconscious, non-guilty kind of sin, by quoting the case of a cannibal who though "he could not possibly have known any better" yet "grieved the Holy Spirit" by his cannibalism. (The Christian Faith, ed. Matthews, p.124).

We have to notice that "grieving the Holy Spirit" is an

expression reserved in Scripture to describe the effects of conscious sin: its transference to the case of a cannibal is questionable. Be that as it may, if the cannibal could not possibly have known any better, then what he did was (as Whale has already half-suggested by actually using the word) constitutional. But if his constitution was displeasing to God, God could hardly be responsible for it. Who, then, was responsible?

At this point we should expect Whale to have recourse, like Brunner and Niebuhr to the idea of the fall of Satan. He does not do so, however. Instead, he substitutes the idea of "spiritual solidarity in evil"; Ritschl's "Kingdom of Sin", in fact, by which the evil acts of each individual are reinforced. He quotes St. Augustine's phrase "massa peccatrix", Schleiermacher's "in each the work of all, in all the work of each," and Dostoevsky's "we are each responsible to all for all" (pp.46,47 Christian Doctrine). He refers to the psychologists' discovery of the collective unconscious, which shows that even below the unconscious life of the individual there is a deep layer (as it were) of hidden inborn forces: its content is not individual, but universal, and, as such, beyond the conscious control of the will. He concludes that in speaking thus, psychology is only

confirming the witness of the New Testament that humanity is subject to a possession or infection by evil from which no individual can dissociate himself. This possession is so sinister, cunning, and strong, that the New Testament can only describe it in terms of demonic powers. "The personification of evil as Satan, difficult though it is for our thoughts, stands for the fact of spiritual solidarity in evil which will not be evaded or ignored." (p.47 Christian Doctrine).

Whale thus mentions Satan only in order to interpret him sociologically and psychologically, an interpretation which is plainly against the sense in which he was traditionally conceived, and which cannot therefore be equated with what Satan "stands for". If there is no such being as Satan, and if the deeply hidden evil tendencies in human nature are connected with the interlocking of lives to form an organic system of evil, then what becomes of the first beginnings of evil in the first human beings? If the first men appeared with this characteristic of submerged evil, already in them, whence came it? Whale dismisses the explanation of "necessary appetites inherited from the sub-human world to which man is akin by evolution" (p.127 The Christian Faith). Yet if this bias of our nature can be called a condition of sinfulness mysteriously constitutive of our empirical make up, who is

responsible for the constitutional fact? It did not come from God, for God would not create what would "grieve His Holy Spirit". It did not come from Satan, for that name apparently does not represent a person. It could not come from man himself if he was born with it, and if it lies in that area of life - below even the unconscious - for which no individual can be held fully responsible. Whale thus leaves the question of responsibility hanging in the air. He does, indeed, say that the individual is ultimately responsible for every fully sinful disposition, and for much of the content of the unconscious (p.128 The Christian Faith), but the words "fully" and "much" reveal his mental reservations concerning a certain degree of inborn constitutional tendency to evil, and man's responsibility for it. Whale may thus be said to conclude that there are evil forces at work in man when he first appears, but who or what is responsible for them, he does not plainly say. He goes as far as he can in defining man's responsibility for such original sin, but he stops short of positing full and unqualified responsibility. In this he is less bold than Niebuhr and Brunner, and, although he says that sin is a concept involving the language not of philosophy, or of law, or of ethics, but of religion, one feels it is because of his inability to dissociate his religious thought, as much as he might wish, from his

ethical thought, that he takes up this position towards the question of responsibility.

V. MODERN THOMISTS.

We can now look at three modern exponents of the Thomist doctrine concerning man's original condition, his fall, and the consequences, viz., F.H. Maycock, F.J. Hall, and C.J. Lewis.

1. F. H. Maycock. This writer gives a clear and well defined picture of the Catholic view in his book "Original Sin." We shall look at what he has to say about the fall of the angels, original righteousness, and original sin.

(a) The Fall of the Angels.

The main quarrel that we have with his account of how evil first entered the universe, of the nature and function of the angels, of the fall of some of them, and of the effects of that fall, is the same as that which we would sustain against C.S. Lewis in his account of the fall of Paradisal man. If words are to be taken to mean what they say, if moral questions are to be treated seriously, then it must be affirmed that such creatures as these angels could not possibly have been tempted in the way described, let alone have yielded to temptation.

The angels are said to be "perfect in beauty" (p.38). Since they are pure spirits, that means perfect spiritual beauty and since beauty is something that is beheld, it means they were beautiful, not only to themselves and to other angels but also to God who eternally beheld them. Spiritual beauty refers to one thing, viz, character. Perfect beauty of character in God's

eyes - is thus the only meaning that can be given to this phrase. They are also said to be perfect in wisdom, and that means, amongst other things, unable to be deceived. Theirs is a "perfect and harmonious spiritual world", "without blemish", "spiritually perfect", "where God is all in all", and "His will is joyfully done (p.39)". Now for such a creature it would be impossible even for God to raise them to any greater perfection than that which they already enjoyed. This description alone, when it is carefully studied, is seen to preclude any necessity for establishment in righteousness. They are already fully righteous. For such a creature, temptation, such as that described later, would be psychologically impossible.

If each rejoiced equally in the different excellences of other angels, how would they not rejoice the more in the excellency of God who was "all in all" (p.39). This "all in all-ness" of God is a totally exclusive phrase, the (spiritual) implications of which have simply not been discerned by men who say that temptation and sin were possible for such creatures. If love was without possessiveness how could any desire arise to possess either God's excellence, or another angel's, or, even, to retain their own in any selfish way? If admiration was without envy, how could covetousness (of any excellency) arise? If their pure and God-given charity was unselfed rejoicing in all good (p.45) how could pride, which is the essence of all selfishness, arise! If their liberty was

imperfect, in the sense that one choice remained to be made between self and God in order to secure establishment in goodness (p.47) then they could not truly be described as completely selfless, and they could not thus be perfectly spiritually beautiful in God's eyes. Some tiny element of self-adherence must be assumed, in order to make the choice a reality. (c.p. Lewis's account of the Paradisal man). It simply was not possible, as Maycock asserts it was for God to create beings who could pass from imperfect liberty to perfect liberty by only one act of decision of the will, for to create such would be (if we are to be, psychologically, realists) to create virtual puppets. How could charity be misunderstood, when wisdom was perfect ? (p.38). How could its nature be distrusted by creatures who were themselves unique centres of charity, and who rejoiced unselfishly in such nature ? (p.44). How could a self really desire complete independence, and prefer the manifestation of its own glory before God's, while it selflessly rejoiced in others glory, and when, for it, God was all in all ?

How could such a creature fail to see and desire its own perfection, which, because it was perfectly wise, it would intuitively perceive was to be gained only by the continued exercise of unselfed rejoicing in God's glory ?

To talk of such created unselfishness becoming guilty of the

most heinous selfishness is to reduce moral terms to meaninglessness. It is just sheerly unconvincing.

We can now look at the ideas of the function of the angels prior to their fall, and of the results of their fall. Some of the angels - only a small fraction of their total number - are conceived as being concerned with this world. (p.39) It is surely a rather amazing coincidence, which cannot fail to strike one as somewhat suspicious, that it is precisely only those angels whose particular concern was said to be with this planet who are conceived as having rebelled! (p.42). It is similarly a suspicious coincidence that though their subsequent malicious activity is described as partially vitiating the life-force at its source, yet it is not held to be necessary to suppose that the disaster affected more than a small part of God's total creation, that small part being, of course, this immediate environment of ours! (p.42). If the life-force itself were vitiated at its source (p.42) then surely all creation, and not only a part of it, would be affected?

Again, if the idea of the life-force is to be conceived dynamically, and not statically and mechanically, can we separate it in thought completely from the activity of God Himself? If not, how are we to conceive of the life-force at its source? Can we possibly speak of a creature corrupting that? The Being of God is the source of the life-force, and He cannot be corrupted. The question is only needlessly

complicated by introducing the idea of the life-force.

Further, it is contrary to plain Biblical teaching, - and it is to such teaching that Maycock appeals - to hold that any corruption of the sub-angelic order of life took place prior to the arrival of man on the scene, and that whatever features in nature appeared to be changed for the worse, so far as man was concerned, were so changed by the devil himself (p.Gen.3. 17.18.). It is, moreover, by no means clear why and how they, who had been so perfectly good, should pass by one single sin, into such determined antagonism towards God. The supporters of the fallen angel theory nowhere satisfactorily explain how it is that repentance and shame find no place in the hearts of the rebels. The psychology of the fallen angels seems to be totally different from the only psychology we know. "For reasons which we cannot know with clarity there was not for the angels a possibility of forgiveness" (p.85). The better a spiritual being, the more likely it is that shame and self-loathing and repentance will follow upon sin. Any hardening in opposition to God is the result of continuance in sin. It cannot be said, as Maycock says (p.42) that there were two possibilities for the angels after their rebellion, either to be deprived of their function and so cease to be, or to be allowed to continue to exist - in rebellion, with power over the world. There are no such things as alternatives for God. If the angels were irretrievably hardened in sin, then God must

withdraw His sustaining power or grace, and they would simply cease to be, for God cannot be conceived as sustaining eternally in being that which is irretrievably, i.e., eternally, opposed to Him. If, however, they were not irretrievably hardened in sin, and if, therefore, God still exercised His love towards them - only now in a redemptive form, then He must sustain them in being, for God cannot be conceived as ceasing to sustain in being what may still turn to Himself in love. Maycock assumes that the wicked angels would cease to be, simply, if their function of concern with this world were withdrawn. This does not follow, for it is overlooked that the hell into which rebellious spirits are cast is precisely the hell of restricted function, and of the loss of the functions of a previous state of privilege. The hell of the fallen angels could have consisted in the restricted function of merely living together, in enmity against Him by whose just laws they were now condemned to live in the agony of remembered happiness. That enmity could well have found expression in continued hostility towards the good angels, in never-ceasing attempts to seduce them, and possibly in the contemplated corruption of that creature, half matter, half spirit, whom they might, with their intelligence, know God intended to create.

An idea against which we must especially set our faces is that of the power which the angels are said to have had over the sub-human world, which it is said was retained by them

after they fell, and which they used in order to divert the developing order of life into ungodly forms, such as self-assertion, and that whole method of survival which has been called the struggle for existence. (p.49).

We must maintain that there are certain functions, which, a priori, must be conceived as being peculiar to God. Such are the initial act of creation ex nihilo, and the sustaining in being of all created life. Another is the ordering of all created sub-human life in the way originally designed for it. The only realm of life in which a creature can be conceived as able to interfere with God's design for that realm, is the moral realm. The reason for ability to interfere there is obvious. In the sub-moral realm, however, it cannot be rationally conceived that any interference should take place, by a moral creature, with the basic mechanics or constitution of nature. Power in that direction must be held to be a specific function of deity. Moral creatures may misuse sub-moral creatures. They cannot possibly de-constitute them.

Mythology, if it is to be respected and retained, must not contradict basic theological ideas. To attribute to the angels the power to disorder physical nature is to invest them with what belongs to God alone, and only to confuse, instead of clarifying, an already difficult situation. Nor must mythology run counter to the only knowledge of virtue and the only psychology of sin that we possess. Such creatures, as these

angels are said to have been, could scarcely be tempted, let alone sin, and if they did sin, then their shame and self-loathing and repentance would surely have been deeper than any we have known. On such grounds we reject this exposition of the doctrine of the fall of the angels and of their activity in the universe afterwards.

(b) Original righteousness and original sin.

Maycock makes the following important points:

- (1) The destiny of man is the full enjoyment of the Beatific Vision (p.p.59. 79.).
- (2) The purpose of the gift of the donum superadditum is to enable man to realise this end (p.54).
- (3) It is reasonable to believe the first man had the ability to fulfil this destiny while yet on earth. (p.61.).
- (4) The gift raised him as far as it was possible to raise him without his compliance. (p.62.).
- (5) The gift was subject to the laws of growth. (p.62).
- (6) The gift was conferred on human nature. Its retention depended on man's action in obeying God. He disobeyed God and he and all his descendants lost the gift (p.55.).

In criticising these positions we must notice first what Maycock says on p.51. "It is clear that nature produces and reproduces itself on principles which it is difficult to suppose could have been excogitated by charity." This

sentence reveals a vitally important factor in our consideration of these doctrines, namely, that it is an idea of what Love could and could not do, that finally determines much traditional thought about man's original nature. Maycock thus explicitly refers to what is generally assumed and deemed to be so patently true as to require no demonstration or even mention. Not only the natural processes of production and reproduction, but also man's constitutional proneness to self-centredness is considered to be patently out of tune with any original divine plan of love. Both are considered to be marks, not of that original plan but of a deviation from it.

It is the main contention of this thesis that this assumption about what Love could and could not do, so far as the original constitution of man is concerned, needs to be seriously examined, not chiefly because of any apparent conflict with what science teaches about man's animal ancestry but because of the real nature of love and of the moral obligations which love was bound to observe in the creation of responsive love. We would hold that the traditional distinction between what is and is not original in the universe has been based upon an ultimately untenable idea of love, an idea which, in its simplest expression, is really the belief that love would never make virtue hard and vice easy. We must not, however, anticipate our conclusion at this point, by criticising that

idea.

We have already mentioned Niebuhr's and Brunner's criticism of the doctrine of ^{the} donum superadditum. It remains to make the following observations in the light of Maycock's points noted above. Nothing is subject to the law of growth that is not also subject to the law of deterioration. To speak of the possibility of growth and to reject the possibility of deterioration is meaningless. The two things go together, and no experience or knowledge of life justifies us in separating them. If the gift of the donum superadditum was subject to the law of growth it must mean that it was also subject to the law of deterioration. The law of growth in things moral and spiritual is that of growth from small beginnings, according to right choices, and the law of deterioration is also by stages from small beginnings according to wrong choices. All forms of such life either grow or deteriorate in this manner, and no good reason can be shown why a super-natural endowment should be exempt from this law. It is a quite arbitrary and unjustifiable assumption to state that one act of wrong choice would remove the ability or gift from Adam. The first wrong choice would be the first stage in the process of deterioration. It would not immediately destroy the ability, no more than the first right choice would establish man in the possession of it for ever.

It would be generally agreed that the stage of growth at which one single right choice would confirm a creature in the permanent possession of some spiritual gift or ability would be an advanced stage. Such an advanced stage of spiritual growth could have been attained only by a series of right choices. Attained in any other way, that is, without man's compliance, the situation would have been immoral. Likewise it would be generally agreed that the stage of deterioration at which one single wrong choice would confirm a creature in the irreversible loss of some spiritual gift or ability would be an advanced one. Such an advanced stage of spiritual deterioration could have been reached only by a series of wrong choices; reached in any other way, that is, without man's compliance, the situation would have been immoral. The ability in man to arrive finally at the full enjoyment of the Beatific Vision was, in the beginning, at a stage neither of advanced growth, nor of advanced deterioration. Both growth and deterioration lay yet before him as possibilities, and each could only be begun by an act of choice, either right or wrong.

Maycock defends the belief that "in Adam" mankind sinned and so lost the gift of sanctifying grace, by referring to the idea of Adam as the head and representative of the race (p.78.). This idea, however, originated before man's ascent from the beasts was realised. Against the background of the belief

that man was specially created, the idea was natural. Without that background, however, the idea cannot stand. In spite of C. S. Lewis's elaborate myth of the Paradisal man we cannot regard that shuffling shaggy ape-like creature, who was the first man, as the head and representative of the human race. That dignity must be firmly removed from the claimant to mere chronological priority in the evolutionary line, and given over once and for all to that man in whom the purpose of God for man was first perfectly realised. He only can be truly called the head and representative who was first perfectly united with God, i.e., who first realised the destiny of man in his own person. In other words, only of Christ can it be truly said, He is our head and representative. If the belief that Adam's sin was the sin of human nature, the sin of humanity in which each shares by virtue of his humanity, if this belief is bound up with the belief in Adam's headship and representative character it is consequently undermined.

Maycock further defends this idea of "the sin of human nature in which we all share", by pointing to the corporateness of the Divine Trinity as an analogy of human corporateness in Adam. (p.79.). Our Lord prayed "that they may be one as we are one: I in them and Thou in me, that they may be made perfect in one that the love wherewith Thou lovest me may be in them, and I in Them". Maycock concludes (p.79.) that

these words and others indicate a communion between Christ and His followers of a kind which we can but dimly appreciate: some measure of the mystery of charitable inter-change which exists in its perfection in the life of God the Blessed Trinity is to be disclosed, some share in it is to be given. He quotes various Christian writers to illustrate the persistence of the conviction that all men are mystically one, through the possession of a common nature.

We are only too aware of the attraction which this idea holds for many Christian thinkers today. In criticising it, we would not wish to be understood to mean that the heights and depths of the meaning of personality can be wholly compassed by human reason and intelligence at their present stage of development. All that we would seek to do is to indicate why we believe this mode of thought is impossible.

We would begin by stating the belief that there are only two kinds of corporateness. There is what may be called the ontological corporateness of the Divine Trinity, and there is the moral and Spiritual corporateness in which a community is bound by virtue of the pursuit of a common ideal. While we are aware of the difficulty, in speaking of the mystery of God's Being, of avoiding tritheistic implications, we believe that between the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost in Heaven there exists a relationship of love. God may thus be said to

experience both kinds of corporateness.

Created human society was never constituted like the un-created Divine Being, and has never experienced the beatitude of ontological corporateness. The ^{necessity} necessary for individual separateness precluded this from the beginning. In a created society constituted by a number of separate individuals, the only kind of corporateness possible was the moral and spiritual corporateness which we have described. It would be achieved but not initially possessed.

If these distinctions be accepted as generally true, then we have to examine their bearing upon the language in which the mystery of human corporateness has been traditionally described. That language is best exemplified in St. Augustine's words, quoted by Maycock: "We were all in that man when we were that man". "The Sin of humanity in which each shares by virtue of his humanity" is another way of putting it.

We would say that such language has crossed the boundary that separates moral and spiritual corporateness from ontological corporateness. There is this continual striving on the part of traditional writers to leave the area of merely human social corporateness and press on into the mysterious corporateness of the Divine Trinity in Unity and Unity in Trinity. The terms in which each man is described as being related to Adam are practically identical with those in which we describe the relationship between the members of the Divine Trinity: - we sinned in Adam because of our oneness with him in

the mystery of corporateness. The Father suffered in the Son because of their oneness in the mystery of corporateness. We were in Adam because we were Adam. God was in Christ because Christ was God, and so forth.

We do not say that an ontological corporateness will not, cannot grow out of that developing moral and spiritual corporateness which Christians know in Christ already. It may be not illegitimate to use the analogy of the Divine Trinity in Unity to point to the supra-personal destiny, the ultimate multiplicity in unity of the human race. But in created beings, oneness must begin by being moral and spiritual, and move onwards to whatever other corporateness may lie in store.

We cannot conceive of ontological corporateness without at the same time implying the existence of perfect moral and spiritual corporateness. Since man was not made immediately morally and spiritually perfect he could not have been made originally in ontological corporateness, and since Adam refused to make the choice that would have established him in the path of moral and spiritual perfection, it means that he himself was never morally and spiritually perfect. Hence we cannot reasonably conceive of any incorporation of the race in Adam after an ontological fashion: and there was no corporateness of the race in him of a moral and spiritual kind. For that kind of corporateness, individual existences are necessary, and as traditionally conceived the race did not then exist to be

so incorporate in him.

Our Lord's words about the oneness of His disciples in Him as He was in the Father cannot be pressed to mean exclusively more than the moral and spiritual oneness of community in love. To make them refer to the ontological corporateness of the Divine Trinity would be to involve ourselves in the question of Christ's consciousness of His Person, which is too uncertain ground upon which to build such a thesis.

The old way of conceiving human nature as a kind of separate entity in which we all share, a kind of substratum of all individuals, a least common factor of humanity, together with the habit of abstracting and hypostatizing it, and treating it as a kind of moral agent whose responsibility is coterminous with every soul who shares it, this can no longer be held if we are to conceive of human nature no longer in terms of substance, as something static and mechanical, but in terms of living dynamic personal relationship. Along these lines we are justified, we believe, in rejecting the old mode of conceiving a mystical unity of the race "in Adam".

D. M. Baillie criticises Moberley's statement ("Atonement and Personality" p.86.), "Christ was not generically, but inclusively man". He says "It is nonsense to say that He is "Man" unless we mean He is a man. "Man" in any inclusive sense can only mean either the whole human race, or human nature,

which in itself is an abstraction". ("God was in Christ" D. M. Baillie pp. 86.87.). Baillie also quotes H. R. MacKintosh (The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ, p.389), "In the domain of reality, there is no such thing existing independently as *humanitas*, or "man in general". No one can represent a man who also is the nature common to all members of the class "man"."

Under his thought about original righteousness, this modern Thomist also includes the ideas of the will being originally established in the desire to fulfil its destiny, of an original condition of unstable equilibrium, and of original imperfect liberty (p.72). Briefly, we may say that perfect liberty is conceived as the complete and final establishment of the will in the love of God. Imperfect liberty is that condition of the will wherein it remains still to establish that perfect liberty by the free exercise of the power of choice. The unstable equilibrium refers to the presence, alongside the desire to serve God, of a degree of self-adherence which remains to be eliminated by right choice.

In considering this group of ideas we are at the heart of the problem. We begin by affirming the pre supposition that man is organically linked with the animal world. Original (psychological) self-centredness was on the scene long before God brought to birth in one or a number of His creatures, the

consciousness of the supernatural. We would assert, therefore, that in that creature the will and the desire to please self would vastly outweigh any desire to please another. Its "liberty" would thus be almost wholly imperfect, rather than just slightly imperfect. It could not be said to be established in anything except self-centredness.

It would be agreed that before man could desire and will to serve God, he must know God. God must take the initiative, and make Himself known to man. Upon the moral quality of man's first conception of God would depend the moral quality of his first obedience. Love can only be called out by a vision of love, and while traditional theology has always implied that God made Himself known to man at first in such a way that man should have responded with loving obedience, we cannot disregard the picture presented by science of man's gradual growth in the knowledge of God. In introducing the scientist here we would not commit the error of wishing to measure the individual's spiritual condition by scientific tests. Man did not begin by knowing God as we know Him. God was not first conceived as a Person, and the supernatural powers with which man believed his world was filled, were certainly far below the level of love. The supernatural was first conceived not in any clear personal fashion, and certainly not in any high moral fashion, but vaguely, fearfully, inarticulately. Man, we

may say, was originally disposed to obey the supernatural, but it was a largely self-centred obedience prompted more by fear of the consequence of disobedience than by any moral conception of duty.

If this picture be accepted as more probably true, historically, then not, then we have to move on to a much later stage in history in order to find the beginning of man's desire to love and obey God for His own sake. Righteousness was not man's original spiritual condition, and the will could not be said to be originally established in the desire to fulfil its destiny when that destiny was only properly known at a later stage.

There is this further consideration. For God to dispose the desire or will of a creature without reference to the creature's will and desire in the first place would be inconsistent with love. The ensuing obedience would be worthless to the degree that it was conditioned, apart from its own response to a vision, and the human mechanism for apprehending God in His fullness was only gradually developed. Of man's religious beginning, therefore, the word righteous cannot legitimately be used. We shall have occasion to return to this theme later from a much more important point of view. At the moment it will suffice to express the belief that Maycock and those who think like him have got the matter the wrong way round. Man slowly became disposed towards

righteousness. He was originally disposed to please self rather than to please any other. He was originally self-centred, not originally righteous.

The only ground upon which man can be said to have been capable of envisaging God as a God of Love in the beginning, and to have been therefore desirous of obeying Him for sheer love's sake, is an a priori conception that that would be the only way in which it would be fitting and possible for Divine Love to create a creature from whom it was desired to elicit a response of Love. We cannot overlook the fact, however, that such an a priori conception of how love would create such a creature, was fashioned against a background of ignorance of man's animal ancestry. Given that ignorance, given the idea of special creation, that conception of how God would originally create man was almost inevitable. That conception, however, needs remoulding not only in the light of our new knowledge of man's animal ancestry, but also in the light of serious thinking about the moral obligation under which love must place itself if it chose to create man by means of evolution from the beasts.

There is one more idea in this writer's book, which we must examine, the idea, namely, that man has a racial memory of a lost state of original righteousness. Man's constant state of discontent is called by Maycock "one of the strongest empirical supports for the doctrine of original righteousness"

(p.64.). He speaks of "relics of the lost dignity and memories of the royal palace which haunt the soul, causing boundless desire and discontent". This, and the fact of the tradition of a lost paradise among all peoples of the earth, he says, make it, to say the least, a reasonable belief.

He quotes Pascal. "The greatness of man is so evident that it is even proved by his wretchedness. For what in animals is nature, in man we call wretchedness; by which we recognise that his nature now like that of the animals he has fallen from a better nature which once was his. For who is unhappy at not being a King except a deposed King?" ((Pensées, 409.) (Also quoted by Niebuhr Vol. i, p.281. Nature and Destiny of Man).

To this, however, we may reply. Satan was once unhappy in heaven because he was not the King, yet his unhappiness sprang not from being a deposed King, and remembering a lost dignity, but because of a vision of what he thought he could become. It was a vision of a future, not a memory of a past, that made him discontented with the present. This is our own belief about man's discontent (man's motive being different from Satan's).

If, by nature, Pascal meant the basic stock of animal instincts, then, what is nature in animals is not wretchedness in man, but the fomes boni as well as the fomes peccati, the indispensable raw material of morality. If, however, by nature, he meant the proneness to satisfy those instincts against the demands of the higher law, then there is no obligation to regard

this unruliness of nature as a sign only of a fall from a higher state, it could equally well be a sign of a self struggling with God's assistance out of original God-ordained self-centredness into a future of God-centredness.

The tradition among all peoples of a lost Paradise, being based upon this discontent, is open to the same interpretation. If these considerations, adduced by many writers beside Maycock, appear to make the doctrine of original righteousness a reasonable belief, it cannot be denied that they make a doctrine of original self-centredness equally reasonable.

It is claimed by Maycock that (p.65) the doctrine of original righteousness "corresponds with our sense that we were not made so that sin was too probable not to happen". This claim implies the belief that we were made so that sin was either possible but less probable than virtue, or possible but equally as probable as virtue. The more you diminish the degree of probability of sin, however, the higher you raise the initial degree of God-centredness, but the more you raise that initial degree of God-centredness, the more you raise the problem of a high moral condition which has not been attained by individual moral effort. This problem is nowhere adequately dealt with by Maycock, nor, so far as the present writer can see, by those who share his view. We shall discuss it further, later.

We can conclude our discussion of this particular idea with the following observation. Insofar as man's sense of what he

ought to be is described as a mormory of what he once actually was, a great mistake is made, Man ought to be perfectly loving towards God, but if he had ever been perfectly loving towards God, he would not have sinned, therefore he was never perfectly loving towards God, and, consequently, he cannot remember such a state, and, therefore, what he ought to be does not represent a memory of what he once actually was.

2. F. J. Hall.

The sole purpose in referring to this writer is to illustrate how it is sometimes proposed to reconcile the knowledge of evolution with the doctrine of the donum superadditum. He is concerned chiefly to defend that doctrine in the face of F. R. Tennant's evolutionary theory of the origin and propagation of sin. He does so by adducing the notion of gaps in the evolutionary series, and he asserts that this notion alone leaves ample room for the operation of super-physical factors. It is into the gap between the first man and his immediate animal ancestor that Hall would presumably insert a high degree of activity of these super-physical factors in order to account for the sudden appearance of Adam's highly endowed spiritual nature. The gift of the donum superadditum is thus represented as but one more example of that direct personal creative action of God which, lower down the chain of life had resulted in those amazing variations of life which

are described as leaps or mutations.

He further maintains that every previous order of life had been able to fulfil the law of its being, and that every ancestral precedent thus suggested that man was also to be enabled to fulfil the law of his being, viz., righteousness. If man were to be left only to the condition of a moralised animal, it would be an anomaly, an unprecedented missing of the mark, which would surely violate not only the wisdom but also the justice of God.

Here we meet with that recurring idea that it would be impossible for God, since He is love, to arrange only for the gradual growth, from small beginnings, of moral and spiritual power, when there was already so deeply entrenched in man a nature of clamorous animal desire. It seems that God, because He is love, must have given to man, at the outset, sufficient spiritual vision and power to enable him to enter immediately into full and perfect communion with God.

It is in order to defend this idea of how Love would surely create souls in the beginning that we are faced with such remarks as that by N. P. Williams: "There would seem to be no a priori reason why chronological posteriority of development" (i.e. of man's spiritual power) "should involve weakness", and that of F.H. Maycock: "Belief about the spiritual condition of the first man does not and indeed cannot conflict with anthropological discoveries about primitive man --- It is a

statement about his spiritual powers and one cannot assess the spiritual condition of any man alive or dead by scientific tests". (p.64. Original Sin).

The attempt is thus made to justify a high degree of initial spiritual endowment either by asserting that such endowment would be independent of the stage of evolution reached, or by seeking to show that the endowment would actually be in keeping with the principle of evolutionary growth.

The doctrine of the *donum superadditum* is a pre-scientific speculation about the spiritual endowment of the first man, determined, naturally, by a pre-conceived idea of what Love would and would not do. This idea we shall criticise later as being untenable. Here we need only observe that while our knowledge of evolution is quite consistent with the idea of the sudden appearance of a spiritual faculty which is an absolutely new thing not explicable solely in terms of antecedents, it is not consistent with the idea of its appearance in immediate plenitude of power and content.

F.J.Hall may say that every previous order of life had been enabled to fulfil the law of its being, and that this suggested man was also to be enabled to fulfil the law of his being, but it does not follow that because the law of self-centredness in animals could be realised by endowing them with a high degree of initial self-centredness, therefore the law of righteousness in men could be realised by endowing them with a high degree of initial righteousness. Hall's language reflects

the belief that God made a moral creature immediately good in the same way as He made instinctive creatures immediately self-centred. There is no need to elaborate the untenability of this belief.

To the statement that there would appear to be no a priori reason why chronological posteriority of development (i.e., of man's spiritual power) should involve weakness, it is sufficient to reply that there is no a priori reason why it should involve a capacity immediately strong enough to resist the appeals of self against the higher laws demands, and also that there would seem to be no a priori reason why we should accept a pre-scientific account of man's primitive condition when that conflicts with the plain implications of scientific knowledge. (This is discussed more fully later).

It is clearly very much open to question whether theologians would have constructed their doctrine of the donum superadditum had they known the truth about man's animal ancestry. Both the Adam story and this doctrine were constructed by men who believed that the first man was made by God with a body and mind and spirit at least as developed as those of a man of their own (respective) days. That they imagined him to be more perfect than themselves is extremely probable because of their interpretation of the word "good". (God made everything, including man, good, in the beginning). A 'good' man could mean, for them, no other than one with at least their own feelings and understanding about God, but it would probably seem to them blasphemous to think of God making man at first as unable

as themselves to fight against and overcome evil.

Against the background of the scientific picture of early man we have to ask, if the physical side of life has developed slowly over millions of years, if the mental side of life has similarly developed, is there any good reason why the spiritual can be held to be exempt from the same principle of growth, namely, from small to great, from weak to strong, from low to high?

Our notion of how life was constituted in its beginnings has to be checked primarily against the background of our pre-conceived idea of what Love would and would not do. Where this idea clashes with the obvious implications of the scientific knowledge of man's beginnings, then there are two things we must not do. We must not force, and so abuse, the categories of physical science in order to make them fit into our conception of love, and we must not refuse the challenge of God through science to re-examine that conception. The a priori reason which disabled Williams and Maycock and Hall from seeing why spiritual life in its beginnings would be weak rather than strong, was a pre-conceived idea that love was bound by its very nature to create man in the beginning more God-centred than self-centred. This idea we would reject as mistaken. The reasons for rejecting it we hope to make plain.

3. C. S. Lewis.

We can now look at C. S. Lewis's remarkable myth of the

Paradisaal man in chapter five of his "The Problem of Pain". There is reason to believe that this particular myth has supplied many Catholic Traditionalists with a convincing answer to the question - how can we reconcile the Biblical story of Adam with the scientific knowledge about man's animal ancestry?

F. H. Maycock in the preface of the Mirfield book on Original Sin says (p.13) "In my view there is no better book on the subject indeed its excellence has been a constant embarrassment to me its finality has led me to deal with the matter more theologically than I first intended".

O. C. Quick also commends the myth. He says "As historical and scientific research advances we need fresh myths not, of course, to take the place of the story of Genesis, but to interpret it in the light of new knowledge. C. S. Lewis's book contains some interesting suggestions on the subject". (The Gospel of the New World, p.43).

Before proceeding to outline and criticise the myth as Lewis presents it, this much must be said. Even though agreement may be found to be impossible, it must be acknowledged that it is an ingenious construction, and, given the Thomist pre-supposition of the doctrine of the donum superadditum, it could provide an admirable resting place for minds troubled by the difficulty presented to orthodoxy by science.

The main points in the myth are as follows:

He paints a picture of man emerging out of the brute

creation, possessed of reason before he became either self-conscious or God-conscious (p.65.). He was wholly subject to God in every way, bodily, mentally, spiritually. His organic processes obeyed the law of his own will, not the law of nature. His organs sent up appetites to the judgement seat of will, not because they had to, but because he chose. Wholly commanding himself, he commanded all lower lives with which he came into contact. His consciousness reposed on the Creator. God came first in his love and in his thought. His love and worship were perfect, and in this sense, though not in all, man was then truly the Son of God, the prototype of Christ, perfectly enacting in joy and ease of all the faculties and all the senses that filial self-surrender which our Lord enacted in the Crucifixion (pp.66.67.).

Judged by some things, e.g., language, artefacts, he may have seemed naturally a savage, but the holiest of us would have glanced at him again, and then fallen down at his feet. The self which Paradisal man had to surrender contained no natural recalcitrancy to being surrendered. His data, so to speak, were a psychological organism wholly subject to the will, and a will wholly disposed, though not compelled to turn to God. The self-surrender which he practised before the Fall meant no struggle, but only the delicious overcoming of an infinitesimal self-adherence which delighted to be overcome. He had no temptation (in our sense) to choose self. (pp. 67- 69). The turning from

self to God was however a sin possible even to the Paradisal man, because the mere existence of self- the mere fact that we call it "me" - includes from the first the danger of self-idolatry. Since I am I, I must make an act of self-surrender, however small or easy, in living to God rather than to self. This is the weak spot in creation, the risk which God apparently thinks worth taking (p.68). (See also Maycock pp.47.48. footnote).

Such, according to Lewis, was the nature of original man, and we do not know how many of these were made by God, or how long they continued in the Pardisal state, but sooner or later they fell. Someone or something whispered that they could become as gods. We have no idea in what particular act or series of acts the self-contradictory impossible wish found expression. This act of self-will on the part of the creature, which constitutes an utter falseness to its true creaturely position is the only sin that can be conceived as the Fall. (p.69). The sin was very heinous because as already stated the self which Paradisal man had to surrender contained no natural recalcitrancy to being surrendered. The fall was a loss of status as a species. What man lost was his original specific nature, and this condition was transmitted by heredity to all later generations, for it was not simply what biologists call an acquired variation. It was the emergence of a new kind of man.

A new species had sinned its way into existence. The change was a radical alteration in his constitution.

This present condition of man as a member of a spoiled species Lewis calls original sin, nor merely original misfortune. Our condition may not be our fault (here he differs from Niebuhr, Brunner) but it is a greater shame and grief than any of the particular acts which it leads us to commit. It may not be a boy's fault that he is a bully or a coward, but if he begins to mend, he will inevitably feel shame and guilt at what he is just beginning to cease to be (pp.73.74). Such is his 'myth', and C.S.Lewis calls it a "myth" in the Socratic sense, i.e., a not unlikely tale, an account of what may have been the historical fact. It would seem that it is open to the following criticisms:

- (a) Orthodox Christian teaching about the Incarnation is that Christ took upon himself unfallen human nature. If, however, unfallen human nature was as described by Lewis, then Christ would be able to control all His organic processes, his natural appetites, feelings, etc. The whole of His physical life would not be under the control of the laws of nature, but under the control of His will. What then becomes of His hunger and thirst in the wilderness of His fatigue and pain? Did He feel these things because He chose to, even when He could have remained in the situation without feeling them? If so, then it can

hardly be denied that we are presented with a new problem in relation to His "sufferings". If, of course, Christ felt these things because, like ourselves, He could no other, then, according to Lewis, Christ's human nature was "fallen", and so He was "guilty" of original sin.

- (b) The Paradisal man, in surrendering himself to God, "deliciously overcame an infinitesimal self-adherence which delighted to be overcome" (p.69). In other words, self-surrender constituted ecstatic pleasure. If so, then self-adherence as commonly understood must have meant self-denial as commonly understood. The phrase self-adherence, or self-gratification is normally used of creatures whose 'selves' are such that when they are gratified or adhered to, sin is committed. Pleasing self is, with them, synonymous with displeasing God.

But according to Lewis, the Paradisal man was completely (pp.66.69) a God-pleasing self. He pleased himself when He pleased God. In his case, therefore, "self" pleasing meant the opposite to what it means in our case. It meant God-pleasing. So he was never really "ungodly" until he denied his 'self' !!

Moreover, to such a creature, the very idea of self-worship would repel, and so it could scarcely constitute a temptation in the sense of something attractive. The very meaning of temptation is the attractiveness of some pleasure which we know

to be forbidden. The only pleasure that could attract him was already determined by his constitution, viz., the pleasure of doing God's will, and the pleasure of overcoming an "infinitesimal" temptation to disobey God's will. If he could not be tempted "in our sense" how could he be tempted ?

It would seem that in thus describing the Paradisal man, C. S. Lewis constructs a creature for whom sin would have been a psychological impossibility, and it is upon such a one that he fastens the responsibility for the primal sin !

If the "something" or someone" who whispered was the "infinitesimal self-adherence" which delighted to be overcome then it would whisper only in order that it might be so overcome. If, however, it was not this that whispered but some one outside, then the whisperer could only stimulate and appeal to that infinitesimal self-adherence which would hear only in order that it might be deliciously overcome, and the whisperer would be aware of this fact ! Whether the whisper, then, was from within or without, it could not possibly have produced the disaster of the Fall. ("God came first in his love and thought: in perfect cyclic movement, being, power, and joy descended from God to man in the form of gift, and returned from man to God in the form of obedient Love and estatic adoration"). If William Temple, with his "evolutionary" view of sin's origin could refer to

sin as too probable not to happen, it might be said that on Lewis's view of the nature of the first man, sin was too improbable to happen at all.

- (c) For God to create such a creature, means that goodness and worship was 99.999% automatic and constitutional. The creature could scarcely help being "good". It is hardly complimentary to the moral sense of God to picture Him as being satisfied with such "love" and "worship". He might as well have made puppets. A smaller risk than that involved in the infinitesimal self-adherence of the first man can scarcely be imagined. It does no credit to God, to have taken the smallest possible risk, though the use of the word risk is presumably intended to imply credit. The fact that such a negligible degree of self-adherence overcame such an overwhelmingly high degree of God-centredness in the creature, suggests that the ensuing larger degree of self-adherence will virtually automatically win over the ensuing lesser degree of God-centredness. There is no sure principle of religious thinking by which we can argue that the grace of Christ will effect against a colossal array of entrenched sin what the initial grace of God was powerless to effect against the tiniest possible speck of self-adherence.

- (d) Lewis says (p.72) that God realised what was going to happen. This, of course, negatives the idea that God took

a risk. "He saw the crucifixion in the act of creating the first nebula". The conflict between the good descending from God and the evil arising from the creature "is resolved by God's assumption of the suffering nature which evil produced". This suggests that Christ did take the fallen nature of man and so must have been burdened with original sin ! He also says "the doctrine of the free Fall asserts that the evil which thus makes the fuel or raw material for the second or more complex kind of good is not God's contribution but man's". (p.72). He is here completely off the track. Evil never was, and never could be the "raw material" for goodness. He has completely misunderstood the classical phrase "fomes boni" which refers to the non-moral raw material of man's animal nature, the instincts and passions not normally subordinate to reason.

- (e) Of the condition of original sin, he says (p.73) "our sufferings are not a punishment for being what we cannot now help, nor are we responsible for the rebellion of a remote ancestor". He thus avoids certain excesses of St. Augustine's thought. He goes on, however, to say that our religious experience does not allow us to regard our present condition as one merely of original misfortune but of original sin. We "cannot help it" - but, if we begin to mend (like a boy who has been brought up badly) we inevitably "feel shame and guilt" at what we are "beginning to cease to be". (p.74).

It will suffice to notice here that Lewis allows we feel guilty for what we know we cannot help !

- (f) His attempt to fit the appearance and the fall of this creature into the categories of evolutionary science make strange reading and must surely involve him in a charge of abusing the terminology of physical science. Physically, his Paradisal man connects up quite naturally with its evolutionary background, but psychically the whole organism is completely and fantastically removed from it. The picture of the immediate new relation between mind and body, and between spirit and God surely constitutes a sheer caricature of all scientific ideas of "evolution". That which was only an animal because all its physical and psychical processes were directed to purely material and natural ends (p.65) became, in the twinkling of an eye, (Lewis calls it "in the fullness of time"!), a God-centred spirit, God coming first in all his thoughts, obediently loving and ecstatically adoring, a true Son of God, a prototype of Christ, enacting perfectly the filial self-surrender of Christ on Calvary. To become possessed at all of a God-consciousness is wonderful enough. The emergence of such, even in its tiniest beginnings is sufficient to justify the term mutation, but that a saint should suddenly appear immediately busy with perfect spiritual worship, where a moment before, was a creature wholly immersed in purely

selfish and material affairs - this is too much, surely, for reason ! If one borrows the categories of evolutionary science, one must surely limit oneself to that degree of possibility denoted by scientists !

Similarly with the Fall, there is no gradual process of deterioration, only an immediate change in the organism, so deep-reaching that it can be called "not parallel to the development of a new organ or a new habit, but a radical alteration of constitution. 'It was not simply an acquired variation: it was a new species". (p.71). It is all abrupt, and, immediately, greatly perfect, or greatly corrupt. That the first of a series of acts, possible by virtue of a creature's constituted nature should effect an immediate change of species is a supposition which can surely by no means be fitted into the framework of our existing scientific knowledge .

VI. THE PRE-NATAL FALL THEORY.

1. Julius Müller.

Müller's exposition of the theory of a multiplicity of pre-natal falls is to be found in his "The Doctrine of Sin" (Book 4, Chapter 4, 3rd edition, translated by W. Pulsford, 1853). The main statements of it are as follows. "In the existence of every man there must be some moment in which the first real sin was committed. But this individual fall does not present itself to the individual as the entering in of an entirely new element into the youthful life, but much rather as the developing and revealing of a hidden potency, as the awakening of a power slumbering in the deeps. Sin does not first of all originate in him, it only steps forth." (op.cit. p.290). "We must admit that in every human individual there is an innate propensity to evil" and "it can only have its ground in a free falling away, in one's own offence." (op.cit. p.293).

Müller observes that we count man as guilty in sin, yet we acknowledge that he is born with the sinfulness from which actual sin proceeds, and that this would be a contradiction "if there were not timelessly preceding our earthly temporal existence some existence of our personality as the sphere of

that self-decision by which our moral condition from the beginning is conditioned" (op.cit. p.400). He concludes, "We are justified in regarding the propensity to evil ... as one which we have ourselves contracted, if each one has in his extra-temporal condition turned away his will from the Divine light to the darkness of self-hood absorbed in itself." (op.cit. p.401).

Little can further be added to the criticisms of this theory adduced by N. P. Williams. (The Ideas of the Fall and of Original Sin. p.p. 507-12), which, so far as one can see, have never yet been satisfactorily answered by any upholder of it.

(1) Muller, though appearing to expound a theory of extra-temporal falls, does, in fact, speak throughout in terms which cannot be emptied of a temporal reference, e.g. "This were now a manifest contradiction, if there were not (timelessly) preceding our earthly temporal existence..." (The Doctrine of Sin, p.400), and "the recognition of a primitive fall preceding the individual time-life" (op.cit. p.401).

(2) In spite of this pre-natal fall, Muller yet tries to find a place for a historical fall of Adam and Eve (op.cit. pp.427-9). Williams remarks of this that it is quite unnecessary logically, but "since the supposed historical sin of our first parents must in accordance with his main theory, be attributed

to pre-creational transgressions on their part, the story of Genesis iii is really, though he will not admit it, nothing but an excrescence upon the main fabric of his theory.

(Williams, p.509).

(3) One of the most serious criticisms of Muller's theory is that to which his idea of the original pre-natal self is open. "Man," he says, "did not begin from an original disunion with God, since before the original self-decision he was non-determinate, and yet essentially existing by God. Therefore he adhered to his eternal origin, but such an adherence, because it is affirmed by no self-decision, has as yet no moral significance." Muller says that "an original neutrality between fellowship with God and departure from God is out of the question: it is in fact an empty abstraction. So also is a vacillation between love of God, and love of self, which would include a power of evil in man, therefore a sin before the sin" (Doctrine of Sin Vol.ii. p.157).

Müller had already committed himself to the assertion that the essence of the first sin was self-love in preference to Love of God (p.101 also pp.133-140). How such a creature as that described above could possibly commit such a sin it is impossible to perceive, for it was capable of no attitude towards itself or towards God, and so must have been conscious neither of self nor of God. The psychological difficulties

of the idea are immense. Williams remarks "If we are to make the conception of a pre-natal sin intelligible at all, we must regard the pre-existent soul as a monad or atom of soul-stuff, containing the potentiality of its fully developed adult structure ...this, of course, means that the conception of heredity ... is a pure illusion. (p.511).

(4) Again, the theory is open to the objection that it involves a view of the original condition of life on this planet which is opposed to the fundamentally Biblical Christian view. According to this latter view, the world, as God made it, was thoroughly good in the beginning - including man himself, whereas on Müller's view, this life is "a penitentiary of fallen souls", wherein each expiates a sin of which he possesses no memory. In this connection Williams makes the telling remark, "It is difficult to see how Christian parents could rejoice that a man is born into the world if they were under the necessity of regarding their new-born offspring as a small culprit who had just been banished from the intelligible sphere in consequence of some gross defiance of the majesty of God." (p.512). The theory is pessimistic, almost Manichaeian, in its implications, so far as this world's origin is concerned.

(5) Müller was prevented by his Lutheran orthodoxy from breaking decisively with the Augustinian conception of original

guilt, which is an indefensible doctrine. (Müller vol.ii p.293).

(6) In addition to these criticisms, however, we have to notice the following point. Müller lived at a time when the scientific doctrine of evolution was not generally received. He was limited to the prescientific view of the special creation of man. The tendency to self-love, now viewed as inherited by man from his animal ancestry, was then regarded as a disturbance of the original constitution of man. It was so regarded because men were incapable of reconciling it with the conception of a loving Creator. Love, it was thought, could not possibly have arranged the very thing which made virtue so hard and sin so easy. To think like that appeared tantamount to making God responsible for sin.

It is this basic preconception, that God could have nothing to do with the origin of self-love, that determines Muller's theory. The evidence for this is found on pp.292-293 of the second volume of his Doctrine of Sin. He had been considering the opinion that in the earliest years of childhood, man was possessed of absolute innocence and perfect purity, and that the dualism of human nature, i.e. the struggle between the spirit and the sense-nature, was sufficient to account for the appearance of sin and a weakened will. Müller calls this weakness a bad disposition and in answer he says that, while the Church doctrine has always considered this disposition as

a disturbance and corruption foreign to the original God-ordained nature of man, this opinion "finds nothing in this disposition which is not compatible with the good order of human nature, and which might not follow from the necessary laws of its development. But...it not only receives the burden of placing at the very ground of human nature, an impure notion, which does violence to the Holiness of the Creator,.... etc." (p.293).

We may note here that while the initial disposition in man to love self before other may follow from the necessary laws of (human) development, it does not follow that that disposition will be yielded to necessarily in the case of the call to man to love God before self. God may arrange the initial self-centred disposition as the morally necessary prelude for the ultimate response of love, but so soon as He calls man to love Him He gives to him the grace to overcome the solicitations of that disposition, in other words, to change his original disposition. It cannot be denied that God is responsible for arranging the moral struggle, but neither can it be denied that He supplies grace to man in that struggle. The concept of Divine grace shuts the door firmly in the face of any idea of necessary sinning.

Miller agrees in principle with the idea that God arranges moral struggle as the morally necessary prelude to the

attainment by man to the Beatific vision. "The creature must first of all by self-development in fellowship with the believed God grow strong in himself and in this fellowship in order to become capable of the vision of God." (op.cit. p.328). Why, if this be true, God should first create a creature such as that described by Muller (op.cit. p.157), empty of all capacity for moral struggle, it is difficult to see, for as soon as God launched it on the moral life He would have to invest it with that capacity. No purpose would be served by God deferring the moral struggle, by creating the soul in this way at first.

Muller has, of course, made the mistake (due to his limited idea of special creation) that any original self-centredness would mean "a power of evil in man", and, therefore, "a sin before the sin." (op.cit. p.157). His inability to conceive of an already existing guiltless self-centredness prior to the first moral choice led to his "naked and vacuous pre-existent ego, ... a pure form, ... empty of all content, possessing merely the potentiality of self-consciousness, without any self of which to be conscious." (Williams, op.cit. p.511).

His "pre-natal soul" must be conceived as being suddenly presented simultaneously with a perfectly new consciousness of self and a perfectly new consciousness of God, and, on the basis of this consciousness, - with no previous experience of God or

of self, - having to choose between them at the level of morality. The situation is psychologically fantastic, and, of course, in view of our reasonably well-established belief that man was self-conscious long before he was God-conscious (to say nothing of our equally reasonable belief that man was conscious of the supernatural as mere arbitrary power long before he was conscious of it as a God of Love), it is quite inaccurate and untenable.

2. D. R. Davies.

A more recent attempt to defend the idea of a multiplicity of pre-natal falls is to be found in D. R. Davies's book "The Two Humanities." (pp.64-79). The main steps in his arguments are as follows: The doctrine of the fall implies clearly a fully developed personality, for to choose independence from creative Being is the act of a highly developed personal self-consciousness. Human beings in historical beginnings were so undeveloped as to be incapable of such personal decision. Theirs was mere undifferentiated tribal consciousness. The beings who were the original creation of God must have been therefore full developed self-conscious spirits, the proof of which is they personally sinned. They were God-like, eternally youthful, angelic. When they sinned their personality descended into the primitive consciousness of the tribal man. They appeared in time as Neanderthal man or Pithecanthropus, and history is the

record of an agonising psychological rise from dark unconsciousness to personal awareness. The fall is thus a change in species and its catastrophic nature can be witnessed to in our own experience of evil inducing profound psychological changes amounting to a difference in being. Christ did not appear till man had recovered the psychic potentiality of his origin. The universal myth of a golden age may be the embodiment of a dim racial memory of man's celestial origin and fall. Children are nearer the roots of being, and heaven lies about them in their infancy: it was in man's infancy that he was uneasily stirred by the memory of the far off and long ago.

In answer to Davies's argument we may make the following observations. It only becomes necessary to postulate a highly developed personal self-consciousness for the being who first sinned, if it is believed that the first sin was that of a being who realised the full significance of his deliberate rebellion against God. It only becomes necessary, however, so to conceive the first sinner because of the prior belief that only such a sin could bring such catastrophic consequences in its train. This belief in turn links up with the belief that this whole present mode of life is not God's original design for man.

We have to reject the idea that the sin of a highly developed personal self-consciousness would have such an effect, and also the idea that this present scheme of things, man's sin

and its known effects apart, does not represent God's original plan. The reasons for rejecting these ideas are as follows. If man had attained, by the time of Christ, to the psychic potentiality of his origin, then any sin committed thereafter would have been as serious, and, therefore, would have had effects similar to those produced by, the first sin committed by such a developed self-conscious being. Each choice of independence from the Divine Being made by men with such a degree of self-consciousness would have meant a reversion to the primitive consciousness of tribal man. That no such results do, in fact, take place argues that no such results can be said to have taken place in the case of any creature supposed to have been created with such a highly developed self-consciousness.

Moreover, if those souls who have passed into the purely spiritual life beyond the grave commit any sins of deliberate rebellion against God while possessing the self-consciousness of a person who lived on earth about the time of Christ, then, on Davies's argument, it would seem they would fall back from their purely spiritual state into this material life and start off again as a 'primitive' with an undifferentiated tribal consciousness. The difficulties of such a view are obvious.

Again, there is no parallel in our experience of sin, of the supposed catastrophic results of the first sin of the first human soul. To adduce, in support of these results, the

profound psychological changes, amounting to a difference in being, which are induced by our sinning, is pointless, since one thing we know for certain is that any "difference in being" resulting from sin, is a progressive change in character, which is nowhere near a change in species, as that word is customarily understood. The great difference wrought by sin in any person does not take place in its devastating totality immediately, that is, as the result of one sin, but only as the cumulative effect of prolonged sinning. This is true in the case of Dorian Gray, whom Davies quotes to support the opposite idea of an immediate catastrophic change in species. Moreover, the more God-like a soul, the more penitent and ashamed it is after sin. This is the only psychology of sin we know; the burden of proof is on those who assert there is another kind.

The results of the first sin are pictured by Davies as "appearing in time" in contrast to the first sin itself which was committed in pre-existence." This contrast between "pre-existence" and "time" suggests the pre-existence was a timeless state, and this would expose Davies's argument to the criticisms which Williams levels against Kant's theory of the noumenal self, viz. a timeless act is meaningless, and a timeless state would mean there was an eternal evil principle which would involve Manichaeism.

Davies's presentation of the pre-natal theory, like

Muller's, represents the whole process in time as the result of evil. This, as has been noted, contradicts the main Biblical Christian belief that this creation came originally from the hand of God 'a good thing.' Christians may believe that beyond and prior to this world, there was a world of pure spirits, even that some of these spirits corrupted this world of time, but such beliefs are held alongside the belief that originally this world is the good creation of God, that everything in it was first of all good as it came from His hand, and only afterwards became infected with evil.

In conclusion we may note that the pre-natal theory contradicts the Biblical and scientific beliefs that man, as a living soul, originally appeared after the rest of this material creation, that as he first appeared he represented the crown and climax of the material universe, and also the belief that though he has corrupted himself through sin, his original state was not celestial but terrestrial, not God-like but brutish.

VII. THE PRE-MUNDANE FALL THEORY

1. The need to differentiate this theory from the pre-natal fall theory.

The Pre-Mundane Fall Theory, as presented by P. Green in "The Problem of Evil" (1920), and in "The Pre-Mundane Fall" (1944), by W. Formby in "The Unveiling of the Fall" (1923), and by N. P. Williams in "The Ideas of the Fall and of Original Sin" (1927), ought to be distinguished clearly from the theory of the Pre-Natal Fall, which we have just criticised. The former title is better reserved to indicate the idea of one single collective or representative fall of all humanity in Time; the latter to indicate that of a multiplicity of individual extra-temporal falls. P. Green in his pamphlet The Pre-Mundane Fall (p.20) has indiscriminately joined together as teachers of "The Pre-Mundane Fall", Origen, Kant, Coleridge, Muller, Formby, Williams. The division would better be,

- (a) Pre-Mundane Fall, - Coleridge, Formby, Williams,
- (b) Pre-Natal Fall, - Origen, Kant, Muller, though we have to notice the difference between Origen and Kant, viz. Origen's falls, though pre-natal, are, strictly, in Time, whereas Kant's belong to the intelligible world, in which, as Williams says, The idea of Time has no validity. This distinction between the two groups of writers helps to clarity of thought.

2. S. T. Coleridge.

We must notice that all that Coleridge says about this matter in Aphorism X in Aids to Reflection, is that man's resistance to God has long been acknowledged as a mystery, which, by the nature of the subject, must ever remain such, - "a problem of which any other solution than the statement of the fact itself is demonstrably impossible". (p.189). "It belongs to the very essence of the doctrine that in respect of original sin, every man is the adequate representative of all men. Even in Genesis the word Adam is distinguished from a proper name by an article before it. It is the Adam, so as to express the genus, not the individual, or rather as well as the individual." (p.194) "It would have been possible to enter into the momentous subject of a spiritual fall or apostacy antecedent to the formation of man, a belief, the Scriptural grounds of which are few and of diverse interpretation, but which has been almost universal in the Christian Church." (p.195).

These are the main statements by Coleridge on the question, and it is on the basis of them that (a) Tennant remarks "Coleridge regarded the universal prevalence of evil as an expression of the timeless act of the whole race, the evil not of any one man's will, but of all human wills collectively." (Origin and Propagation of Sin, Lecture II,),

and (b) Williams says "Coleridge seems to hint at some such theory" (that is, a collective fall of the race soul of humanity in an indefinitely remote past) "when he speaks of 'a spiritual fall or apostacy antecedent to the formation of man.'" We shall not neglect any important aspect of the theory if we attend to it as it is elaborated by the Bampton lecturer.

3. The theory as presented by N. P. Williams.

Williams's main position may be outlined as follows. Sin presupposes the moral law to sin against, and the birth of the moral law must have taken place thousands of years after the emergence of man as a distinct species. (p.516). The first known sinner must have been merely one amongst thousands of brethren whom he could only infect by example not by heredity. Even supposing the descendants of this primeval sinner to have intermarried with the descendants of his ex-hypothesi sinless or non-moral brethren so that all became polluted by his infirmity, such an idea presupposes the transmissability of acquired as distinct from congenital characteristics, which is too uncertain an idea on which to build any fall doctrine. (pp.516-7). The first sin, even if we could isolate it, would not thus explain subsequent sins. It would be, not the cause, but the first known effect of the hereditary infirmity, the first result in human history of the

ultimate fall. The first specifically human creature did not fall: he only failed to rid himself of the anachronistic ape and tiger strain in the blood, to emancipate himself from the deficiency in 'herd-instinct' or gregarious feeling (p.517). Innate weakness of herd-instinct is due to an arrested development. This arrest points to an evil agency existing in the nature of things before man was. This evil power is the same as that mysterious power which vitiates the whole of sub-human life with cruelty and selfishness.

Williams defends the use of these moral terms in relation to sub-human life by saying that not all evil is sin. He applies the term 'evil' to all phenomena which our moral consciousness tells us ought not to exist. We only describe such phenomena as 'sins' if they are due to conscious voluntary action. He describes certain familiar features of animal and plant life which offend the refined moral consciousness and concludes that we would not have created them like that if we had had the power. Such things are against our idea of a loving Creator. (p.522).

To explain this underlying evil in all creation we must assume a pre-cosmic self-vitiation of the world-soul, which we must conceive as having been created free, personal, self-conscious, the image of its Maker, most mighty, and good, most fair and perfect. The idea of 'original righteousness'

can here be employed. (525-6) At the beginning of Time this world-soul turned away from God to self in some transcendental and incomprehensible fashion. It thus shattered its own interior being and lost its unitary self-consciousness which it has only regained after aeons of myopic striving in sporadic fragments which are the separate minds of men and perhaps of superhuman spirits. (p.526).

There was an intimate connection between the created world-soul and the eternal Logos, it was meant to consist in the continuous penetration, inspiration, and guidance of the world - soul by the Logos. The Spirit of Christ has gone on helping the blinded and marred world-soul to recover its original harmony, peace, and unified self-consciousness. (p.529). In the fullness of time the Logos entered into a closer bond with the fallen world-soul by uniting humanity to His divinity. Through the Church, the defect of herd-instinct, of love, - it matters not how it be named - may be remedied through the direct transfusion into our souls of His own life. (p.530).

Such is his theory, and in the sweep and comprehensiveness of it, one cannot deny a certain initial attractiveness. There are certain features, however, in the theory which cause us to reject it, and the reasons for that rejection we shall now endeavour to make plain.

4. Criticisms of the Theory.

The first point which we would criticise is his location of the inherited infirmity in an arrested development of the herd-instinct. Even if he did not intend it, he certainly uses the terms love, social feeling, gregariousness, herd-instinct, the social instinct, the moral sentiment, interchangeably. We can notice in this connection especially his phrase "the defect of love, of social feeling, of gregariousness, of herd-instinct, it matters not how it be named -" (p.530 op.cit.). We know that these features of life are closely connected, being stages in man's growth. The moral sentiment is connected with the herd-instinct, and love is only possible on the basis of the moral sentiment, but to identify a failure in love with a defect of herd-instinct, and this is the plain implication of his language, is obviously untrue.

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Williams's argument amounts to this, that if man's herd-instinct had been stronger, it would by itself have been able effectively to combat the sex and self-assertive instincts as these found greater opportunities and inducements to express themselves through the rapid growth of social and intellectual life. If man's victories over temptations to selfishness in these directions, however, had been due to the

operation of an instinct, how could we designate those victories as moral victories?

It is precisely the greater strength of the instincts of self-assertiveness and sex over against the herd-instinct in man, that makes possible any moral struggle and any moral growth at all. If the nicely calculated pre-human balance of animal instincts had been maintained later in human beings, no moral struggle could have taken place. What the herd-instinct did for the beast in enabling it to curb its sex and ego instincts, has to be done in man by something quite different from instinct, namely, by free moral choice. Far from weakness of herd instinct being an infirmity in man, it is the very condition of moral growth. If it had remained or developed sufficiently strong to combat the self-centred nature in man, then man would have been incapable of real moral action: in fact, he would not have been a man at all. If love would have been easier because of a stronger herd-instinct, it really means that love would have been easier because it would have been more instinctive. It is precisely the difficulty of love's struggle in creatures that is the hall-mark of the original divine plan. That it should be easy for love right from the beginning is an idea based, as we hope to show, on a wrong conception of the task and obligations facing creative love.

The second point which we would criticise is his description of the behaviour of certain plants and animals and insects as selfish, cruel, diabolical, that such behaviour can only be due to an evil force pervading sub-human nature. If, however, as he says, the theory of the transmissability of acquired, as apart from congenital, characteristics is too uncertain an idea on which to build any theological fall-doctrine, surely, also, the idea of cruelty and hatred in the sub-human world is too uncertain on which to build such a doctrine! He admits that the creatures are not morally culpable for their behaviour, and confesses that the ultimate ground of his judgment of their behaviour as evil is a feeling that such behaviour is not in accord with the will of Creative Love. We are thus faced once again with the old preconceived idea that Love could never arrange for the rise of moral creatures out of a prelude of self-centredness, that Love would make unselfishness easy and selfishness hard. It is our contention that this pre-conception is mistaken but we shall defer the defence of our view till the last chapter.

A third point is, Williams carries back the problem of the origin of evil beyond man, because of his agreement with Muller that the first human sin was not the Fall. "It was merely the first result in human history of the Fall" (p.519). The evil was there prior to man. It only stepped forth in

him. It is no solution, or better explanation of the problem of the origin of evil, to trace its presence in man to a defect in love, and to trace that defect to the self-corruption of a world soul which corrupted itself through a defect in love. You cannot get rid of the root of self-love by transferring the first sin from a human soul to a world-soul. The mistake is to think that it is necessary to get rid of the root of self-love inherited by man from his animal predecessors.

In this connection we must observe that while Williams may criticise the soul in its pre-natal state (as described by Müller) as too vacuous an entity to be capable of sin, his own world-soul can certainly be criticised as being too good a creature ever to be able to sin in the way described. There is this further point, the pre-natal fall theory is more in line with the traditional Catholic belief that man is responsible for the weakness in himself that makes sin seem inevitable. It was man's sin that caused his present condition here. The Pre-Mundane Fall Theory, on the other hand, exempts man, as man, from responsibility for the weakness in himself. It was not man who sinned the weakness into existence, but the world-soul.

A fourth point is, Williams regards the innate psychological self-centredness which man has inherited from

the brutes as being somehow an evil thing. (p.527). This original self-centredness in man must, however, be firmly dissociated from any idea of a taint of evil, from any idea of something having gone wrong with the original scheme of things. It must be held to be the original plan of God, and to be the necessary prelude to the creation of un-selfcentredness. Of this we shall speak later (see last chapter).

Further, we have already referred to N. P. Williams's remark that there would seem to be no a priori reason why temporal posteriority of development should involve weakness. He goes on to say, "An omnipotent God presumably might and could have so ordered matters that the moral consciousness when it did appear should have sprung into existence endowed with the fullest power and control over the animal impulses, like Athene Springing fully armed from the head of Zeus." (p.532). It is not long before we learn to be suspicious of arguments which begin in the strain "God is omnipotent so presumably He might..." It is really the appearance once again of that which we have already noticed, namely, a pre-conceived idea - and, as we believe, a wrong one, - of what Love would and would not do. It is surely most significant that Williams here invokes the idea of Divine Omnipotence to support the argument that God cannot be responsible for the difficulty of the moral struggle, and that

he illustrates the idea of omnipotence which he has in mind by a reference to pagan mythology, wherein divine power is represented as being of the magical autocratic kind which is able to take short cuts to the realisation of its purposes by overriding the moral obligations of love and disregarding the contingencies of natural laws. This is an unchristian conception which can hardly commend itself to us, and which must be held to undermine somewhat the position which it is intended to defend. Moreover, if we assume that God is omnipotent in such a way that He could arrange that the moral consciousness should be able immediately to have the fullest power and control over animal impulses, then surely we must also assume He would arrange that the world-soul should be able immediately to have the fullest power and control over the evil impulse to rebel. You cannot, logically, defend God against a charge of being responsible for the weakness of our mortal nature by saying that if He had originally arranged its emergence by a process of development He would have seen to it that it should emerge immediately able to overcome all evil opposition, - you cannot argue like this - without involving God in a charge of being responsible for the moral weakness in the world-soul, for presumably He could also have seen to it that the world-soul should appear immediately able to overcome temptation. The fact that even

the world-soul did not appear immediately like that, suggests that God was not able to make it appear like it!

The whole idea of a world-soul created good, free, personal, self-conscious, yet corrupting itself, is open to the same criticism as was levelled against the idea of the good angels, and the good Paradisal man. Such creatures could not sin in the way they are said to have sinned. The idea involves spiritual and psychological happenings which are totally unrelated to, and completely indefensible by any reference to, the facts of spiritual life as we know it, and if terms, borrowed from that life, are to be used to describe such events, then those events must be, in all reason, basically related to our own spiritual experience, to describe which those terms were originally specifically invented. It is this total unrelatedness between these so-called primal events and the knowledge gained from moral and spiritual experience in this life that forces us to put them aside as impossibilities. In this connection it is surely not without significance that Williams himself can only refer to the fall of the world-soul as happening in "some transcendental and incomprehensible manner."

We must also notice the bearing of the theory on the doctrines of Redemption and Incarnation. How can we be assured of the efficacy of the Atonement if what we are being

redeemed into is that personal goodness which characterised the world-soul in the beginning, and which was powerless to resist the enticements of evil? What, moreover, are we to think of the human nature that Christ took in the Incarnation? If, as the advocates of the premundane fall theory suggest, human nature was never anything other than a corrupt and struggling fragment of a disintegrated world-soul, what kind of human nature was it that the Second Person in the Divine Trinity assumed at Bethlehem? Orthodox Catholicism has always assumed that it was unfallen human nature, as originally created by God, but according to this theory there never was such a thing! Thus the theory strikes at the heart of the Christian faith. It reduces the Incarnation to a mockery. Would God, clothed in the very robes of catastrophe, enact what could, at the most, only succour men to become what had originally proved to be powerless to resist temptation? How could a corrupted fragment of a fallen world-soul be united to Deity, and how could the resulting union of natures be said to have resisted the subtlest temptations to which spiritual nature can be subjected, unless such resistance was due only to the Deity within, and not in any way to the corrupt humanity? How, thus, could the "Incarnation" be anything other than a docetic and monophysitic charade? What becomes of the Divine Voice speaking through the mouthpiece

of this corrupt nature exhorting all who share that nature to "be perfect as God is perfect," when even the original world-soul created good by God had failed to remain good? If there is no other goodness which God can offer to human nature than that of the world-soul which was powerless to remain good, why should He be at pains to devise the elaborate drama of the Incarnation? If, however, there is a goodness, other than that which was powerless to remain good, why did He not endow the world-soul with it in the first place, instead of only offering it to it now at the cost of such loss and suffering?

In conclusion, we can notice the following contrasts between this theory and traditional Catholic belief, in the light of Williams's statement that "Catholic Christianity is committed to no more than the bare assertion that there was a fall, i.e. a primal rebellion of a created will against God."

Traditional Catholic belief asserts that man himself was created originally good by God. The Pre-Mundane fall theory holds that man, as such, was not created originally good by God, but was, like the rest of the physical universe, a struggling remnant of an already self-corrupted world-soul.

Traditional Catholic belief asserts that man was made in God's image, that he is responsible for endangering that image, that he has dragged himself down through the mire, that he is a miserable wretch, worthy of death and destruction,

and is only redeemed from sin, which is his fault, by the mercy of God. It is impossible to believe, on the Pre-Mundane fall theory, in the doctrine of the original *imago dei* in man. That theory represents man as a hero to be pitied, a victim struggling against tremendous odds, the creation of which were in no sense his own fault. He is the result of a mysterious transcendental calamity, and redemption is the rescue of an innocent from an undeserved fate.

Traditional Catholic belief asserts that the several pre-human orders of creation, as we know them were created good by God. The Pre-Mundane fall theory teaches that these orders were not created good themselves, but are the corrupted and struggling remnants of a fallen world-soul which was created good by God.

Traditional Catholic belief asserts that whatever pre-human fall there may have been belonged to an order of being organically separate from this terrestrial order. The Pre-Mundane fall theory teaches that the pre-human fall pertained to what was organically related not only to the celestial but also to the terrestrial order. (Williams *op.cit.* p.527, 528)

Traditional Catholic belief asserts that man's temptations and struggles are connected with the malicious activity of a supernatural fallen being, and with the

weakness brought about through the first yielding to that being. The Pre-Mundane fall theory teaches that those difficulties and temptations are due to the self-corruption of what is organically connected with his very essence, for the consequent original corruption of which he cannot be held responsible and also possibly to the activity of creatures who have since voluntarily increased in themselves that original corruption from which they, too, suffered.

It is in the light of such considerations that we would put aside the theory as unsatisfactory.

VIII. THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY

Few writers would disagree with the statement that the greatest exponent of the evolutionary theory of the origin and propagation of sin is F. R. Tennant. We can begin our discussion of this theory by isolating the main statements from his Hulsean lectures of 1901-2.

1. F. R. Tennant's Views Outlined.

Can we find the ground of the possibility and occasion for sin in our natural constitution, regarded as the perfectly normal result of a process of development through which the race has passed previously to the acquisition of full moral personality, and can we assign the rise of evil itself simply to the difficulty of the task which has to be encountered by every individual person alike, the task of enforcing his inherited organic nature to obey a moral law which he has only gradually been enabled to discern? This is the view which Tennant seeks to support, and his main position is as follows.

He warns us more than once, that in discussing the initial stages of sin we must necessarily use language which would seem terribly inadequate to describe sin as it is present to the mind of the Christian penitent. He assumes physical and mental continuity between man and beast (p.86. op.cit.) Man did not at first think of himself so much as an individual

as part of a system. The idea of moral personality in terms of which theology has been wont exclusively to formulate its doctrine of original sin emerged extremely late in human thought, (p.89. op.cit.) The awakening of man's moral sense was an advance accomplished by a long series of stages, and the origin of evil was a gradual process, not an abrupt and inexplicable plunge. Its appearance would consist in the continuance of man in certain practices, the satisfying of certain natural impulses, after those things had come to be regarded as conflicting with a recognised sanction of ethical rank as low as that of tribal custom (p.91 op.cit.)

The first sins of humanity would be as the sins of childhood, not the most heinous, but rather the least guilty. The motions in men which the first recognised sanction condemned were natural and non-moral, not sinful. Many of man's native propensities are inevitably strong because they are or were useful or necessary, and were therefore intensified by natural selection. There is no need to refer their clamorous importunity to an evil bias or corrupted nature. (pp. 94, 95, op.cit.). To the evolutionist sin is not an innovation, but is the survival or misuse of habits or tendencies incidental to an earlier stage of development, whose sinfulness lies in their anachronism.

A bias to evil can only be predicated of the will, and

the will emerges after the nature is inherited. It is the basal proposition of the evolutionary theory of sin that until the will has emerged and the life begins to be self-directed, no germ of evil can be said to exist in the individual (p.105. op.cit.). Morality consists in the formation of the non-moral material of nature into character, in subjecting the seething and tumultuous life of natural tendency, of appetite and passion, affection and desire, to the moulding influence of reflective purpose. Here, and not in any universal and hereditarily transmitted disturbance of man's nature is to be found the occasion or source of universal sinfulness (p.109, op.cit.)

In thus naturally accounting for the origin and universality of sin, we neither excuse sin, nor explain it away. If this account of sin sees in it something empirically inevitable for every man (these words Tennant later altered to "universally present in some degree in the lives of man") it by no means implies that sin is theoretically or on a priori grounds an absolute necessity. It asserts that the realisation of our self, because of our nature and surroundings is a stupendously difficult task, and thus emphasises, like the old doctrine of inherited depravity, man's crying need of grace, and his capacity for a gospel of redemption (op.cit. p.113).

The fall is exchanged for an animal origin and a subsequent superposition or acquisition of moral rationality. Taint of sin is replaced by normal self-directed tendencies once naturally but now wrongly called sinful (op.cit. p.114). That man's performance lags behind his aspirations, is to be attributed not to a defection from a sinless yet moral state, but to the fact that he is rising in moral culture, whilst his inherited psychical and physical constitution is making no evolutionary progress. The theory preserves the truth of solidarity of race, both in nature and in environment along with that of individual responsibility and guilt (op.cit.p.115) Such, briefly, is Tennant's position.

2. Common Criticisms of his views.

The charges most commonly brought against his views are as follows. (1) His theory does not explain why sin happens always and everywhere. We have to presuppose a bias to evil right at the beginning. (2) It seeks to explain what is, ex hypothesi, inexplicable. (3) It minimises sin's seriousness by making it inevitable. (4) It is a godless naturalism. (5) Spiritual sins cannot be made to depend on animal ancestry. (6) It makes sin purely negative, a mere failure to moralise the raw material of all morality. (7) It offers no adequate explanation of the sense of guilt. (8) It involves God in

responsibility for sin, if God is responsible for lack of moral illumination.

3. These Criticisms Criticised.

Let us deal with these criticisms separately. (1) "It does not explain why sin happens always and everywhere: we have to presuppose a bias to evil right at the beginning." In answering this criticism we may observe that any theory which "explained" completely why the human will acted in certain ways, would explain such acts away by introducing determinism into human conduct. That Tennant's theory does not do this can scarcely be adduced as a deficiency. How far he explains sin will be seen when we deal with the next criticism, viz. that his theory seeks to explain what is, ex hypothesi, inexplicable.

Before we pass to that criticism we have to notice what is said further in this first criticism, namely, "we have always to presuppose a bias to evil at the beginning." It was S. C. Gayford who put forward the following criticism, which Tennant recorded in the preface to the second edition of his "Origin and Propagation of Sin", - "Is the will found from the first in sympathy and alliance with the impulses which it ought to curb! Is it neutral? or does it incline towards that higher law which is just beginning to dawn upon the consciousness? This really goes to the root of the matter. Tennant really

evades it. He assumes without proof that the will from the first has been neutral as towards the lower impulses."

Tennant's reply included the following remarks. "If the will emerge before the moral consciousness; if, in other words, man's attitude towards his inborn propensities is volitional before it can possibly be influenced by any sense of right or wrong, then it must surely follow that the will from the first has been neutral towards the lower impulses. It could not be anything else. The impulses are non-moral, and the will is as yet non-moral: the being is purely animal at this stage." (op.cit. p. xviii). He continued, "That the child should continue to gratify impulses after having come already to understand it ought not, is a serious moral fact: but it is not necessary to postulate any sympathy and alliance with natural impulses more mysterious than the continuance of the capacity to feel pleasure in their satisfaction. There is," Tennant concludes, "no root of the whole matter deeper than that which my investigation of the sources of actual sin sought to lay bare."

R. S. Moxon, in discussing Gayford's criticism, agreed that Tennant's answer was satisfying to the reason, but added that it somehow failed to secure conviction because of the discontinuity which Tennant still found between the fomes peccati and the will.

We must agree that Gayford's question did go to the root of the matter, but we must observe a very important point. His question is, unintentionally ambiguous, and whether or not Tennant perceived the ambiguity, his answer met both of the two possible interpretations. Where lay the ambiguity? In the words "from the first". "Is the will from the first in sympathy with the impulses it ought to curb... or does it incline towards the higher law just beginning to dawn on the consciousness?" Did Gayford mean (a) from the first moment when conduct began to be volitional, or (b) from the first moment that the will was faced with a choice between gratifying the old impulses and obeying the higher law by denying them? If he meant the first, then Tennant answered that there was no sympathy and alliance as such for there was no alternative to choose apart from the impulses. If Gayford meant the second, then Tennant answered there was a sympathy and an alliance, but such only as sprang from the remembered pleasure of past gratifications of those impulses.

It is here maintained that this answer is correct, and that to seek an answer along the lines of presupposing an already existing sinful tendency or perversion of the will or bias to evil in the beginning is to go sadly astray. In supporting this contention we propose to reveal the pre-suppositions that underlie Gayford's question, and to show how

unsatisfactory these are for serious thought.

Gayford obviously believed that the will was in sympathy and alliance with the impulses that ought to have been curbed, at the first moment when it encountered the demands of the higher law, and that this should not have been the case. This means that he believed the will should have been more swayed in action by something new than by something old, that there should have been no tendency on the part of the will to gratify old impulses on occasions when it was clear that they should not be gratified. We have to ask, can any good reason be given for supposing that a nature habituated to unopposed self-gratification (a) should cease to tend to gratify itself immediately a law appeared demanding the subordination of self, (b) should never have to struggle in order to achieve obedience to that law, (c) should not probably fail sometimes to achieve obedience? Is the answer to this, - that the tendency to disobey the moral law would be absent in such a nature, because the new law's attraction would vastly outweigh that of self-gratification? If this is the kind of answer that would be given, we have to ask what reason can be given for supposing that the moral law would be immediately more attractive than the prospect of the old habitual self-gratification? Is the answer to this, - that God would see to it that it would be so? If that answer is given, then we have stripped Gayford's

original question down to its basic underlying presuppositions. As so often, we see it is a case of an idea or feeling about what God would and would not do in certain circumstances. God, it is felt, might make sin possible, but He could never, surely, make it as easy as it is! Virtue He would certainly make possible, but never as difficult as it is! That virtue is difficult and sin easy, and that Divine Love could not conceivably wish this to be so at the beginning, would seem to be the underlying presupposition in the minds of those who attribute these facts to an initial perversion of human nature, an initial bias of the will to evil.

This perversion or bias to evil is thus seen to be introduced in order to defend a particular idea of God's character, an idea, which, reduced to its simplest form, is that the mark of love is always to make virtue easy from the very beginning for the object of its regard. The idea that the Divine purpose of love is to be measured by reference only to what is most convenient and pleasant and easy for man, cannot, however, commend itself to serious thought amongst those who believe that the evolutionary scheme represents God's initial design of creation in the universe. The reason why it cannot do so is, as we hope to show, because psychological self-centredness is the necessary prelude in man to the calling out of unselfishness.

We must now look a little more closely at this idea of an initial perversion of the will, which is introduced in order to account for the tendency of the will from the beginning to gratify old impulses in defiance of the promptings of the moral law. The following reflections would seem to show that the use of the word perversion in this connection is quite indefensible. Man is not a creature of one single nature, like an angel who has a purely spiritual nature. He is neither pure animal nor pure spirit. He is a mixture of both, in the sense that he is growing out of an animal past into a spiritual future. It is natural for man to be thus double-natured, and it is natural also that he should at first be more animal than spiritual, since the spiritual cannot be perceived at once in all its beauty. It is natural, too, that the animal should war against the spiritual, and that there should be at first victories and defeats on both sides. A momentary victory of the animal over the spiritual cannot be called unnatural in the sense that it is due to some perversion.

Perversion is essentially something that is unnatural, against nature, and the use of the word to describe the will which at first gratifies self in opposition to the demands of the higher law springs from confusing initial moral and spiritual disobedience with what is unnatural. Immorality is not always perversion, though perversion is always immorality.

A man is not a sexual pervert who fails to control his desire for sexual intercourse with his wife when he knows he ought. He is a moral weakling, but not a pervert like a homo-sexual whose conduct is against both animal and spiritual nature alike in man. Neither is a man a pervert who fails to control his desire for food and drink. He is a glutton, but while gluttony is sinful it is not a perversion. It would be a perversion if he desired always to satisfy his gluttony by being fed through a tube in his toe. It would be a case of perversion if an angel, a pure spirit, desired intercourse with the daughters of man, for no part of its nature was constituted like that by God. Equally it would be a case of perversion if an animal desired intercourse with vegetables, for no part of its nature was constituted like that by God. Perversion must always be reckoned against a background of established natural procedure: it is a deviation, a turning away, from a constituted order of nature. For man to yield to animal desires may be wrong, but it is not unnatural in the sense of perversion, for the animal ordained by God, is in him, in accordance with the will of God.

The priority and intensity of animality, opposed to the posteriority and weakness of spirituality could be the adequate "explanation" of weakness of will in a man, and we would here maintain that it is a serious misuse of the word, to call

a creature perverted because at the first dim dawn of the moral sense it continues to act in line with the law of its ancient God-given nature.

Now let us consider the phrase "a bias to evil". The universal tendency to please self rather than God is attributed to such a bias. The tendency to please self is inherited from our animal ancestors, and, by itself, this tendency, this psychological self-centredness, is not an evil thing. It does not even become an evil thing when it is yielded to in the face of the knowledge that such yielding to it is evil. We must differentiate, here, between the tendency to please self, and the act of surrendering to it on certain occasions. We must recognise, in other words, that it is sometimes evil to yield to a tendency which, in itself, is not evil. The tendency to please self on all occasions cannot be identified with a bias to evil. A bias to evil would be a tendency to yield to the tendency to please self for the sake of displeasing God! If the pleasing of self consisted in the displeasing of God, then it would be a bias to evil, but as a matter of fact we know that in much self-pleasing there is an element of discomfort caused precisely by the knowledge that such self-pleasing is displeasing to God. Man's pleasure at first is always in the thing sought, and not in the knowledge that the thing sought is evil in the circumstances.

Moreover, besides the universal tendency to please self, there is the universal dread of conscience, the universal striving to excuse or rationalise or minimise transgression at first. These things scarcely witness to an initial bias to evil. Such a bias would rather have been evidenced by a degree of pleasure in having done something that was sought and done because it was known to be evil. Conscience would have been somewhat mocked rather than feared, the memory somewhat exulted in rather than shunned. There is no authoritative evidence that such things were universally true, rather than their opposite, in the beginning. These are precisely the characteristics of evil in its later, more developed, i.e. diabolical stage. Once again we must contend it is a case of serious misnomer to describe as a bias to evil, a tendency to do things (which happen to be evil in certain circumstances), not because they are evil but solely because they happen to be pleasing to self, and were pleasing to self long before they could be done in the circumstances that now make their doing evil.

2. Next there is the criticism that the theory offers an explanation of something which is, *ex hypothesi*, inexplicable. Man's sinful will, it is said, remains as the one completely irrational fact in a world which God created and saw to be very good. That Tennant foresaw such criticism is evidenced by

his note B "On the explanation of sin" on pp.250 ff, of "The Concept of Sin". The following passages indicate the only sense in which he seeks to "explain" the rise of sin. "Sin cannot be wholly explained in terms of cognition. Feeling and conation are equally involved in its constitution, and feeling and conation....are a "surd" factor of experience that cannot be rationalised". (p.252 op.cit.).

"There is no further explanation of these conative factors in experience than that they are there. Man is primarily a conative and feeling being, and by taking this fact into consideration we can explain without at the same time excusing his frequent lapses into sin". (p.254 op.cit.) "If it be asked why...we come to be capable of preferring...satisfactions of lower worth, the only answer is that as a matter of fact estimations of worth are not the only considerations which weigh with us, and in virtue of which the will is prompted to act. This is an original property of our nature as we inherit it: it is an ultimate datum behind which we cannot go."

(p.256 op.cit.) "The only explanation we can give of sinful activity of the will which never works in vacuo and which is not solely influenced by reasons of the cognitional kind is an account of the conative modes of consciousness which furnish interests and motives such as may prompt the will to unreasonable or immoral action. These of themselves apart

from volition no more wholly constitute or explain sin than does volition apart from them." (p.258. op.cit.)

"Sin is not thus "traced to" what is not sin as if it were identical with, exhausted by, or explained solely in terms of, involuntary motive or material." (This is an answer to Dr. Orchard, in his "Modern Theories of Sin" (p.100)).

"Inherited propensities, in themselves non-moral, are the indispensable material from which the will constructs sin. Their presence in every human being, making the inducement to sin common to all men is the sufficient explanation of the fact that few if any...go through this world without contracting some stain of sin." (p.259. op.cit.).

It is the repetition of such a qualified use of the word "explain" that proves beyond a shadow of doubt that the theory does not offer anything like a complete explanation of any sinful act of the will. Tennant is most careful to make clear that any explanation of sin can only go so far and not the whole way. What he offers in his theory is an explanation of how it is exceedingly probable (but not inevitable), that man will, at least, at first, make a certain use of freedom rather than another in relation to the conflict between self and duty. This is all that any theory of the origin of sin can do, that does not reduce human conduct to completely determined behaviour. In view of Tennant's whole paragraph on the meaning of the

explanation of sin, and of his reiterated statements showing the qualified sense in which he uses the word, and also of the fact that he distinctly retains the ideas of man's freedom and guilt and responsibility, it cannot, with reason, be maintained that his theory explains sin away by seeking to explain it completely.

3. This brings us to the criticism that the evolutionary theory of the origin of sin really makes sin inevitable, and therefore minimises its seriousness. In answer to it we may quote Tennant's own words. "I would have it observed" he says (p.112. The origin and Propagation of Sin) "that in thus accounting naturally for the origin and universality of sin, we neither excuse it nor explain it away. If sin can (thus) be traced back...it loses nothing of its exceeding sinfulness for us to whom it is none the less the deliberate grieving of the Holy Spirit."

In a note on p.26 of "The Concept of Sin" he says "In my work 'The Origin and Propagation of Sin' (2nd ed. p.113) I unfortunately allowed myself to speak of sin as "empirically inevitable" when what I should have said was "universally present in some degree in the lives of men". Had this phrase been anything but a slip, a careful reader would observe that it was practically a surrender in two words of the result which many pages were expended in attaining. That is was no more than

a slip would also be made evident by the remainder of the sentence in which the phrase occurs "it by no means implies that sin is theoretically or on a priori grounds an absolute necessity." Again in "The Concept of Sin" he says (p.246) "When we have made every allowance" (for disease, inherited weakness, environment)" ...there remains in much lawless conduct an element which is not to be explained away, - namely, the fact of deliberate choosing of the worse when a better course is both known and possible."

These are scarcely the words of one whose intention it was to construct a theory that should represent sin as inevitable, and so minimise its seriousness: and the criticism cannot be sustained that such was its effect.

The only way in which his theory could make sin inevitable would be for it to represent the inborn propensities of human nature as too powerful ever to be moralised by the will, and to represent the power of the moral ideal as insufficient to aid the will in its task of moralising these propensities. The theory explicitly rejects both of these positions, for it asserts that the animal impulses are indifferent material waiting to be moralised (p.96 op.cit.) and that morality consists in the formation of the non-moral material of nature into character in subjecting the seething and tumultuous life of natural tendency, of appetite and passion, affection and

desire, to the moulding influence of reflective purpose. Sin consists in the will's failure completely to moralise the raw material of morality. He speaks of the higher nature which demands the subordination of the lower in man (p.26 op.cit.) and of cases (p.xix) in which the moral sanction is obeyed. All this is not the language of a theory which represents the animal propensities as too powerful to be moralised, or the moral ideal as powerless to effect that moralisation by the will. The theory's whole *raison d'être* is to account for the difficulty, not the impossibility of the moral ascent, and for man's crying need of grace. It is interesting to notice that some who differentiate themselves from Tennant's theory or accuse him of making sin inevitable by it, yet find themselves driven to the conclusion that sin in the human race is "virtually inevitable" or "too probable" not to happen (see J. S. Whale article in *Expository Times* April 1940: and W. Temple, *Nature, Man, and God*, p. 366). The exceedingly narrow margin by which such writers separate sin from the realm of the inevitable is maintained in order to defend God's character and the validity of morality, but of such margin it may be said it is too narrow not to tend to breed a despair which it is practically impossible to differentiate from the despair bred by the explicit idea of sin's inevitability.

4. Upholders of the Catholic doctrine of original righteousness sometimes bring against the evolutionary theory of the origin and propagation of sin the charge that it is a godless naturalism. (F. J. Hall: "Evolution and the Fall, p.155). Tennant distinctly dissociates himself from any evolutionism which can find no place for supernatural activity within it. He says (p.xvii, Origin and Propagation of Sin) "Inasmuch as my account of man is professedly expressed in terms of scientific fact or scientific theory, and since science as science can use the language neither of philosophy nor of theology because indifferent to the principles of both, the charge of naturalism is not to be wondered at." On p.144 he says "It matters little when we are scientifically describing the process whether we speak of it as God's revealing of Himself to man, or as man's becoming sensible of God's influence and truth. In the latter mode of speech we assume the movement of God in man, in man's feeling after God, and if our language resembles that of naturalism, our mind is that of theism." And in a note he adds, "The process of God's revelation of Himself and His onward guidance of man's moral and spiritual ideas have been described in these lectures solely in their human or natural aspect as if they were the outcome of unaided human thought. I have used the language of description rather than of explanation."

No charge of a naturalism excluding the operation of divine grace can be sustained against his theory. Evolution is ultimately represented as the work of God. God is never out of it, and He gives to each creature at every stage in its upward growth His grace in appropriate mode and measure.

5. It is von Hügel (Essays and Addresses, i. 8-9) who makes the criticism that "certain sins of the flesh may be occasioned by the body, e.g. impurity, sloth, gluttony, but others, e.g. the deadly sin of pride cannot be made to depend on our animal descent: such a single-derivation theory will not work. It may simplify many pressing problems but it fails to distinguish between two distinct and different sources of man's difficulties as a spiritual being." He points out the double characteristic of all intelligent creatures - they are dependent on God for their very existence and their essentially finite powers, and yet God has endowed them with a certain limited power of independence to say yes or no. In reference to this point of von Hügel's, J. S. Whale concludes "man's capacity not only for obedience but also for proud defiance constitutes the mystery of the fall. The fundamental instinct of the animal world is the will to survive. Man's sin cannot be so explained or described. It is the will to power

which differentiates man from the animal, and constitutes the tragic dissidences of human history."

The first thing we must say in answer to this is, we must keep in mind Tennant's warning, which is so easily forgotten, namely, that the advocate of the evolutionary theory, in discussing the initial stages of sin must necessarily use language which would seem terribly inadequate to describe sin as it is present to the mind of the Christian penitent. von Hugel looks at pride from the advanced Christian point of view (witness his reference to the pride of the fallen angels - the most advanced of all creatures!), then looks back at the animal life from which it is suggested that our difficulties rise, and refuses to believe there could be any connection. The answer to von Hugel, however, is surely plain. However far removed the developed pride of humanity may seem to be, from the undeveloped life of the brute, he would be a bold man who would say that it was impossible to discern in some animals, not least in those generally acknowledged to be nearest to man in the line of ascent, the faint beginnings of that pride and self-assertiveness which, in excess, is the curse of our race. All that we are concerned to do is to establish that there are such faint beginnings. It is not necessary to seek, as von Hugel does, for a separate source, in man's nature, of developed pride and self-sufficiency, separate, that is,

from our animal nature. For that "certain limited power of independence to say 'yes' or 'no'," which, it is claimed, is man's peculiar danger and constitutes the separate source of his specifically spiritual sin, that power is faintly discernible in the realm of animal social life, as it is plainly so in human life. Whether the authority be the herd-leader, as in the case of animals, or God, as in the case of men, the same ability and tendency to rebel (against the other than self) is apparent.

To say, moreover, as Whale does, that man's capacity not only for obedience but also for proud defiance constitutes the mystery of the fall, is to say something which surely borders on the meaningless. That man should have this capacity is surely no mystery, if God wished man to love Him. Man could not love God without such capacity. If there is any mystery in the fall, it surely lies, as Whale himself elsewhere suggests, in the fact that man availed himself of the capacity to defy God. Why he should ever do that might be called a mystery, but that he should be able to do so is surely not mysterious. Here, however, a remark from C. C. J. Webb's "God and Personality" seems worth quoting: "The possibility of Sin is, after all, involved in freedom to choose the good: and it would seem meaningless to find a new problem in the reality of what is already understood to be in a true sense possible."

Again, to seek to dissociate certain sins from our animal nature by saying that the fundamental instinct of the animal world is the will to survive, whereas it is the will to power which differentiates men - this betrays a failure to perceive the common root of both. The will to power is a developed expression of that root of self-centredness which is present in the animal world, and which expresses itself there as the will to survive. The will to power is compounded of self-glorification, self-magnification, self-deification. It is pride in its worst form. But it is pride, and pride is essentially the setting up of self over against others in claims to undue attention, service, and praise. That this is altogether absent from the beasts few would assert. It is to this self-assertiveness, faint, perhaps, but none the less discernible that we can look as the root and source and beginning of the later developed will to power. It may be true to say that the fundamental instinct of the animal world is to survive, but we must beware of verbal disguises. To survive means I must survive, and that implies at the cost, if necessary, of other selves. That is but another form of the root self-centredness of all created life, of which the will to survive may thus be said to be but an early form, and the will to power a later one. No separate and distinct source is needed for the latter. Its root is surely obvious. Impurity,

"while being the viler sin, may be instinctively felt to be less deadly than pride", but greater deadliness is no proof of difference of origin. Moreover, can we really maintain that "while impurity is occasioned by the body, pride is not"? Is pride never occasioned by physical strength, physical skill, physical beauty? Pride may be first occasioned by the body, then by the intellect, then by the spirit. We have to be careful here, and heed again Tennant's warning about sin in its beginnings and sin in its later more developed forms. It is a far cry from the primitive self-assertiveness of the stronger or more agile or more graceful animal, with its preenings, its tyrannies its jealous guarding of little privileges, to the maniacal human leader, drunk with the sense of power and grinding thousands into subjection, slavery and death. It is so far a cry, indeed, that it is not difficult to understand the immediate and outright denial by some of any connection whatsoever between the two. But when these two characteristics are examined closely, this much becomes clear: - given the principle of evolution which never excludes the Divine activity, it can no more be reasonably argued that there is no root of self in animal life from which human pride and self-sufficiency could grow than it can now be reasonably maintained that woman was originally formed from the rib of a man!

To point, as von Hugel does, to the fall of the angels as an illustration of the fact that pride is not occasioned by the body, is a perfect example of that neglect of Tennant's warning already referred to. In its highest and most developed form, pride is open and deliberate rebellion against God, the attempt to usurp His power and occupy His throne. One does not expect the highest form of anything to appear immediately at its beginning in an evolutionary process. Pride, when it first appeared in man, was nowhere near a conscious open deliberate rebellion against His Maker. Man's pride was not initially diabolic. To use the pride of the rebellious angels, which was diabolic, as an analogy of the beginnings of pride in man, so as to discredit the theory of its lowly origin, this is surely illegitimate. It is to argue thus: since pride appeared in man, who had an animal ancestry, and also in angels, who had no such ancestry, therefore since it could not be occasioned by anything animal in the angels, it could not be occasioned by anything animal in man: which is absurd.

The angels are conceived as being created immediately with all the attributes of spiritual life fully developed. Man was made differently. He was evolved. The angelic character was, as it were, the outcome of a shortcut in creative method. Man's was the result of a long process. It does not follow that because the ability to be proud and defiant towards God

in the extremest form was necessarily ready made in the case of the angels, and was, in them, unconnected with any bodily life, therefore it was bound to be the one thing which was ready made and unconnected with animal life in man, who in all other respects is rooted in the past. The difference between pride in man at first (non-diabolic), and pride in the angels at first (diabolic), is a difference between two stages in pride's growth; both can appear in man, but the diabolic represents the latest stage. When one admits the possibility of stages of growth, one cannot exclude the possibility of a common root in the past of all stages.

It is the cumulative weight of these considerations rather than, perhaps, the force of any one of them in particular which would seem to render von Hugel's argument unconvincing.

6. To the criticism that to define sin in terms of a failure to moralise the raw material of morality is to make it purely negative, it is perhaps sufficient to reply that sin is represented as positive in so far as it is shown that the failure is due to a conscious and deliberate misuse of experience. This is also the answer to those who offer this criticism in the form "that Tennant describes sin as an evolutionary overhang", or "as a mere survival of animal impulses into the rational stage of development". The point

is that the will permits the overhang, and that it is a willed operation of animal impulses. The mere survival of animal impulses constitutes the *fomes boni* as well as the *fomes peccati*, and if there is one thing which Tennant is careful to do it is to distinguish between the will that sins, and these impulses that constitute the raw material of sin.

7. It is R. S. Moxon who says (p.211 *The Doctrine of Sin*) that Tennant's theory offers no adequate explanation of the sense of guilt. "In tending to reduce the circle of human conduct to which sin in the strict sense can be applied, his theory fails to confirm the judgment of the universal consciousness of guilt. It breaks down in its inability to fathom the depth of self-abasement which the sinner feels at the thought of his sin, and which compels him to cry aloud in the agony of contrition: "Woe is me, for I am undone". As the consciousness of guilt is a factor of experience that cannot be denied, serious suspicion is at once cast on the validity of any theory which fails to justify its verdict."

In answer to this we may doubt if that feeling which prompts to the cry "woe is me", is always to be identified with a consciousness of guilt. To believe, with Moxon, that it is to be so identified, is to leave no room for anything but a moral relation of the individual, as actual sinner, to God.

Professor Otto in his book "The Idea of the Holy", urges that we cannot reduce either our idea of God or our reaction to that idea to a purely moral or rational content. The conception of the wrath of God e.g. in the ninetieth psalm illustrates the overplus in the idea of the holy. There is a hidden depth in God - the numinous - which cannot be rationalised or moralised by us. This provokes in man such confessions as those of Isaiah or Peter ("Woe is me! for I am undone...Depart from me: for I am a sinful man. O Lord."): "these outbursts of feeling are not simply, and probably, at first, not at all, moral depreciations, but belong to a quite special category of valuation and appraisement...the feeling of absolute profaneness" (English Transl. by Harvey 1923 p.53) In God there is "the positive numinous value or worth, and to it corresponds, on the side of the creature, a numinous disvalue or "unworth"." (ibid. p.53) The guilt of a bad action is to be clearly distinguished from its moral pollution. This religious element can be neither moralised nor conceptualised.

We thus see that a consciousness of guilt is not to be identified with this universal sense of numinous disvalue or unworth. Wherever humanity becomes conscious of God at all, this sense awakens, and it is in no way reduced, even when the area of actual sin in the individual life is reduced by some theory of sin's origin.

8. Moxon also puts forward the criticism that man can only be held fully responsible for sin, if in addition to having the faculty of originating action, it can be proved that he has also a clear knowledge of the nature and importance of the moral ideal. But the degree of moral enlightenment, he contends, which is possessed by man at any moment is not under his control, and so, in order to avoid attributing the responsibility for sin to God, it must be proved that a man's moral illumination is independent of God, as well as his will. Moxon is here obviously thinking of sins done in ignorance. It is precisely Tennant's argument that responsibility for sin is in exact proportion to moral illumination, that full responsibility would imply full enlightenment. God may be responsible for the degree of lack of enlightenment. He certainly is at the beginning, though not always later; but that does not involve God in a charge of responsibility for sin, on Tennant's theory, for on that theory "sin" is restricted for the individual, to the area of "deliberateness" and "knowledge". Material sin, on that theory, is a misnomer.

4. W. Temple's Views.

In concluding this section on the evolutionary theory of the origin and propagation of sin we must look at what William Temple says in the chapter on Finitude and Evil in his Gifford Lectures (Nature, Man and God, pp.359 ff.) He argues that the

problem of evil is totally misconceived if we picture it as the winning of control over lawless and therefore evil passions by a righteous but insufficiently powerful reason or spirit. It is the spirit which is evil: it is reason which is perverted: it is aspiration itself which is corrupt. Our primary need, he says, is not to control our passions by our purposes but to direct our purpose itself to the right end.

How did this need and this problem arise? Temple asks why are we such that what appears to us good is other than the real good? and answers, there is here an unquestionable bias or tendency to evil in human nature; it is called original sin. The fall can really be called a fall upwards for it consisted in the winning of the knowledge of good and evil. It is the form taken by this knowledge that perverts our nature. We know good and evil but we know them amiss. The corruption is at the centre of rational and purposive life.

Prior to this, however, Temple asserted that man is narrowly limited in the range of his apprehension, that this limitation is in no way his own fault but is his divinely ordained constitution. It is this limited range of apprehension that leads to wrong estimates about what is the real good, and these wrong estimates, in turn, lead to wrong preferences, and these to wrong actions. There seems to be little, if any, room for real responsibility. The spirit can

scarcely be called evil, the reason perverted, and aspiration corrupt, for aspiration is but another word for preference, reason is subject to natural limitations, and the spirit is really the will, which is the person in action, which action is determined by reason and desire. Man is far too heavily determined by the limitations of finitude, which seem to be the real cause of all the trouble.

Temple certainly goes as far as is humanly possible in appearing to diminish human responsibility, in making sin appear practically unavoidable, without implicating God in a charge of responsibility for sin. God so made the world, he says, that man was likely to sin, and the dawn of moral self-consciousness was likely to be more a fall than an ascent. Also, some selves must be expected to order their scale of values wrongly, because of their falsified perspective (due to the limitations of finitude) and that will be enough to infect the race. It is still more likely that all will thus err, then mutually infect with error one another. "It was not necessary" Temple continues, "that we should err, so we cannot say sin itself is God's act. But He must have foreseen the issues so that sin falls within His purpose and is even part of it. What He faced was a probability so great as to be distinguishable only in thought from certainty." Temple admits that God, with His eternal knowledge apprehends all reality in

its ordered completeness, so, really, for Him there is no such thing as a probability, but human beings must maintain the distinction between certain knowledge and probability in order to save God from a charge of directly causing man to sin.

We cannot fail to notice the likeness between Temple and Tennant. There is little if anything to choose between Temple's "necessary tendency of the mind towards self-centredness", his "sin falls within God's purpose, and is even part of it" and Tennant's "sin, while not an absolute necessity, may yet be necessarily incidental to the execution of God's plan."

The chief result of both works is to represent sin as practically inevitable at first by virtue of the constitution of all finite life, to assert that God nevertheless cannot be held responsible for actual sin, and to leave us with what is virtually an unresolved tension of conflicting opposites. For this boldness we have reason to be thankful.

The main reason for this, perhaps, somewhat lengthy discussion of the evolutionary theory has been to defend it against the charges usually brought against it, charges which, it is believed, spring from a wrong reading of Tennant's work, due, perhaps, to a prejudiced approach to the theory as such. It is also believed the main criticisms cannot stand in the light of a fair re-examination of that work. It may be true

that he has not thoroughly purged his floor, and that certain infelicities of expression still remain even after major alterations like that already noted, but while that is also true of his theory which is true of any theory about this subject, namely, that it leaves something finally unexplained, it remains, it may be believed, the best attempt to place the story of man's origin and growth in the scale of life in right position with the fact of human sin.

At this point we can look back and take stock of our survey of these theories of sin. We have noticed some main points of belief in classical Augustinianism and Thomism, and have indicated why we cannot agree with these. We have done likewise in the case of some modern Augustinians and Thomists. We have passed in critical review the theories of a multiplicity of pre-natal falls, and of a premundane self-vitiating of the world-soul. With these we have disagreed.

We have dealt differently with the evolutionary theory of the origin and propagation of sin, criticising, not the theory itself, but certain criticisms of it. If, in doing this, we have suggested a measure of agreement, we would safeguard ourselves against misunderstanding so far as to dissociate ourselves from any appearance of believing that such an account could explain sin fully.

So far, in other words, our work has been, mainly,

destructive criticism. There remains the consolidation or exposition of our own belief. Before we move on to that directly, however, there is one thing we must do by way of prelude. We must exhibit in a sweeping glance, as it were, the important part played by the idea of development and by the knowledge of evolution, in writings on the subject of sin during the last century or so.

IX. EVOLUTION AND THE IDEA OF DEVELOPMENT IN
RECENT THOUGHT ABOUT SIN.

Since the publication of the *Origin of Species* in the middle of the last century, the facts of growth and development have been given an important place in the thought of many writers, other than those already mentioned, regarding the problem of the origin and propagation of sin. These writers have shown, in effect, that human nature cannot be understood aright theologically without considering it in relation to its origin and growth, and that, whether a new explanation of sin is attempted, or pre-Darwinian theories are merely defended and restated in the light of new knowledge about man's beginnings, no one can now afford to neglect the fact of evolution in relating the difficulty of human virtue to belief in a God of Love.

The great names, Spinoza, Kant, Schleiermacher, Hegel, Schelling, Kierkegaard, Ritschl, etc., which are included in most treatises on modern theories of sin, precede the era when the scientific theory of evolution challenged existing beliefs concerning man's origin and sinfulness. We are, thus, under no obligation to include them in what is, strictly, an examination of post-Darwinian thinkers, yet we cannot help observing that

though those giants of philosophy and theology were not called upon to face the challenge of evolution, their work is, nevertheless, not wholly without a reflection of the realisation of the importance of the fact of development in human life, for a right understanding of the problem of sin.*

Schleiermacher represented sin as having its rise in the struggle of the flesh against the spirit, and the cause of the opposition, he said, was the fact that the history of the race was one of progress and development. Sin arose through the priority of man's sensual and intellectual development to his power of will, and the explanation of original sin is, therefore, closely bound up with the earlier appearance of the self-assertiveness of sense. (The Christian Faith, para.69.)

Brunner says of Schleiermacher that he gave up the fundamental Christian view of the origin of man and substituted for it an idealistic evolutionary theory with a strongly naturalistic bent: for the idea of the origin in creation he substituted that of the goal of evolution of a universal spiritual process. Hegel regarded the doctrine of the fall as a myth expressive of the first step in human development, and said that at first man gave way instinctively to natural impulses, but as life developed he came to realise by actual trial that to do so always was wrong. (Philosophy of Religion, Spiers and Sanderson's translation p.p.275.ff). Schelling conceived of the soul as

* We are not here suggesting that these writers anticipated the scientific theory of evolution. The idea of development as such is an old one amongst philosophers.

existing before birth. By an act of choice it subjected itself to the exigencies and limitations of temporal life involving the necessity to sin, which was represented as an inseparable feature of human development. The importance of the idea of evolution for Schelling is shown by the fact that even God, for him, is subject to the process, being evolved from a blind unconscious will to be. (Philosophical Investigations on the nature of Human Freedom, and subjects connected therewith).[¶] Kierkegaard approached the subject of sin in his "Fear and Trembling" (1843), and, in The Idea of Dread (1844) put forward the view that every man is the Adam of his own soul (chapter 1, section 2.). For a time he was afraid to make sin the very substance of human nature, but in 1849, in Sickness unto Death, he left his first position and moved on to a belief in the dogma of the universality and totality of sin, and in a supra-mundane corruption of the will. Kierkegaard was not concerned with evolution as such, but his description of the state of mind of the first sinner, with the stress on vagueness, trembling, the apprehension of mere possibility, and the gradual approach to the borderland of moral freedom must surely be admitted to be a far better description of what must have been the mind of the first man,

¶ See Tennant: Origin and Propagation of Sin. Lecture II.

than of every man, as temptation was encountered for the first time. We cannot press his views into the service of a theory alien to his own belief, but it is difficult to resist the impression that in the Concept of Dread, (chapter one, especially sections three and four), Kierkegaard described perfectly the psychological condition (as far as it can legitimately be imagined and reconstructed) of that remote first ancestor of man as he emerged from the purely animal stock, and became dimly and fearfully conscious of somewhat that lay before him. We may not unfairly say that though Kierkegaard professed to be describing the advent of freedom as he saw it happen to all, he was, in fact, anticipating a description of how it happened and could only happen to that creature whom we visualise as first stepping forth from the animal kingdom into the world of humanity. In an indirect, and certainly in an unconscious, way, therefore, he may be said to have borne witness to the importance of the fact of growth in the story of humanity for a right understanding of the origin of sin.

Ritschl held that evil sprang out of the merely natural impulses of the will, which, being subject to development has not, at first, perfect knowledge of the good, and evil must necessarily arise until that perfect knowledge is attained. Sin, viewed as ignorance, was thus regarded as a necessary stage in the development of man as a moral being. (Justification and

Reconciliation, English translation, p.349).

Brunner had noted that Hase showed that same kind of change of view as took place in the case of Schleiermacher. Hase held that the orthodox Christian view about man's origin dealt not so much with a lost past as with an intended future which was to be realised through struggle and growth. Rothe thought that the concept of the creation itself contained the idea that at first the personal creature could not emerge otherwise than from matter, and was then immediately tainted and defiled by it, while Troeltsch declared that the doctrine that man was made in the Image of God does not mean the loss of an original condition, but a goal to be reached through historical development, (see Brunner, *Man in Revolt*, p.87).

In addition to these there has been a continuous line of writers who, in one way or another, have stressed, as a key feature for the better understanding of the whole problem of sin, the idea of development in human life. Some have advocated a quite definitely evolutionary treatment of the problem. Others, who do not ally themselves specifically with that theory, or who reject it definitely, yet find in their own theories a clear place for the idea of development. In all cases it has somehow to be "fitted in".

Pfleiderer was the first theologian to attempt seriously to give an evolutionary account of the origin of sin in the individual, and his attempt furnished the main lines on which

F.R. Tennant constructed his theory in his Hulsean lectures. He held that sin was to be found in the yielding to natural impulses, which themselves were not sinful, in circumstances where their gratification had been prohibited. At first the desire for self-gratification was instinctive and a law of life, but gradually the laws of society appeared and regulated the occasions when man might give in to his impulses. He believed that after the traditional doctrine had been surrendered, it was possible to retain as its core, "the idea that the dignity of man does not lie behind us but before us as the goal of evolution".

Tennant remarked that Canon J. M. Wilson, Ruetschi and Hermann had addressed themselves to the problem of sin in a way similar to his own, and in addition to these we can mention S.A. McDowell's "Evolution and the need of Atonement" (1912), R.S. Moxon's "The Doctrine of Sin" (1922), H.W. Lane's "Evolution and the Christian Faith" (1923), W.R. Selbie's "The Psychology of Religion" (1924), and W. Powell's "The Fall of Man" (1934). These all treat the problem of man and sin from an evolutionary point of view.

Orchard in his "Modern Theories of Sin" spoke of sin as being incidental to the process of development, of the dissatisfaction which is bound to follow on sin, of sin's essentially impermanent nature, and of its ultimate self-destruction. He held that it was essential to the true

attainment of man's destiny that he should realise himself through struggle, and that there should be open to him certain experiments which, being doomed to failure and dissatisfaction, should leave finally and permanently open only the true path, viz., union with God.

There is no need to repeat in detail the well known criticisms of some of these views. All that we would do here is reject any idea of sin as being a necessary stage in development, and as having any actual value in the ultimate production of goodness. Such ideas obviously minimise sin's seriousness, compromise the concept of guilt, and empty the ideas of divine forgiveness and atonement of much of their real meaning. It is enough for the purpose of this essay to have indicated the place allotted by many writers to the idea of development or to the theory of evolution in their consideration of man's spiritual failures. We have now to attempt to clarify our own position regarding the relation between the scientific theory of man's ascent from lowly beginnings and the Christian doctrines of original righteousness, the fall, and original sin.

X. CONCLUSION.

1. The basic presupposition in all traditional thought about sin.

To read the history of attempts made by theologians to account for the fact of sin in human life is to read very largely the story of one persistent belief, the belief, namely, that God is not and could not be responsible for an original condition of man's will which would make sin easy, and virtue hard. This is the fundamental presupposition, it seems, in all defences of the doctrines of original righteousness and original sin. God is love, and, therefore, it is supposed, He could not have created man originally more prone to gratify self than to please Him. God is love, and therefore it is supposed, something must have happened to disturb an original God-ordained condition.

This underlying presupposition about the nature of Divine Love, and its obligation to create man originally more disposed to please God than to please self, may not always be referred to explicitly, but our thesis is built upon the belief that it is always there. If our belief is not justified then our argument falls to the ground.

It is this underlying belief which has given rise to theories about sin's origin in man whereby something is brought from outside, whether in the form of a supra human angelic will

already self corrupted, and insinuating temptation into the human situation, or in the form of some dislocating act committed by the human will itself, or by the world-soul, in some pre-existence, and so forth. A situation is imagined beyond this life, wherein conditions were originated which conspired to make sin easier and more probable on earth. The order of life, or the constitution of life as we know it cannot, it is thought, be conceived as representing God's original plan. The writer of the Genesis story of the fall of Adam, St. Paul, St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, Kant, Muller, N.P. Williams, Neibuhr, Brunner, Barth, Heim, Berdyaev, Quick, and many others, despite their theological and philosophical differences, attribute the rise of evil in this life partly to something which happened prior to it, and contrary to God's will.

With all the reconstruction of theological doctrine made necessary by scientific discovery this old belief still persists. Man may no longer be conceived as a special creation separate from the beasts, but if it is his animal ancestry that is said to be the major occasion of his sin, then it is answered either that his animal ancestry cannot be the original plan of God, and so must itself be the result of some already existing evil, or, if it is His plan, it must have been tempered with by some evil agency for otherwise, surely, it would not be so troublesome. It is always the idea of what love would and would not do that

decides the idea of man's original condition.

In other words, what we seem to be faced with in theology is a widespread inability or refusal to identify the psychological self-centredness of man's animal ancestors with the main structure of the God-ordained nature of man in his historical beginning. To put it otherwise and, perhaps, more plainly, original self-centredness is deemed to be incompatible with the idea of a loving Creator. That man should appear, should be conscious of supernatural demands, and that his desire and ability to obey those demands should be originally weaker than his desire and ability to disobey them, this is utterly rejected by the majority of theologians. It is assumed that God, because He is love, would never arrange such a hard situation for man.

The theories which have been evolved in order to avoid these difficulties, however, in the moment of seeming to do so only raise others equally great. We may attribute the difficulties of the evolving order to some extra-temporal or pre-mundane catastrophe, but that disaster is itself as clamorous of explanation as the very problems which it purports to solve.

The traditional method of approach, and of answering the problem has been rejected by evolutionists, but amongst these there are two different attitudes. One is that we can regard

evolution as the original unmodified plan of God, and that sin may, therefore, be regarded as a mere stage necessary to the final emergence of perfection. The other is that while we can regard evolution as God's original plan, we cannot, on that account, regard sin as either necessary or inevitable, but only as exceedingly probable. For Christians the second kind of evolutionism alone is possible, provided that it can be reconciled with the belief that God is Love.

We now declare our belief that it is along the path of a new and careful thinking together of the empirical fact of evolution, and the theological postulate of the love of God that we shall arrive at the most satisfactory answer to the question of sin's beginning and its universality.

The first safeguard however, against misunderstanding is to be established by making clear what we mean by an answer. Why the first man in this world, or a noumenal self, or an anima mundi, or an angel, or any other created centre of self conscious purposive activity, in time, or out of time, should act contrary to perceived duty, it is, in the nature of the case, impossible fully to explain. If such an act could be fully explained, then no moral problem would exist, for the will would be completely determined. Any professed answer to this ancient and continuing tragedy must be prefaced by the acknowledgment that it can only go so far and no further.

Determinism must be avoided because it is not consistent with creative Love. Our answer can only take the shape of showing how it is very probable, the circumstances being what they are supposed to have been, that human wills would act at first selfishly rather than unselfishly, and that those circumstances and that probability are not only not incompatible with the presupposition of a loving Creator, but are the only possible expression of Divine Love.

We are to attempt to justify what we believe to have been God's act in bringing to birth a self-centred organism as the prelude to the creation of responsive love. This prelude we would seek to defend as morally necessary. In doing this we believe that a somewhat different approach to the problem of sin is being explored. In the past the evolutionary scheme has been generally represented as "not making sin a necessity, or inevitable", as "not minimising either sin's seriousness, or man's need of salvation", and so on. In other words, though these are important considerations, there has been generally a somewhat timid and negative apologetic so far as any evolutionist theodicy is concerned. Original righteousness has been rejected primarily because it contradicted the evolutionary scheme, not primarily because it involved a real contradiction of Love.

On the other hand, the general inability to see in a

gradual moral and spiritual evolution, the only morally consistent path of creation open to a God of Love has led to flights of metaphysical fancy which, far from defending Him against charges of injustice have, in fact, we believe, only exposed Him to a fundamental moral failure.

We are to maintain that it is precisely because God is Love that He could do no other than create man originally self-centred, originally far more disposed to please self than to please any other. The doctrine of original righteousness is untenable, not primarily because of any difficulty of reconciling it with an evolutionary view of man's origin, but because it contradicts the idea of a truly Loving Creator. We believe that orthodox theology is under an obligation to reconsider its idea of Love in creation. We must conceive of Divine Love as being bound to create responsive love only out of that which It must first have created with the greatest possible chance of refusing to respond to anything but self. We must conceive of Love as being morally bound to weight as heavily as possible the scales against Itself. The idea of original righteousness does not fulfil these conditions, In so far as righteousness was original, it must have been established without reference to the creature's own will and desire, and that is immoral.

2. Science and Theology in relation to Original Righteousness.

We cannot conceive of God as being faced with a choice between a number of alternative methods of creating responsive love. To the perfect wisdom and love of God only one way could be open, namely the best, most loving. If today we reject the idea of Special Creation, and accept evolution as God's way of creating a moral and spiritual creature who should learn to love and worship Him, then this will have two results. It will undermine any idea of a moral and spiritual creature who was not created by being evolved from a lower order of life, and who was in his beginning endowed with highly developed moral and spiritual excellencies: and it will also undermine the idea of a being whose bodily and mental nature was continuous with and limited by lowly antecedents, whose spiritual or religious nature yet appeared in its beginnings very largely unlimited by such continuity.

At this point we are very conscious of the spectre of the naturalistic fallacy. We may therefore clearly state our belief in the absolute newness, the sheer novelty, of the religious consciousness in man. That is a miracle in the sense that its appearance is believed to be caused by the direct action of God, and cannot be understood fully in terms of antecedent physical causation. The rejection of the naturalistic fallacy however, does not mean that what is

believed to be thus supernaturally created is free from the natural law of small beginnings, slow growth and titanic struggle against existing forces for survival. The appearance of an absolutely new faculty is one thing, the degree of power with which it is conceived to be originally invested is another. The former is not in itself inconsistent with evolution as God's way of 'creatio continua'; the latter can contradict it, and the idea of original righteousness is nothing less than such a contradiction..

It may be true, that science cannot prove that the first men were little above the brutes in their large self-centredness, but there is such a thing as an overwhelming probability, and theology cannot overlook such probabilities. We have admitted that we are concerned to reject the idea of original righteousness not on scientific but on theological grounds. Before we do so, however, we must make this observation. There is no scientific evidence which points our minds in the direction of original righteousness as the probable initial condition of the earliest man. What scientific evidence there is, however, points us in the direction of a large element of superstitious terror, and of a desire to placate the supernatural for purely selfish reasons, in the earliest religious life of man.

This cannot be reasonably disregarded by any who are concerned to defend a doctrine of man's original spiritual

condition. We must always admit a huge gap between our knowledge of primitive religious activity and what is called the religious life of the first man, but that does not entitle us to refuse to read back into the life of the first man a religious condition which is the logical extension backwards of that low moral and spiritual life which we find progressively as we move further and further back in the history of man generally. We are not entitled to refuse to do this, unless our idea of Divine love makes such a procedure impossible: and such is the case with traditional theology's idea of Divine Love.

Again, it may be true that the original spiritual condition of man may be beyond the precise determination of scientific method. That, however, does not give us the right to force into the categories of physical Science prescientific ideas about original man, which we do when we seek to represent original righteousness as an evolutionary leap or a mutation. Few scientists of repute would be found who would say that an immediate change from animal self-centredness to a great rather than a small degree of human God-centredness fitted in with what was known of evolutionary progress. If we retain the idea of original righteousness because it seems best to fit in with our idea of the love of God, then we must do so without seeking reconciliation with the scientific probabilities about early

man, and at the same time declare that what we do is purely for a theological reason which we can see no good reason to change.

Having discarded the idea of special creation in favour of evolution, modern Augustinians and Thomists alike have yet retained the idea of the spiritual nature with which their predecessors originally invested the specially created Adam, and have joined it to the body and mind of a creature evolved from ape-like ancestors. We cannot have it both ways, however. Either we retain the idea of a special creation completely, or we reject it completely. Either we retain the idea of evolution completely or we reject it completely. We cannot retain a bit of one and a bit of the other, and, joining both bits together, call the resulting mixture an evolved creature.

Brunner, after asserting the importance of scientific knowledge about man's beginnings to explain the fact of sin (Man in Revolt, p.401), goes on to assert that human existence was originally disposed for the reception of the gift of "being in the love of God," which, he says, is the life originally given to man. The original God-created state of life, he says, is the life originally given to man. The original God-created state is to be understood as an existence in love, as a *justitia originalis*, since the gift comes first, - "He first loved us." This is that for which God creates man. Thus the original nature is "being in the love of God," the fulfilment

of responsible being, the responsibility which consists in responsible love.

On p. 407 Brunner argues there is no good reason for not admitting the fact of development. He deprecates the device by which theology would seek to fence off a certain remote sphere of life so that it may remain immune from the probings of science. Development both physical and mental he describes as being from embryonic human conditions. To admit such development does not mean that we explain mental life from its origin. Development does not exclude the fact that it is something completely new. He asks "Why should not that which, in principle, is new appear only gradually by degrees?"

It is surely begging the question to admit the fact of mental and physical development from embryonic human conditions, and then to state that, spiritually, because God loved us, because we were, at the beginning in a state of "being in the love of God", that that could therefore only mean we were in a state of responsive love, that is, responding with actual love to the love of God which was operative towards us from the beginning.

It does not at all follow that because God first loved us, therefore, at first, we would be able to love Him back. It is possible even for us, not only to love someone who is capable of love, who yet does not love us in return, but also to

love someone who is psychologically incapable of responsive love. Such people would still be "in our love" if we loved them. It does not follow that because a child has "being in the love of its father", that is, its father loves it when it first appears, therefore the child is able to love the father immediately. For quite a time its world of relationship is developing, instinctive, blurred, dominated by the glamour of constitutional self-centredness, and oblivious to any call of love to respond with love. It is quite sub-moral.

The very fact that God loved us first, that is, before we loved Him, could mean that His love and ours did not meet at the moment of our appearing.

If man's response to God, as well as man's physical and mental life, can be described as developing out of embryonic conditions, and if that response can be said only to become a response of love after God's first love of us, then there is good reason for describing man's growth up to love in terms of gradual stages, beginning at first with something which might be described as a vague awareness of mystery and otherness, and only moving slowly upwards through stages of clearer vision and higher response, to the great moment when at last love of God is born in the heart.

We may say God loved man through the infant stages of man's apprehension of the supernatural, stages in which that apprehension was for long devoid of the spiritual vision

necessary for the calling out of love. Man was, in other words, "in the love of God" long before God was ever "in the love of man", even while man existed.

Brunner it would seem, confuses the creation of man, with the creation in man of that vision of God as love, which alone can call forth the response of love in a growing creature. Man was man, and aware of and responsive to the supernatural, long before he was aware that that supernatural was a God of love.

It is begging the question to say that human existence was disposed for the reception of this gift of "being in the love of God", which Brunner calls "the life originally given to man", and then to assert that that disposition would mean that men would immediately respond to being loved by God by loving Him back. Human existence may be said to be disposed by God for the reception of the gift of "being in His love", but such disposition is not incompatible with an initial inability to respond. It is not necessarily identical with ability at first. Human existence is disposed to receive the gift by being disposed by God for growth up to that point of spiritual awareness when He can reveal His true nature. Only after such revelation is a receiving of the gift possible in the sense of a response of love. A child is disposed for the reception of the gift of "being in the love of its father" long before it

responds with love to that love.

Brunner, as we have seen, deprecates the pitiable comedy which is enacted whenever theology would claim that a higher more perfect human existence of the first generation existed in a sphere not accessible to reason, as it retires before the relentless onward march of scientific discovery. He says it should be abandoned. He also deprecates, however, the surrender of the idea that man was created originally good, in the interests of reconciling theology with science. He refers as we have seen to the idealistic evolutionism of the 19th century which replaced the orthodox Christian doctrine because the historical form of that doctrine had become impossible. Such a modification of theology to meet the pressure of knowledge he rejects, and retains the orthodox doctrine of man created originally righteous.

Brunner thus holds together the idea of man's development from embryonic human conditions, which, he says, ought to cause no alarm, and the idea of man being created originally righteous. He seems to seek to safeguard himself against a total surrender to the implications of the doctrine of development by leaning too heavily on the idea that new forms of life are not completely explained by reference to their primitive origins. To admit development does not exclude the

fact that forms of life are absolutely new things, not entirely dependent on their predecessors. It is by the principles of novelty and independence that Brunner would appear to defend his position concerning original righteousness.

The gap between original righteousness and preceding animal self-centredness cannot, however, be adequately bridged merely by thus referring to the impossibility of explaining new appearances solely in terms of antecedents. The fact that one accepts the principle of development and also rejects the naturalistic fallacy does not keep open the gate for the doctrine of original righteousness. For the new thing which appears in the case of God's creation of man, which cannot be explained genetically, is not original righteousness, but the consciousness of the supernatural. The sense of the numinous was the great new thing, which, because it was subject to the law of development did not begin at an advanced stage, but at a lowly stage.

What we really have to face here is the question of the content of man's first apprehension of the supernatural. It is irrelevant to speak of man being created with a will already disposed to obey God if the question is not first faced and answered, what kind of God was it that man first conceived he had to obey? What was the content of his first vision of the supernatural? Visions differ, and with them, the motives

for obedience. Obedience can spring from love, but it can also spring from fear, greed, indifference.

If we grant the fact of development from embryonic human conditions, so far as mental and physical life are concerned, is there any sound reason for denying such development in the case of religious life? If not, is there any sound reason for supposing that the first stages of man's religious awareness should involve a vision of a supernatural person whose nature was love?

Brunner and those who think like him seem to make this supposition. They take advantage of the idea of new appearances in the evolutionary scheme, and of their independence of preceding conditions, to launch man's religious life into being at an already advanced stage. The really vital point is raised, however, when we ask "Can we really say that man first conceived of God as a loving Heavenly Father?" Only such a vision could draw out a response of love. If, created with such a vision, man began to responding to it with love, then, indeed, he might be said to have been created originally righteous. Against such an idea of man's beginning, however, we have to place the story, too well known to need repetition in detail, of man arriving at that apprehension of God, and giving to Him that kind of obedient loving response only after long ages of slow groping towards it.

We would here contend, therefore, that in view of Brunner's surrender of the idea of any area of life being sacrosanct so far as scientific research is concerned, and in view of his acceptance of the idea of development, he is guilty of a gross inconsistency in clinging to the idea of original righteousness. He is guilty of reading back into man's original condition a vision and an obedience to it, which only characterised man's life at a later stage, "Why should not that which in principle is new appear only gradually by degrees?" Why not, indeed? It is precisely because the vision of God only appeared gradually, by degrees, that man was unable at first to render the loving obedience to God which can only be called out by a vision of God as love.

Why God should not have granted man such a vision at the beginning is another question. That He would do so because He is love is assumed by many. Does not Brunner assume that God created man originally righteous because, to him, any other assumption would appear to be inconsistent with the idea of Divine Love? And is that inconsistency conceived to be so plain, that it is assumed there is no need to discuss it or even state it? At this point we can take up our contention that it was precisely because God is love that He did not, could not, create man originally righteous.

3. How can we reconcile original self-centredness with the idea of a God of Love?

How can we say that it was a moral obligation incumbent upon God to create a being who should desire and be able to love and worship Him, by creating him at the outset with a nature very largely of animal self-centredness? That is our central question.

It was consistent with love for God to create in a creature an awareness of a supernatural world, without consulting the creature's wishes in the matter. No transgression of the bounds of morality, no violation of personality, however primitive that personality, would be involved in such a revelation. It would still be left to the creature's own choice to respond later by love or selfishness.

But it would not be consistent with love for God to order the creature's response without reference to its own wishes. This would happen if God dealt with the original self-centred disposition of the creature to whom He revealed Himself, by any other means than that of Love. It would not be love if God changed the creature's disposition from self-centredness to any degree whatsoever of God-centredness, without consulting it.

The doctrine of original righteousness implies that God did precisely so change His creature's disposition. The creature did not choose to be righteous. God did not seek its willing response. He made it righteous, whether it desired or not.

He did not wait on His creature's wishes. By an act of sheer power, self-centredness was changed into a degree of God-centredness. Along with God-consciousness came a given degree of God-centredness.

This precipitation of righteousness would be a violence to moral nature, for choice, consultation, agreement, are the ineradicable elements of morality and love. Original righteousness would be artificially induced righteousness, and there is no such righteousness in God's sight. No such immoral tour de force can be conceived as being perpetrated by a God of Love.

It is an axiom of morality that love must be consciously, freely, gladly given, that true righteousness must spring from loving obedience to the law. Love, to be real, must be the free choice of love, and a choice is a choice between alternatives. There had to be an alternative to loving God, for the creature whom God willed should love Him. God had to create that alternative to Himself, since it had to be there in the beginning, and since it had to be an alternative object of love, it would have to be created from the beginning by God with the power to attract man away from God.

God could not create another 'deity', separate from Himself and man, for that would mean, if the second 'deity' were created as good as God, it would not be an alternative. If it were created less good so that it would wish to draw men to

itself away from God, then it would be evil; since nothing good could desire that men should turn from God to it, and so God would be the creator of something evil, which is impossible. There had to be an alternative to God, other than a second deity separate from man. That the creature should be able to love itself, seems to be the only law by which God could secure the existence of a lawful alternative to Himself, and that this might be possible God had to create His creature man with some degree of self-centredness. Thus far even the staunchest upholders of original righteousness would go. They would all agree that there must have been some degree of self-adherence in the first man in order to make possible that real choice by which the moral worth of love's response is determined. Here, however, is the great question. What degree of self-adherence was necessary in the beginning in order to make possible that choice upon which the moral quality of love would depend?

It is obvious that the smaller the degree of self-adherence in the beginning, the greater the degree of God-adherence; the less the risk of choosing self, the greater the possibility of choosing God. We have already seen that a complete lack of self-adherence in the beginning would mean the complete moral worthlessness of the response to God. By how much, it seems, you increase the initial degree of self-adherence, by so much you increase the moral worth of the response to God, whereas, by how much you increase the initial degree of God-adherence,

by so much you decrease the moral worth of that response.

This somewhat mathematical way of figuring moral facts may seem artificial and misleading, but we know what is signified, and can we speak in any more appropriate or relevant manner which does not lead to the same end?

It may be answered to this particular way of arguing, if the moral worth of the creature's first response to God is determined by the large initial degree of self-adherence, and the small initial degree of God-adherence, does it not mean that the greatest worth of the response will be secured by a total initial self-adherence and by a total lack of God-adherence?

Is not this the end to which we are driven by sheer logic?

It may be replied that if it is, then it is at least in line with what the scientific theory of evolution suggests, namely, that the further back we go along the line of ancestry, the poorer in quality becomes the general moral response, receding further and further from the highest quality of true love, till it reaches the stage of thinly disguised self-centredness.

To this it may in turn be replied that if a completely self-centred organism is the logically morally necessary prelude to the creation of responsive love, how can any response of love to God proceed from what is, at first, devoid of any God-adherence whatsoever? A completely self-centred creature would be incapable, of any love at all: it could not even begin

to love. Have we extinguished morality by logic!?

How can supernatural love reveal itself to a creature originally disposed to please only itself? Is there any ground on which God can work, any point of contact, any bridge, as it were, over which He can pass to make His love known? We believe that even God could not reveal Himself as Love to a creature who had had no experience of love. Love from above, from the supernatural, could not be understood or responded to by man if there was not, first, love from below, from the natural, from man. We believe that God prepared for the revelation of Himself as Divine Love, by giving to man first the experience of human love. Love had to be known and experienced by man first, as between male and female, parent and child, etc., before God could hope to succeed in any appeal to man to obey Him for love's sake. Man, we may say, is led by God through the experience of earthly love, that he may be enabled to see and understand the beginning of the truth about God's nature.

This priority in time of the human experience of earthly love does not in any way diminish the importance of God's revelation, for earthly love is itself the divinely prepared vehicle wherein God has prepared the possibility of the lightning flash of His revelation of His character.

How precisely animal lust actually passed into human care and affection and love cannot be explained. We can only call it a miracle, an instance of God's eternal creative activity.

He made man in such a way that it could happen, and when it happened it was far more God's accomplishment than man's, in the sense that man but realised what had been arranged as a possibility by God in the beginning.

There are no grounds, however, for believing that when love first appeared, it appeared immediately at its highest or even at a high level amongst men, that human nature was at that moment miraculously reconstituted so that man became henceforth far more disposed to love than to be selfish. Love, we believe, in accordance with the laws of an evolving universe, was born in lowly fashion, having to struggle against the entrenched self-centredness of millions of years, and the burden of proof is upon those who believe otherwise.

Man was not first awakened to a sense of the supernatural, however, by his experience of earthly love. That experience provided him with the moral content with which to fill out his idea of the supernatural, but that idea itself flashed in upon him through the medium of the impact of the world of sub-human nature. It was in the context of that impingement of Nature upon the creature's soul that there was brought to birth the sense of the supernatural. Again, it was God's accomplishment rather than man's in the sense that man responded to Nature in a way which had been made possible by God for him in the beginning.

There were thus two channels through which God's

revelation was made to man. There was the world of sub-human nature, and the world of human relationships. The first was mainly the medium through which God awakened man's sense of the supernatural: the second was mainly the medium through which He gradually enabled him to fill his idea of the supernatural with a moral content.

Since we believe that man's first conception of the supernatural was determined by the nature of his relationship with sub-human and human nature, we have to ask what was the quality of that relationship when man first became aware of the supernatural? Since that moment is obscured by the thick mist of prehistory we have to resort to a probable hypothesis. It is that man's response to the whole of life, to his fellows and to sub-human nature alike, would be, at first, scarcely distinguishable from that of the beasts from which he had emerged. It would be, in other words, at first, almost wholly and instinctively a self-centred response, viz. to get pleasure and to avoid hurt.

This being the probable quality of man's first response to the natural, we assume that his first response to the supernatural would be on the same instinctive and self-centred level. We can see no reason for believing that the advent of anything so vague and disquieting as the sense of the numinous would immediately elicit a response of love from a creature who had

had no experience of love, or awaken in him a realisation that it was his duty to make that response.

Obedience at first, then, would be self-centred, concerned chiefly with getting pleasure and avoiding hurt. Nature's ability to give both pleasure and hurt would be identified at first with the ability and intention of the supernatural. The idea of the supernatural would change in accordance with the slow moralisation of human relationships. God at first would be made "in the image of man". Such anthropomorphism is not derogatory to religion. It was man's response to the revelation that God is at least like the best in man. Obedience to the supernatural would be correspondingly moralised. The demand for it would clash with the basic self-centredness and the rendering of it would be of greater moral value than the first self-centred obedience. Self-discipline, self-sacrifice would become increasingly possible and so would evil.

This process of understanding God through first understanding himself was only an initial stage for man. As soon as man perceived, under God, that God was Love, then he began to understand what love really was, for love was seen no longer merely in the light of human relationships, but in the light of God's dealings with nations and individuals, in creation, in providence, in forgiveness. If, for man, love had been for a short time, under God, a schoolmaster to lead men to God, it

now entered the school of God's love as that was revealed in the broad context of world history. In the light of that revelation the imperfections of human love were exposed, and man henceforth could only understand himself aright by understanding God aright. Since God is fully revealed only in Christ, only in Christ can man understand himself properly.

In a sense, therefore, man may be said to have been created in God's image only when he first perceived God was love, and obeyed Him for love's sake, and not when he was first created, or when he first sensed the supernatural and obeyed it self-centredly. The idea of special creation could hold with the idea that man was created immediately in God's image, for it saw man created immediately at the stage when he was able to respond with loving obedience. The image of God, like true freedom, and true righteousness may be said to have been born late, and to have increased only as God led man slowly and painfully out of his initial self-centredness into the life of love, the love of man, and the love of God, in response to the revealed knowledge of the love of God for man.

We know that love can change self-centredness into its opposite, but only by way of self-revelation, appeal, help, encouragement, warning, punishment, self-sacrifice. Love, however, always stops short at the citadel of the beloved's will. Further than that it cannot go. According to the revelation of

God in the Incarnation, that is how He deals with self-centredness. It is how He bids His children deal with it now. There cannot be two ways open to love to change self-centredness. We know this one by experience and revelation. Any other must be by speculation only. If the essence of true righteousness is obedience by free choice, then, since the first man, if he was made originally righteous by God without being consulted, would not himself have freely chosen to reject his previous self-centredness, his righteousness would not be true righteousness.

It might be asked, if God had it in His power then to make a creature righteous, to change its disposition without consulting it, i.e., not by way of the creature's response, but by way of His own divine fiat, why does He not still so act? The mere accident of chronology, the mere difference between the first and succeeding members of a series would scarcely constitute a reason for change in the Divine tactics.

Moreover, if it is believed that the reason for God's creation of original righteousness was to make it easier for man to resist temptation, there is, in the nature of the case, no evidence available by which we may judge whether in fact it was so made easier for him. We only know that, if God did make man originally righteous, it had the same result as if man had not been so made. Man failed to resist temptation.

Again, if it is believed that original righteousness was

creative love's device for making it easier for the creature to resist temptation, it has to be acknowledged that it might indeed have had that result, but it would also have made it easier for God to elicit a response of love from His creature. It would not be as difficult for God to persuade a creature to be righteous, who had a will already disposed to obey Him, as it would be to persuade one whose will was still wholly disposed to please self rather than another. In creating man originally righteous God would not thus give to man every possible chance of refusing to obey Him, and this is a moral obligation even for God. Any obedience which man might render, therefore, by virtue of original righteousness would be less costly to himself in self-sacrifice, and consequently less precious to God than an obedience won from one less disposed to obey God and more disposed to please self. The doctrine thus reflects on the quality of God's love, on the risk He was prepared to take in seeking to win that love and obedience from His creature which He desired. Original righteousness means that God weighted the moral scales in His own favour in an immoral fashion.

There is this further general consideration. The whole line of development prior to man's appearance militates against the "likelihood of original righteousness". If God spent hundreds of millions of years, as we reckon time, preparing the vehicle for man's consciousness of Himself, would He, when a creature was at last touched by Him into awareness of a

supernatural world, rush His fences, as it were, and change, at a stroke, the disposition which had thus been so patiently evolved in order that it might be worked upon by His love? If that disposition was the special material which He had been at such pains to prepare in order to wrestle out of it, by love, a response of love, what reason could there be for an act which determined the disposition in any degree without any such wrestling of love?

We are only too well aware of the danger of analogies drawn from physical processes to illustrate spiritual truth, but the process of creation prior to man's appearance entitles us to speak of God's patience. Are we abusing the analogy if we suggest that the creation of any righteousness by a mere fiat, would represent an impatience on God's part?

If it is morally possible for God to enter only into a moral relationship of love with His creatures whom He desires should love Him in response, then He is morally confined to one only way of dealing with self-centredness. Here we must repeat what we have said once already. God must first of all seek to make Himself known, for response depends on, and can only follow, revelation and vision. The will and the desire must not be touched before the consciousness is illuminated. Love of God can only truly come after the vision or knowledge of God. Righteousness can only follow upon illumination. This is not

to suggest that we need only to know God's character and purpose, in order to obey. We need His grace to help us do what we believe it is His will we should do, but enabling grace is given after the grace of illumination.

The purpose of illumination or revelation or vision is to change the desire, that of enabling grace to strengthen the will to realise the desire so induced.

Man's response must be a response to a vision. This is vital, if love is to be conceived as we know it by revelation and experience, so far as its moral implications are concerned; and if man's vision of God was subject to the same law of growth as characterised the whole physical and mental process before him and in him, then the vision which elicited the desire for righteousness and love, as well as the power from on high which enabled him in a degree to realise his desire, these represent later stages in man's pilgrimage and not his initial spiritual state.

There is one very simple consideration which makes the doctrine of original righteousness suspect. It is so simple that it is itself apt to be suspect. We may assert as loudly and as learnedly as we like that God made man originally righteous, i.e. originally more disposed to obey God than to please self, but the fall proves that the will that fell was originally more disposed to please self than to please God. If it was not, then it could not have fallen.

The Genesis story of Adam is consonant with the account of man's original disposition as that is suggested by the account of his ascent from the beasts. The Genesis writer could only conceive of Adam as a special creation, yet in spite of this, he was compelled to represent Adam as doing what he could only have done if he had been originally more disposed to please self than to obey God. The Bible represents Adam as a self-centred creature: and such we believe man was in his beginning by God's design.

4. The bearing of the idea of original self-centredness on (a) the fall, (b) original sin, (c) freedom, (d) the Incarnation, the Resurrection, the Atonement.

(a) The Fall.

What, then, of the doctrine of the fall? Obviously as this doctrine has been traditionally expounded, it is inconsistent with any rejection of the traditional ideas of original righteousness and original sin. We cannot fit in the old doctrine of the fall with a doctrine of original self-centredness. The fact that every man was once innocent of moral wrong, that once he sinned for the first time, and soon discovered that one sin made the next easier, this is not the doctrine of the fall of the human race; for it was not mere innocence that was supposed to have vanished with the fall. Innocence could have co-existed with sheer animal self-centredness, as we know in the case of a child now. The fall was believed to have altered man's disposition to what it is now, and we have seen why we cannot believe this.

If on moral grounds, we believe that God Himself ordained that each man should begin with self-centredness as the bulk of his original constitution, then we may believe, with Temple and other evolutionists, that the first encounter with the demands of the moral and spiritual law would almost, but not quite, inevitably lead to transgression. Sin would be a probability. It would, in fact, be "too probable not to happen". It can never, however, be reckoned as necessary or inevitable.

The distinction in thought here may be a fine one, but it is necessary, as Temple held, in order to safeguard God against a charge of being responsible for actual sin. His responsibility for the high degree of probability of sin is precisely the moral obligation incumbent upon Divine Love which we have noticed.

Over against this divinely ordained probability, however, we have to place the fact that as soon as God lit "the lamp of the human consciousness of Himself," He was in action to diminish the probability of sin. His action is what we call grace. That God helps men to fight against temptation right from the beginning is the belief which cancels any belief that sin is in any way necessary to man's final perfection. God would never be found fighting against what was necessary.

Original righteousness, the fall, original sin, these three ideas are all linked together, and are based ultimately on a particular conception of Divine Love. It was because that love was conceived in a simple manner, as being concerned primarily to

make things easy for man, that man was conceived as having been created with a nature and disposition different from that which was perceived to be the common lot of man. It was because his original nature was so conceived that the existing universal condition was deemed to be the consequence of some primal disaster.

Once we analyse the obligation facing Divine Love in the work of creating souls who should respond with love, we see that that love has to be conceived differently from this traditional idea. Once that traditional idea of Love is seen to be false, the old trinity of inter-dependent doctrines is seen to be no longer tenable in their traditional form.

In short, once we perceive that God had to make men originally self-centred, and that that idea, incidentally, fits in with what science indicated as the probable condition of the first human being, then original righteousness has to go and with it the idea of a fall of such a nature that it involved the whole of the human race in the consequence of self-centredness or original sin. What we are faced with is not the traditional picture of the fall, but the picture of each individual having to fight, with God's help, against a disposition with which God originally endowed him, that disposition being the morally necessary prelude to the emergence in man of the real self-sacrifice involved in the moral choice of serving God rather than self.

(b) Original Sin.

How does this attitude to original righteousness affect our thought about original sin?

This latter doctrine was constructed to account for that weight of self-centredness which makes obedience to God difficult and disobedience easy - the bias to evil as it has been called. We have seen how it seemed impossible to many to believe that a God of love would make man originally like that. His original disposition, it was thought, must have been different. He must have been created originally righteous.

That which original sin was conceived to stand for, is thus seen to be identical with the very disposition which we have declared to be originally God-created: It was that which God was morally bound to give man at the beginning: namely the tendency to please self rather than the other than self.

In so far as the condition described as original sin has been traditionally believed to represent a condition not originally belonging to man, but cleaving to him only as the result of first sin, we are under a clear obligation to cease from using the phrase in this connection. In saying this, we do not cease to be aware of the terrible morally weakening effect of sin upon our nature, of the vast separation from God and man worked by sin. The cumulative effects of sin are terrible realities; but these effects work in a nature which at first was more prone to serve self than God, when it was met by God's demands for self-

sacrifice.

Man's initial proneness to please self, in other words, would only be sin if it was the result of sin. Since it was not the result of sin (though it can be intensified by sin) it cannot be called, original sin. The condition remains with us, but it ought to be renamed, not primarily because of what evolutionists may have to tell us of the nature which man has inherited from the brutes, but primarily because it is seen to have been determined by the very nature of Divine Love in the beginning. Our bias to self is not original sin, for it is an original bias, and what is original in man is of God.

(c) Freedom.

The question of freedom must be discussed in relation to the question "Why was it morally incumbent on God to create man originally self-centred, i.e. more disposed to please self than to please God?"

We have to state our belief at the outset that the doctrine of original righteousness seriously complicates the problem of freedom. If man was created out of the beasts by God and endowed with original righteousness, it means that prior to such creation either the creature from which God evolved him, was free to choose to become righteous or not, but that God overrode its freedom by an arbitrary act, in which case He abused that freedom, or the creature was not free to choose to become righteous, but God made

it righteous independently of any such freedom, in which case God abused the virtue of righteousness by separating it from its moral ground, namely, freedom.

God created man in order that he might respond with love to His love. As Christians, we can only speak of freedom in relation to man's choosing to realise this purpose. The phrase "Whose service is perfect freedom" expresses perfectly the Christian conception of freedom. It is freedom from whatever has the power to prevent us from loving God perfectly. What is it that has such power? It is that complex of spiritual allegiances which is represented under the phrase "the world, the flesh and the devil". Whatever is capable of drawing man's love and loyalty away from God is the cause of un-freedom.

If it was God's plan to call men into love, it means that He willed to call men into love of Himself, out of what was not love for Him. That is, God's will was to draw men to Himself, from someone else. That it was possible for man to respond must be assumed.

Freedom for man is to serve God. Unfreedom, therefore, is to serve someone else. Man begins by loving solely himself. Since this is the love from which he is to be made free in order that he may find the highest freedom in loving God, he may be said to begin by being bound, and to move onward and upward by God's grace into the freedom destined by God for him. Man begins in unfreedom - the unfreedom of self love - not in freedom.

Freedom, it has been said (by R.S.Moxon and others), is gained and unfreedom is lost, as man enters willingly into the life of loving and serving God.

There are some who would represent the first sin as man's first act of emancipation - the first blow struck for freedom and independence against the tyranny of external law and authority. In one sense, sin is an expression of freedom- but only of the freedom which, Berdyaev says, exists prior to choice. This is the basic non-moral freedom without which sin and virtue alike would be impossible. One may call it mechanical freedom, in contrast with the dynamic freedom of the life of self-surrender to God. It is freedom to become. It is not the freedom of being somewhat.

St. Augustine called this mechanical freedom, "initial freedom" or "libertas minor". And it is this freedom presumably to which Berdyaev refers when he speaks of the freedom which is grounded in the void, in the abyss from which the dark stream of life issues forth, "Freedom", he says, "is not created because it is not part of nature, it is prior to the world and has its origin in the primal void".

To use this freedom in order to serve self, instead of God, is to use mechanical freedom so as to lose the possible freedom of God's service.

It is to use mechanical freedom in order to serve self and so to become bound in the unfreedom of self-contradiction. To act

like this therefore does not assert the higher kind of freedom (*libertas major*) as belonging already to man. It only reveals the possession of mechanical freedom (the basic freedom which is part of the essential mechanics of the moral life) and the use of that freedom to become bound in the unfreedom of the service of self.

There is, thus, something ambiguous and ultimately wrong in calling the first sin, a blow struck for freedom, for while it reveals the fact of mechanical freedom it only gains freedom from God's service at the cost of being bound more securely in the service of self and, in experience, such freedom is discovered to be not worth having, to be, in fact, the very worst kind of bondage.

We may say that man is free (i.e. mechanically), to be free either from serving God or from serving self. And this means that man begins already in one service, and is free to remain in that service or to transfer to another service. He cannot be conceived as being initially in no state of service or allegiance whatsoever. No creature about to become a moral creature can be conceived as being free to begin to be in service either to God or to self. It is freedom either to become other than he is already, or to remain what he is already. It is never freedom to become either of two things, neither of which he is at the moment in the beginning.

To win freedom from self is God's purpose. It can only

be won if one is already in bondage to self. Thus they are right who say that man does not begin in freedom, but that he wins his freedom. Righteousness is freedom gained from the service of self, in the service of God. Hence true freedom is best described in the words of the Anglican Catechism, "A death unto sin, and a new birth unto righteousness."

Original righteousness is thus seen to involve the idea that a considerable degree of freedom from the service of self (*libertas major*) has been gained without the exercise of initial or mechanical freedom (*libertas minor*). But it was this latter kind of freedom with which God endowed man so as to enable him morally to gain the higher freedom. Original righteousness thus involves God in a moral contradiction. Freedom in being gained without any exercise of freedom-to-choose, constitutes a violation of the (moral) purpose for which freedom to choose was made an integral part of man's being.

What purpose could be served in giving to man, readymade, a measure of that dynamic freedom-in-being, which ought to have been gained by the exercise of initial freedom? It means that God took no heed of that which we know, in the depths of our being, must be heeded by God if morality is to be real and no sham. It cannot be believed that the fons et origo of all morality would act thus.

Such a consideration of the meaning of freedom, brief though it be, only serves to reiterate the conviction already stated, namely, it was a moral obligation incumbent upon God to create man

initially with the disposition from which He willed to redeem him - viz. self-centredness.

(d) The Incarnation, the Resurrection, and the Atonement.

We suggested at the beginning of this essay that it was the sight of the far reaching implications of new knowledge about man's beginnings that kept back many from the task of seeking to reconcile that knowledge with the cardinal doctrines of our faith.

The purpose of the essay has been to relate such knowledge to the old doctrines of man's original state, his fall, and the consequences. We have seen, however, that those doctrines would appear to need revision not only in the light of what we now know concerning man's origin, but also, and, we believe, chiefly, in the light of a courageous re-examination of the moral obligation incumbent upon Divine Love in the creation of man. It is the nature of Divine Love that really determines the belief that man was created originally self-centred, that is, originally disposed to please self rather than any other, and not just a consideration of his ascent from the beasts.

We are not obliged to go on and treat in detail, the bearing of this belief upon the central doctrines of the Incarnation, the Resurrection, and the Atonement. One or two observations, however, may not be out of place.

The Incarnation and Atonement do not depend for their truth upon the particular idea of the pre-fall state of man. It was the condition of sin, not any pre-sin condition, which determined

God's action, and which is therefore pivotal for these doctrines. Traditionalists may insist that the Atonement deals with sin by restoring a lost grace upon human nature. We may assert that it deals with sin by bestowing a new grace on man: but whether God restores a lost grace, or bestows a new one, in Christ, He gives it, and that is what is essentially true and fundamental in the doctrine of the Atonement.

So far as the doctrine of the Resurrection is concerned it may seem at first sight that the view outlined here would affect that doctrine adversely. That is not the case. If the ability to overcome death was an original endowment of man which was lost by sin, then it was restored in Christ by virtue of His sinlessness. If the ability was not an original endowment but one to be gained by victory over sin, then it was bestowed in Christ by virtue of His victory over it. Whether God restored the ability, or bestowed it, in Christ, He did give it in His Son, and that is what is essentially true and fundamental in the doctrine of the Resurrection.

It may be thought that while our view may not make sin either inevitable or necessary, it yet minimises the seriousness of sin. Surely, it might be argued, it is less serious to yield to what, on our view, was God-ordained (a large degree of self-centredness) than it is to yield to what has always been held to be man-created (a large degree of self-centredness). The answer is, we

cannot argue that it is less serious to yield to what God created and ordained should be resisted (however small or great the degree) than it is to yield to what God did not create but which it is equally His will should be resisted. Whether God or man was responsible for the large degree of self-centredness in man makes no difference to the seriousness of yielding to it, for whatever its origin, God commands us to resist it. The seriousness of sin consists in its being a yielding to that which God commands us to resist. It does not depend upon who was responsible for that to the yielding of which is sin.

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